Includes documents, news items, reports from government agencies, legislative proposals, summary of laws, & public statements intended to provide an overview of the critical issues in today's policy debate. Both sides of an issue are fairly presented. Includes: wiretapping & digital telephony (FBI report on implementing the Communications Assist. for Law Enforce. Act); the clipper chip debate (public key status report; clipper encryption); key escrow (clipper III analysis), & export controls (internat. market for computer software with encryption).

Includes documents, news items, reports from government agencies, legislative proposals, summary of laws, and public statements intended to provide an overview of the critical issues in today's policy debate. Both sides of an issue are fairly presented. Includes: wiretapping and digital telephony (FBI report on implementing the Communications Assist. for Law Enforce. Act); the clipper chip debate (public key status report; clipper encryption); key escrow (clipper III analysis), and export controls (internat. market for computer software with encryption).

Includes documents, news items, reports from government agencies, legislative proposals, summary of laws, and public statements intended to provide an overview of the critical issues in today's policy debate. Both sides of an issue are fairly presented. Includes: digital telephony; the clipper chip and the encryption debate; information warfare: documents on the Security Policy Board and other efforts to undermine the Computer Security Act; and export controls and international views on encryption. Illustrated.

Telecommunication has never been perfectly secure, as a Cold War culture of wiretaps and international spying taught us. Yet many of us still take our privacy for granted, even as we become more reliant than ever on telephones, computer networks, and electronic transactions of all kinds. Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau argue that if we are to retain the privacy that characterized face-to-face relationships in the past, we must build the means of protecting that privacy into our communication systems. Diffie and Landau strip away the hype surrounding the policy debate to examine the national security, law enforcement, commercial, and civil liberties issues. They discuss the social function of privacy, how it underlies a democratic society, and what happens when it is lost.

EUROCRYEVr '97, the 15th annual EUROCRYPT conference on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques, was organized and sponsored by the International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR). The IACR organizes two series of international conferences each year, the EUROCRYPT meeting in Europe and CRWTO in the United States. The history of EUROCRYFT started 15 years ago in Germany with the Burg Feuerstein Workshop (see Springer LNCS 149 for the proceedings). It was due to Thomas Beth's initiative and hard work that the 76 participants from 14 countries gathered in Burg Feuerstein for the first open meeting in Europe devoted to modem cryptography. I am proud to have been one of the participants and still fondly remember my first encounters with some of the celebrities in cryptography. Since those early days the conference has been held in a different location in Europe each year (Udine, Paris, Linz, Linkoping, Amsterdam, Davos, Houthalen, Aarhus, Brighton, Balantonfiired, Lofthus, Perugia, Saint-Malo, Saragossa) and it has enjoyed a steady growth, Since the second conference (Udine, 1983) the IACR has been involved, since the Paris meeting in 1984, the name EUROCRYPT has been used. For its 15th anniversary, EUROCRYPT finally returned to Germany. The scientific program for EUROCRYPT '97 was put together by a 18-member program committee whch considered 104 high-quality submissions. These proceedings contain the revised versions of the 34 papers that were accepted for presentation. In addition, there were two invited talks by Ernst Bovelander and by Gerhard Frey.

In the mid-1970s, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman invented public key cryptography, an innovation that ultimately changed the world. Today public key cryptography provides the primary basis for secure communication over the internet, enabling online work, socializing, shopping, government services, and much more. While other books have documented the development of public key cryptography, this is the first to provide a comprehensive insiders’ perspective on the full impacts of public key cryptography, including six original chapters by nine distinguished scholars. The book begins with an original joint biography of the lives and careers of Diffie and Hellman, highlighting parallels and intersections, and contextualizing their work. Subsequent chapters show how public key cryptography helped establish an open cryptography community and made lasting impacts on computer and network security, theoretical computer science, mathematics, public policy, and society. The volume includes particularly influential articles by Diffie and Hellman, as well as newly transcribed interviews and Turing Award Lectures by both Diffie and Hellman. The contributed chapters provide new insights that are accessible to a wide range of readers, from computer science students and computer security professionals, to historians of technology and members of the general public. The chapters can be readily integrated into undergraduate and graduate courses on a range of topics, including computer security, theoretical computer science and mathematics, the history of computing, and science and technology policy.

The Privacy Law Sourcebook is the leading resource for students, attorneys, researchers, and journalists interested in privacy law in the United States and around the world. It includes major US privacy laws such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Communications Act, the Privacy Act, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, the Electronic Communications Act, the Video Privacy Protection Act, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The Sourcebook also includes key international privacy directives including the OECD Privacy Guidelines, the OECD Cryptography Guidelines, and European Union Directives for both Data Protection and Privacy and Electronic Communications. The Privacy Law Sourcebook 2016 has been updated and expanded to include recent developments such as the United Nations Resolution on Right to Privacy, the European Union General Data Protection Regulation, the USA Freedom Act, and the US Cybersecurity Act. The Sourcebook also includes an extensive resources section with useful websites and contact information for privacy agencies, organizations, and publications.

An examination of the challenges of establishing the authenticity of electronic documents—in particular the design of a cryptographic equivalent to handwritten signatures. The gradual disappearance of paper and its familiar evidential qualities affects almost every dimension of contemporary life. From health records to ballots, almost all documents are now digitized at some point of their life cycle, easily copied, altered, and distributed. In Burdens of Proof, Jean-François Blanchette examines the challenge of defining a new evidentiary framework for electronic documents, focusing on the design of a digital equivalent to handwritten signatures. From the blackboards of mathematicians to the halls of legislative assemblies, Blanchette traces the path of such an equivalent: digital signatures based on the mathematics of public-key cryptography. In the mid-1990s, cryptographic signatures formed the centerpiece of a worldwide wave of legal reform and of an ambitious cryptographic research agenda that sought to build privacy, anonymity, and accountability into the very infrastructure of the Internet. Yet markets for cryptographic products collapsed in the aftermath of the dot-com boom and bust along with cryptography's social projects. Blanchette describes the trials of French bureaucracies as they wrestled with the application of electronic signatures to real estate contracts, birth certificates, and land titles, and tracks the convoluted paths through which electronic documents acquire moral authority. These paths suggest that the material world need not merely succumb to the virtual but, rather, can usefully inspire it. Indeed, Blanchette argues, in renewing their engagement with the material world, cryptographers might also find the key to broader acceptance of their design goals.