"Sharp exchange rate depreciations, or currency crashes, are associated with poor economic outcomes in industrial countries only when they are caused by inflationary macroeconomic policies. Moreover, the poor outcomes are attributable to inflationary policies in general and not the currency crashes in particular. On the other hand, crashes caused by rising unemployment or external deficits have always had good economic consequences with stable or falling inflation rates"--P. 1.

We analyze determinants of sovereign bond yields in 22 advanced economies over the 1980-2010 period using panel cointegration techniques. The application of cointegration methodology allows distinguishing between long-run (debt-to-GDP ratio, potential growth) and short-run (inflation, short-term interest rates, etc.) determinants of sovereign borrowing costs. We find that in the long-run, government bond yields increase by about 2 basis points in response to a 1 percentage point increase in government debt-to-GDP ratio and by about 45 basis points in response to a 1 percentage point increase in potential growth rate. In the short-run, sovereign bond yields deviate from the level determined by the long-run fundamentals, but about half of the deviation adjusts in one year. When considering the impact of the global financial crisis on sovereign borrowing costs in euro area countries, the estimations suggest that spreads against Germany in some European periphery countries exceeded the level determined by fundamentals in the aftermath of the crisis, while some North European countries have benefited from “safe haven” flows.

This is the introductory chapter to an NBER conference volume that examined the lessons to be drawn from the financial and currency crises of the late 1990s. The paper does not attempt to summarize the specific content of that meeting but provides the author's personal conclusions about crisis prevention and management. The first part of the paper deals with policies of the emerging market economies that affect the likelihood of crises, including exchange rate regimes, capital account convertibility, foreign exchange liabilities and reserves, domestic credit structure, and financial supervision. The paper then considers policies of industrial countries that affect the risk of crises in emerging market economies, including exchange rate instability, interest rates, banking supervision, trade policy, and the provision of a lender of last resort facility. The second half of the paper deals with the way that the crises were managed by the IMF and attempts to answer the following questions: (1) Have the crises been resolved, permitting the crisis countries to return to solid economic growth and to achieve renewed access to international capital markets? (2) Did the IMF stabilization policies resolve the crisis with as little economic pain as possible? (3) Did the agreed structural reforms actually occur and, if so, were they successful? (4) How did the experience of the crisis countries affect the incentives of lenders, borrowers, and countries facing crises in the future? (5) Were the actions of the IMF politically legitimate for an international agency? (6) What were the political consequences of the crises and the policies that followed?

Dabrowski (Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Poland) presents eight comparative papers from a research project carried by his organization between October 1999 and September 2001. The papers examine theoretical models and causes of currency crises; discuss issues of crisis management and the contagion effect; and explore social and political consequences of currency crises. Also included are case studies of 1990s currency crises in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova. Annotation 2004 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com).

Economists and policymakers are still trying to understand the lessons recent financial crises in Asia and other emerging market countries hold for the future of the global financial system. In this timely and important volume, distinguished academics, officials in multilateral organizations, and public and private sector economists explore the causes of and effective policy responses to international currency crises. Topics covered include exchange rate regimes, contagion (transmission of currency crises across countries), the current account of the balance of payments, the role of private sector investors and of speculators, the reaction of the official sector (including the multilaterals), capital controls, bank supervision and weaknesses, and the roles of cronyism, corruption, and large players (including hedge funds). Ably balancing detailed case studies, cross-country comparisons, and theoretical concerns, this book will make a major contribution to ongoing efforts to understand and prevent international currency crises.

The current account deficit of the United States is more than six percent of its gross domestic product—an all-time high. And the rest of the world, including other G7 countries such as Japan and Germany, must collectively run current account surpluses to finance this deficit. How long can such unevenness between imports and exports be sustained, and what form might their eventual reconciliation take? Putting forth scenarios ranging from a gradual correction to a crash landing for the dollar, G7 Current Account Imbalances brings together economists from around the globe to consider the origins, status, and future of those disparities. An esteemed group of collaborators here examines the role of the bursting of the dot-com bubble, the history of previous episodes of current account adjustments, and the possibility of the Euro surpassing the dollar as the leading international reserve currency. Though there are areas of broad agreement—that the imbalances will ultimately decline and that currency revaluations will be part of the solution—many areas of contention remain regarding both the dangers of imbalances and the possible forms of adjustment. This volume will be of tremendous value to economists, politicians, and business leaders alike as they look to the future of the G7 economies.

This paper proposes an approach to track US$1 trillion of emerging market government debt held by foreign investors in local and hard currency, based on a similar approach that was used for advanced economies (Arslanalp and Tsuda, 2012). The estimates are constructed on a quarterly basis from 2004 to mid-2013 and are available along with the paper in an online dataset. We estimate that about half a trillion dollars of foreign flows went into emerging market government debt during 2010–12, mostly coming from foreign asset managers. Foreign central bank holdings have risen as well, but remain concentrated in a few countries: Brazil, China, Indonesia, Poland, Malaysia, Mexico, and South Africa. We also find that foreign investor flows to emerging markets were less differentiated during 2010–12 against the background of near-zero interest rates in advanced economies. The paper extends some of the indicators proposed in our earlier paper to show how the investor base data can be used to assess countries’ sensitivity to external funding shocks and to track foreign investors’ exposures to different markets within a global benchmark portfolio.

This study addresses a fundamentally new feature of the contemporary world economy: the simultaneous buildup of very large public deficits and debt positions in virtually all of the advanced high-income countries. The recent global financial crisis sharply accelerated this fiscal deterioration, but it was already well underway in some countries, including the United States, where demographic prospects had posed extremely worrisome trajectories for a number of years. The book has three basic objectives. First, it projects the global fiscal outlook to 2035. Second, it asks whether the combination of deficits and debt in a large number of countries at the same time produces an impact on the world economy that is qualitatively different from the more traditional emergence of such problems in one or a few countries in any given period. Third, it analyzes the effects of the fiscal prospects on key economic variables including global interest rates and growth rates. The analysis finds that the current public debt profiles in most advanced economies will grow to dangerous and unsustainable levels over the next couple of decades unless major changes are made in projected spending and revenue levels. The authors conclude that the United States and Japan, in particular, need to start planning now for significant future budget cuts to minimize the risk of a crisis. Acting soon enables the adjustment to be phased in over an extended period, which cushions the inevitable adjustment costs, while avoiding the potentially enormous pressures that could be levied by markets if correction is delayed too long.