The legal meaning of bankruptcy and insolvency law has often remained elusive, even to practitioners and scholars in the field, despite having been enshrined in Canada’s Constitution since Confederation. Federal jurisdiction in this area must be measured against provincial powers over property and civil rights, among others. Debt and Federalism traces changing conceptions of the bankruptcy and insolvency power through four landmark cases that form the constitutional foundation of the Canadian bankruptcy system: the 1894 Voluntary Assignments Case, Royal Bank of Canada v Larue in 1928, the 1934 Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act Reference Case, and the 1937 Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act Reference Case. Together, these decisions ultimately produced the bedrock for modern understandings of bankruptcy and insolvency law. Thomas G.W. Telfer and Virginia Torrie draw on archival and legal sources to analyze the decisions from a historical and doctrinal perspective. This astute book demonstrates that the legal changes introduced by these landmark cases underpin contemporary bankruptcy and insolvency law and scholarship.

Debt crises have placed strains not only on the European Union's nascent federal system but also on the federal system in the United States. Old confrontations over fiscal responsibility are being renewed, often in a more virulent form, in places as far flung as Detroit, Michigan, and Valencia, Spain, to say nothing of Greece and Cyprus. Increasing the complexity of the issue has been public sector collective bargaining, now a component of most federal systems. The attendant political controversies have become the debate of a generation. Paul Peterson and Daniel Nadler have assembled experts from both sides of the Atlantic to break down the structural flaws in federal systems of government that have led to economic and political turmoil. Proposed solutions offer ways to preserve and restore vibrant federal systems that meet the needs of communities struggling for survival in an increasingly unified global economy. Contributors: Andrew G. Biggs (American Enterprise Institute); César Colino (National Distance Education University, Madrid); Eloísa del Pino (Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos, Madrid); Henrik Enderlein (Hertie School of Governance, Berlin); Cory Koedel (University of Missouri); Carlos Xabel Lastra-Anadón (Harvard University); Daniel Nadler (Harvard University); Shawn Ni (University of Missouri); Amy Nugent (Government of Ontario, Canada); James Pearce (Mowat Centre, University of Toronto, Canada); Paul E. Peterson (Harvard University); Michael Podgursky (University of Missouri); Jason Richwine (Washington, D.C.); Jonathan Rodden (Stanford Uni versity); Daniel Shoag (Harvard University); Richard Simeon (University of Toronto, Canada); Camillo von Müller (University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, and Leuphana University, Germany); Daniel Ziblatt (Harvard University)

The Global Financial Crisis has led to a renewed attention for the management of public debt and deficits of advanced and developing industrial states. To successfully deal with such problems of public finances raises particular concerns in federal states where fiscal competencies are split between two levels of government. This book offers comparative in-depth knowledge of political struggles related to fiscal consolidation policies in eleven federal states since the 1990s, including the Global Financial Crisis and its aftermath. It identifies conditions that lead to "robust" solutions that can both commit federal actors to prudent fiscal policy-making and avoid conflicts between federal actors that cause federal instability. This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of political economy and comparative politics in general and comparative federalism and EU Politics in particular.

America is mired in debt—more than $30,000 for every man, woman, and child. Bitter fighting over deficits, taxes, and spending bedevils Washington, D.C., even as partisan gridlock has brought the government to the brink of default. Yet the more politicians on both sides of the aisle rant and the citizenry fumes, the more things seem to remain the same. In White House Burning, Simon Johnson and James Kwak—authors of the national best seller 13 Bankers and cofounders of The Baseline Scenario, a widely cited blog on economics and public policy—demystify the national debt, explaining whence it came and, even more important, what it means to you and to future generations. They tell the story of the Founding Fathers’ divisive struggles over taxes and spending. They chart the rise of the almighty dollar, which makes it easy for the United States to borrow money. They account for the debasement of our political system in the 1980s and 1990s, which produced today’s dysfunctional and impotent Congress. And they show how, if we persist on our current course, the national debt will harm ordinary Americans by reducing the number of jobs, lowering living standards, increasing inequality, and forcing a sudden and drastic reduction in the government services we now take for granted. But Johnson and Kwak also provide a clear and compelling vision for how our debt crisis can be solved while strengthening our economy and preserving the essential functions of government. They debunk the myth that such crucial programs as Social Security and Medicare must be slashed to the bone. White House Burning looks squarely at the burgeoning national debt and proposes to defuse its threat to our well-being without forcing struggling middle-class families and the elderly into poverty. Carefully researched and informed by the same compelling storytelling and lucid analysis as 13 Bankers, White House Burning is an invaluable guide to the central political and economic issue of our time. It is certain to provoke vigorous debate.

This work explores how entrepreneurial activity developed in the USA, and how federal and state politics facilitated or limited it. It analyses the implications of cities creating innovative, quasi-governments to circumvent state control over city finances.

The ability of a nation to finance its basic infrastructure is essential to its economic well-being in the 21st century. This book covers the municipal securities market in the United States from the perspective of its primary capital financing role in

Delegating fiscal decision making power to sub-national governments has been an area of interest for both academics and policymakers given the expectation that it may lead to better and more efficient provision of public goods and services. Decentralization has, however, often occurred on the expenditure and less on the revenue side, creating “vertical fiscal imbalances” where sub-national governments’ expenditures are not financed through their own revenues. The mismatch between own revenues and expenditures may have consequences for public finance performance. This study constructs a large sample of general and subnational level fiscal data beginning in 1980 from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. Extending the literature to the balance sheet approach, this paper examines the effects of vertical fiscal imbalances on government debt. The results indicate that vertical fiscal imbalances are relevant in explaining government debt accumulation suggesting a degree of caution when promoting fiscal decentralization. This paper also underlines the role of data covering the general government and its subectors for comprehensive analysis of fiscal performance.

The American national debt stands at $20.49 trillion as of January 2018, or roughly $63,000 for every person in the United States. The national debt has grown six-fold in the past 25 years, and borrowing only has accelerated in recent administrations. What are the factors driving such unrestrained borrowing? Is American fiscal policy different now than in an earlier era? Is there a moral dimension to public debt and, if so, how can that dimension be measured? Public Debt and the Common Good addresses these and other questions by looking to the fiscal policy of the American states. Drawing on classical themes and the longest quantitative review of state debt in the literature, James Odom expertly integrates institutional analysis with dimensions of culture to define the parameters of political freedom in a theoretically coherent way. In doing so, Odom argues that centralization and injustice, or the incapacity for the common good, can help explain state indebtedness. Contributing to ongoing scholarly debates on public debt theory, this book will be of interest to students, scholars, and practitioners who work at the intersection of political philosophy and economics, as well as those who specialize in state public policy, state politics, and federalism more generally.

This report examines the possibility of the federal government reaching its statutory debt limit and not raising it, with a particular focus on government operations. First, the report explains the nature of the federal government's debt, the processes associated with federal borrowing, and historical events that may influence prospective actions. It also includes an analysis of what could happen if the federal government may no longer issue debt, has exhausted alternative sources of cash, and, therefore, depends on incoming receipts or other sources of funds to provide any cash needed to liquidate federal obligations. Finally this report lays out considerations for increasing the debt limit under current policy and what impact fiscal policy could have on the debt limit going forward.