This book defends the correspondence theory of truth by developing a new account of the relationship between truth and reality.

Necessary Existence breaks ground on one of the deepest questions anyone ever asks: why is there anything? The classic answer is in terms of a necessary foundation. Yet, why think that is the correct answer? Pruss and Rasmussen present an original defense of the hypothesis that there is a concrete necessary being capable of providing a foundation for the existence of things. They offer six main arguments, divided into six chapters. The first argument is an up-to-date presentation and assessment of a traditional causal-based argument from contingency. The next five arguments are new "possibility-based" arguments that make use of twentieth-century advances in modal logic. The arguments present possible pathways to an intriguing and far-reaching conclusion. The final chapter answers the most challenging objections to the existence of necessary things.

This book develops new techniques in formal epistemology and applies them to the challenge of Cartesian skepticism. It introduces two formats of epistemic evaluation that should be of interest to epistemologists and philosophers of science: the dual-component format, which evaluates a statement on the basis of its safety and informativeness, and the relative-divergence format, which evaluates a probabilistic model on the basis of its complexity and goodness of fit with data. Tomoji Shogenji shows that the former lends support to Cartesian skepticism, but the latter allows us to defeat Cartesian skepticism. Along the way, Shogenji addresses a number of related issues in epistemology and philosophy of science, including epistemic circularity, epistemic closure, and inductive skepticism.

The concept of truthmaking is attracting much attention in contemporary metaphysics. This work asks how the truthmaker principle should be formulated, whether it is well motivated, whether it genuinely has the explanatory roles claimed for it, and whether more modest principles might serve just as well.

What is truth? What role does truth play in the connections between language and the world? What is the relationship between truth and being? The Metaphysics of Truth tackles these fundamental philosophical questions and develops a distinctive metaphysical worldview. Moreover, it does so in a climate where the traditionally central issue of the nature of truth has diminished in significance due to the rise of deflationary and primitivist views, which deny that there are interesting and informative things to say about truth. Douglas Edwards responds to these views, and demonstrates the importance of the metaphysics of truth with regard to both the study of truth itself, and metaphysical debates more generally. He also develops a detailed pluralist metaphysical approach, which starts with the diversity of different subject areas, and holds that there are different relationships between language and the world in different areas, or 'domains'. He develops a pluralist approach which explains what domains are; how different domains are individuated; which metaphysical frameworks apply in different domains; and how truth plays a key role in the picture. The picture is extended to incorporate ontological pluralism - the idea that there are different ways of being - which increases the explanatory power of the view. Edwards gives particular attention to important domains which have not yet received a great deal of attention in debates about truth, namely the institutional and social domains, and thus connects work on the metaphysics of truth and being to key issues in social construction.

The Third International Kant Congress met at the University of Rochester from March 30 through April 4, 1970. Over two hundred students of Kant's philosophy from Europe, Africa, and North and South America attended. The Congress was organized by a Committee consisting of Gottfried Martin of the University of Bonn and myself as co-chairmen, and the following members: Professors Ingeborg Heidemann (Bonn), Gerhard Funke (Mainz), Edmond Ortigues (Rennes), Stephan Korner (Bristol), W.H. Walsh (Edinburgh), George A. Schrader, Jr. (Yale), and John R. Silber (University of Texas). Generous financial support for the Congress was provided by Mr. Kilian J. Schmitt of Rochester. One hundred and eight papers were presented in six plenary and twenty two concurrent sessions. Chairmen of programs, in addition to members of the Committee, were: Professors John E. Atwell, Douglas P. Dryer, A.R.C. Duncan, Stanley G. French, Klaus Hartmann, Robert L. Hol mes, Peter Jones, George L. Kline, Peter Krausser, Robert G. Miller, John D. McFarland, Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, Charles M. Sherover, Ernst Konrad Specht, Dietrich Schulz, Giorgio Tonelli, Robert Tredwell, Kurt Weinberg, James B. Wilbur, and Arnulf Zweig.

This book defends the correspondence theory of truth by developing a new account of the relationship between truth and reality.

Mark Jago offers a new metaphysical account of truth. He argues that to be true is to be made true by the existence of a suitable worldly entity. Truth arises as a relation between a proposition - the content of our sayings, thoughts, beliefs, and so on - and an entity (or entities) in the world.

American pragmatist Rorty and the French analytic philosopher Engel present their radically different perspectives on truth and its correspondence to reality. "What's the Use of Truth?" is a rare opportunity to experience each side of this impassioned debate clearly and concisely.

Blake E. Hestir's examination of Plato's conception of truth challenges a long tradition of interpretation in ancient scholarship.