This paper develops a small open economy model where global and domestic liquidity is intermediated to the corporate sector through two financial processes. Investment banks intermediate cross-border credit through interlinked debt contracts to entrepreneurs and commercial banks intermediate domestic savings to liquidity constrained final good producers. Both processes are needed to facilitate development of key production inputs. The model captures procyclical investment bank leverage dynamics, global liquidity spillovers, domestic money market pressures, and macrofinancial linkages through which shocks propagate across the two processes, affecting spreads and balance sheets, as well as the real economy through investment and working capital channels.

This paper develops a small open economy model where global and domestic liquidity is intermediated to the corporate sector through two financial processes. Investment banks intermediate cross-border credit through interlinked debt contracts to entrepreneurs and commercial banks intermediate domestic savings to liquidity constrained final good producers. Both processes are needed to facilitate development of key production inputs. The model captures procyclical investment bank leverage dynamics, global liquidity spillovers, domestic money market pressures, and macrofinancial linkages through which shocks propagate across the two processes, affecting spreads and balance sheets, as well as the real economy through investment and working capital channels.

The global financial crisis (GFC) has renewed interest in emergency liquidity support (sometimes referred to as “Lender of Last Resort”) provided by central banks to financial institutions and challenged the traditional way of conducting these operations. Despite a vast literature on the topic, central bank approaches and practices vary considerably. In this paper we focus on, for the most part, the provision of idiosyncratic support, approaching it from an operational perspective; highlighting different approaches adopted by central banks; and also identifying some of the issues that arose during the GFC.

This paper examines how the financial activities of non-financial corporates (NFCs) in international markets potentially affects domestic monetary aggregates and financial conditions. Monetary aggregates reflect, in part, the activities of NFCs, who channel capital market financing into the domestic banking system, thereby influencing funding conditions and credit availability. Periods of capital inflows are also those when the domestic currency is appreciating, and such periods of rapid exchange rate appreciation coincide with increases in the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves, increasing the stock of narrow money. The paper examines economic significance of cross-country panel data on monetary aggregates and other measures of non-core bank liabilities. Non-core liabilities that reflect the activities of NFCs reflect broad credit conditions and predict global trade and growth.

This update of the guidelines published in 2001 sets forth the underlying framework for the Reserves Data Template and provides operational advice for its use. The updated version also includes three new appendices aimed at assisting member countries in reporting the required data.

This paper seeks to advance our understanding of global financial interconnectedness by (i) mapping aspects of the architecture of global finance and (ii) investigating critical fault lines related to interconnectedness along which systemic risks were built up and shocks transmitted in the crisis. It thus takes initial steps toward operationalizing enhanced financial sector and macro-financial surveillance called for by the IMF’s Executive Board and by experts such as de Larosiere et al. (2009). Getting a better handle on interconnectedness would strengthen the Fund‘s ability, together with the Financial Stability Board, to track systemic risk concentrations. It would also inform spillover and vulnerability analyses, and sharpen bilateral and multilateral surveillance.

An overview of the financial vulnerability of emerging market economies and how the impact of exchange rate regimes affects this vulnerability.

The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) was proposed by the Basel committee to increase the resilience of the banking sector to negative shocks. The interactions between banking sector losses and the real economy highlight the importance of building a capital buffer in periods when systemic risks are rising. Basel III introduces a framework for a time-varying capital buffer on top of the minimum capital requirement and another time-invariant buffer (the conservation buffer). The CCB aims to make banks more resilient against imbalances in credit markets and thereby enhance medium-term prospects of the economy—in good times when system-wide risks are growing, the regulators could impose the CCB which would help the banks to withstand losses in bad times.

Two leading economists develop a theory explaining the demand for and supply of liquid assets. Why do financial institutions, industrial companies, and households hold low-yielding money balances, Treasury bills, and other liquid assets? When and to what extent can the state and international financial markets make up for a shortage of liquid assets, allowing agents to save and share risk more effectively? These questions are at the center of all financial crises, including the current global one. In Inside and Outside Liquidity, leading economists Bengt Holmström and Jean Tirole offer an original, unified perspective on these questions. In a slight, but important, departure from the standard theory of finance, they show how imperfect pledgeability of corporate income leads to a demand for as well as a shortage of liquidity with interesting implications for the pricing of assets, investment decisions, and liquidity management. The government has an active role to play in improving risk-sharing between consumers with limited commitment power and firms dealing with the high costs of potential liquidity shortages. In this perspective, private risk-sharing is always imperfect and may lead to financial crises that can be alleviated through government interventions.