Analyses processes of democratization and economic reform in five Latin American countries from the early 1980s to 1993.

This book takes a powerful new approach to a question central to comparative politics and economics: Why do some leaders of fragile democracies attain political success--culminating in reelection victories--when pursuing drastic, painful economic reforms while others see their political careers implode? Kurt Weyland examines, in particular, the surprising willingness of presidents in four Latin American countries to enact daring reforms and the unexpected resultant popular support. He argues that only with the robust cognitive-psychological insights of prospect theory can one fully account for the twists and turns of politics and economic policy in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela during the 1980s and 1990s. Assessing conventional approaches such as rational choice, Weyland concludes that prospect theory is vital to any systematic attempt to understand the politics of market reform. Under this theory, if actors perceive themselves to be in a losing situation they are inclined toward risks; if they see a winning situation around them, they prefer caution. In Latin America, Weyland finds, where the public faced an open crisis it backed draconian reforms. And where such reforms yielded an apparent economic recovery, many citizens and their leaders perceived prospects of gains. Successful leaders thus won reelection and the new market model achieved political sustainability. Weyland concludes this accessible book by considering when his novel approach can be used to study crises generally and how it might be applied to a wider range of cases from Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe.

Over the last twenty years Latin America has seen a definitive movement toward civilian rule. Significant trade, fiscal, and monetary reforms have accompanied this shift, exposing previously state-led economies to the forces of the market. Despite persistent economic and political hardships, the combination of civilian regimes and market-based strategies has proved to be remarkably resilient and still dominates the region. This book focuses on the effects of market reforms on domestic politics in Latin America. While considering civilian rule as a constant, the book examines and compares domestic political responses in six countries that embraced similar packages of reforms in the 1980s—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. The contributors focus on how ambitious measures such as liberalization, privatization, and deregulation yielded mixed results in these countries and in doing so they identify three main patterns of political economic adjustment. In Argentina and Chile, the implementation of market reforms has gone hand in hand with increasingly competitive politics. In Brazil and Mexico, market reforms helped to catalyze transitions from entrenched authoritarian rule. Finally, in Peru and Venezuela, traditional political systems have collapsed and civilian rule has been repeatedly challenged. The contributors include Carol Wise (University of Southern California), Karen L. Remmer (Duke University), Carol Graham (Brookings Institution), Stefano Pettinato (United Nations Development Programme), Consuelo Cruz (Tufts University), Juan E. Corradi (New York University), Delia M. Boylan (Chicago Public Radio), Riordan Roett (Johns Hopkins University), Martín Tanaka (Institute for Peruvian Studies, Lima), and Kenneth M. Roberts (University of New Mexico).

In Eastern Europe and Latin America two trends are under way: 1) far-reaching reforms to convert economies from inward-oriented, state-dominated models to more open, market-driven approaches; and 2) efforts to consolidate democratic political openings replacing earlier authoritarian regimes. These reforms often conflict, yet paradoxically the success of each is crucial to the other. Building on earlier case studies in both regions this volume explores issues common to both regions and critical to the prospects of economic and political reforms, with contributions from Joan Nelson, Jacek Kochanowicz, Kalman Mizsei, and Oscar Munoz.

Latin American democracies of the sixties and seventies, most theories hold, collapsed because they had become incompatible with the structural requirements of capitalist development. In this groundbreaking application of game theory to political phenomena, Youssef Cohen argues that structural conditions in Latin American countries did not necessarily preclude the implementation of social and economic reforms within a democratic framework. Focusing on the experiences of Chile and Brazil, Cohen argues that what thwarted democratic reforms in Latin America was a classic case of prisoner's dilemma. Moderates on the left and the right knew the benefits of coming to a mutual agreement on socio-economic reforms. Yet each feared that, if it cooperated, the other side could gain by colluding with the radicals. Unwilling to take this risk, moderate groups in both countries splintered and joined the extremists. The resulting disorder opened the way for military control. Cohen further argues that, in general, structural explanations of political phenomena are inherently flawed; they incorrectly assume that beliefs, preferences, and actions are caused by social, political, and economic structures. One cannot explain political outcomes, Cohen argues, without treating beliefs and preferences as partly independent from structures, and as having a causal force in their own right.

In recent years first Chile, then Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have abandoned decades-old authoritarian political regimes and state-directed economic strategies and moved toward democratized politics and freer markets. This volume seeks to understand the key roles of "technopols"--technically skilled, politically savvy leaders--in these transformations. It is based in part on elite interviews with each of the leaders discussed: Domingo Cavallo of Argentina, Pedro Aspe of Mexico, Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, and Evelyn Matthei and Alejandro Foxley of Chile. All are major social scientists turned politicians who, the authors argue here, have themselves contributed to the formulation of the ideas that they eventually came to implement in their respective governments. Contributors are Jorge I. Domínguez, Javier Corrales, Stephanie R. Cobb, João Resende-Santos, Delia M. Boylan, and Jeanne Kinney Giraldo.

The first part of the volume addresses the changing nature and interaction of the state and the market in Latin American countries, as well as the principal challenges of consolidating political and economic reform in a period of profound change. The second part of the book examines a variety of traditional and non-traditional political roles, ranging from the military to women, and from the environmental lobby to human rights. It explores the ways in which the changing composition of the political debate is shaping the political arena. Forward looking in its approach, to volume provides readers with an indication of factors which will be of key significance in the immediate future, the tensions which have yet to be resolved and the prospects ahead.

While there is much literature analyzing the politics of implementing economic reforms, very little has been written on the social and political consequences of such reforms after they have been implemented. The basic premise of this book is that the convergence of many social, economic, and political ills (such as high levels of poverty, income inequality, criminal violence, and the growth of the informal sector) in the context of unprecedented levels of political democratization in Latin America presents a paradox that needs to be explained. What Kind of Democracy? demonstrates how the myriad social problems throughout the region are intimately linked both to a new economic development model and the weaknesses of Latin American democracy. This volume brings together prominent scholars from Canada, the United States, and Latin America, representing several different disciplines to analyze ongoing processes of economic, social, and political change in the region. The contributors are Werner Baer, Manuel Barrera, Juan Alberto Fuentes, Yoshiaki Nakano, Claudio Paiva, Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, Jean-François Prud'homme, Jorge Schvarzer, Francisco Weffort, and Francisco Zapata.

Market reforms in Latin America have resulted in a variety of outcomes, which have often been disappointing. This books studies market reforms in eight key Latin American countries, aiming to shed light on the question of why similar policies have resulted in a variety of outcomes, ranging from outright failures to clear successes. The book focuses on policy implementation and the factors that impinge on the sustainability of market reforms. The findings provide a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate on the reasons for market reform 'fatigue'.