A central puzzle in jurisprudence has been the role of custom in law. Custom is simply the practices and usages of distinctive communities. But are such customs legally binding? Can custom be law, even before it is recognized by authoritative legislation or precedent? And, assuming that custom is a source of law, what are its constituent elements? Is proof of a consistent and long-standing practice sufficient, or must there be an extra ingredient - that the usage is pursued out of a sense of legal obligation, or, at least, that the custom is reasonable and efficacious? And, most tantalizing of all, is custom a source of law that we should embrace in modern, sophisticated legal systems, or is the notion of law from below outdated, or even dangerous, today? This volume answers these questions through a rigorous multidisciplinary, historical, and comparative approach, offering a fresh perspective on custom's enduring place in both domestic and international law.

Although many modern philosophers of law describe custom as merely a minor source of law, formal law is actually only one source of the legal customs that govern us. Many laws grow out of custom, and one measure of a law's success is by its creation of an enduring legal custom. Yet custom and customary law have long been neglected topics in unsettled jurisprudential debate. Smaller concerns, such as whether customs can be legitimized by practice or by stipulation, stipulated by an authority or by general consent, or dictated by law or vice versa, lead to broader questions of law and custom as alternative or mutually exclusive modes of social regulation, and whether rational reflection in general ought to replace sub-rational prejudice. Can legal rules function without customary usage, and does custom even matter in society? The Philosophy of Customary Law brings greater theoretical clarity to the often murky topic of custom by showing that custom must be analyzed into two more logically basic concepts: convention and habit. James Bernard Murphy explores the nature and significance of custom and customary law, and how conventions relate to habits in the four classic theories of Aristotle, Francisco Suarez, Jeremy Bentham, and James C. Carter. He establishes that customs are conventional habits and habitual conventions, and allows us to better grasp the many roles that custom plays in a legal system by offering a new foundation of understanding for these concepts.

John M. Zane recommends this work, of which he comments "...the facts and ideas that are called legal can be studied with advantage from the same viewpoint as other branches of social phenomena, such as language, religion, folklore, or customs, that are not legal... The first chapter is called Methods of Jurisprudence, showing the manner in which law develops, sometimes in one way, sometimes in another...The next chapter deals with the particular factors of custom and legislation. It examines, without dogmatizing, the difference between the gradual acceptance of law by means of custom and the conscious, purposeful statement of a law by the law-making power. The next chapter takes a particular instance of the family organization as a fertile source of law in different stages. Finally the last chapter, entitled The Right of Appropriation, carries the discussion into the origins of property and the clashing interests of the individual in his freedom to acquire and contract as against the interests of the social organization. It is all in the easy method of a wise man talking, as if lecturing, upon topics, not seeking to exhaust, but to suggest. The book is stimulating. It will bear reading and rereading. Like all good books, it suggests more than it says..." John M. Zane, Yale Law Journal 35:1026-1027.

Some legal rules are not laid down by a legislator but grow instead from informal social practices. In contract law, for example, the customs of merchants are used by courts to interpret the provisions of business contracts; in tort law, customs of best practice are used by courts to define professional responsibility. Nowhere are customary rules of law more prominent than in international law. The customs defining the obligations of each State to other States and, to some extent, to its own citizens, are often treated as legally binding. However, unlike natural law and positive law, customary law has received very little scholarly analysis. To remedy this neglect, a distinguished group of philosophers, historians and lawyers has been assembled to assess the nature and significance of customary law. The book offers fresh insights on this neglected and misunderstood form of law.

Provides an in-depth study of the theory, history, practice, and interpretation of customary international law.

This Oxford Handbook examines the sources of international law, how the understanding of sources changed throughout the history of international law; how the main legal theories understood sources; the relationship between sources and the legitimacy of international law; and how sources differ across the various sub-areas of international law.

Because of its unique nature, the sources of international law are not always easy to identify and interpret. This book provides an ideal introduction to these sources for anyone needing to better understand where international law comes from. As well as looking at treaties and custom, the book will look at more modern and controversial sources.

Although customary international law has long been an important source of rights and obligations in international relations, there has been extensive debate in recent years about whether this body of law is equipped to address complex modern problems such as climate change, international terrorism, and global financial instability. In addition, there is growing uncertainty about how, precisely, international and domestic courts should identify rules of customary international law. Custom's Future seeks to address this uncertainty by providing a better understanding of how customary international law has developed over time, the way in which it is applied in practice, and the challenges that it faces going forward. Reflecting an interdisciplinary mix of historical, empirical, economic, philosophical, and doctrinal analysis, and containing chapters by leading international law experts, it will be of use to lawyers, judges, and researchers alike.

Fundamentals of Public International Law, by Giovanni Distefano, provides an overview of public international law’s main principles and fundamental institutions. By introducing the foundations of the legal reasoning underlying public international law, the extensive volume offers essential tools for any international lawyer, regardless of the specific field of specialization. Dealing expansively with subjects, sources and guarantees of international law, university students, scholars and practitioners alike will benefit from the book’s treatment of what has been called the “Institutes” of public international law.

A comprehensive and wide-ranging account of the interrelationship between law and literature in Anglo-Saxon, Medieval and Tudor England.