Rating agencies judge how solvent banks and big companies are. Prior to the financial crisis they were too optimistic when rating the risk of the banks and this prompted politicians worldwide to issue new regulations. This book explains what rating agencies do, why they are so important for the economy and the new European Regulation.

Credit rating agencies have been criticized for their role in the financial crisis by understating credit risk. The US subprime mortgage crisis highlighted the systemic relevance of the rating agencies and the deficiencies in their activities; this led to an international consensus to regulate the rating business. Written by those involved in developing European Legislation, this book explains EU Regulation in the context of global initiatives undertaken by the G-20, the Financial Stability Board, and IOSCO to address failures within the rating industry. Through an in-depth analysis of the EU Regulation's requirements on governance, conflicts of interest, methodologies, and transparency, the book provides a clear explanation of how rating agencies operate and how the identified failures have been addressed. Moreover, it examines the supervisory and enforcement powers of ESMA, the EU authority in charge of the registration and oversight of rating agencies. This is complemented with an analysis of guidance from supervisors (ESMA and EBA), IOSCO's recommendations, and US legislation. The book discusses possible new regulatory developments in areas such as the agencies' business model, competition, civil liability, and ratings of sovereign debt, in light of the Euro debt sovereign crisis. It concludes with the authors' support for an enhanced regulatory and oversight coordination at international level and for the implementation of the necessary steps to reduce the existing over-reliance on ratings.

Credit rating agencies face a difficult trade-off between delivering both accurate and stable ratings. In particular, its users have consistently expressed a preference for rating stability, driven by the transactions costs induced by trading when ratings change frequently. Rating agencies generally assign ratings on a through-the-cycle basis whereas banks' internal valuations are often based on a point-in-time performance, that is they are related to the current value of the rated entity's or instrument's underlying assets. This paper compares the two approaches and assesses their impact on rating stability and accuracy. We find that while through-the-cycle ratings are initially more stable, they are prone to rating cliff effects and also suffer from inferior performance in predicting future defaults. This is because they are typically smooth and delay rating changes. Using a through-the-crisis methodology that uses a more stringent stress test goes halfway toward mitigating cliff effects, but is still prone to discretionary rating change delays.

The Independence of Credit Rating Agencies focuses on the institutional and regulatory dynamics of these agencies, asking whether their business models give them enough independence to make viable judgments without risking their own profitability. Few have closely examined the analytical methods of credit rating agencies, even though their decisions can move markets, open or close the doors to capital, and bring down governments. The 2008 financial crisis highlighted their importance and their shortcomings, especially when they misjudged the structured financial products that precipitated the collapse of Bear Stearns and other companies. This book examines the roles played by rating agencies during the financial crisis, illuminating the differences between U.S. and European rating markets, and also considers subjects such as the history of rating agencies and the roles played by smaller agencies to present a well-rounded portrait. - Reports on one of the key causes of the 2008 financial crisis: agencies that failed to understand how to analyze financial products - Describes inherent business model and pricing conflicts that compromise the independence of credit rating agencies - Reveals how rating agencies large and small, regulatory bodies, and vested interests interact in setting fees and policies

This book examines the transgressions of the credit rating agencies before, during and after the recent financial crisis. It proposes that by restricting the agencies’ ability to offer ancillary services there stands the opportunity to limit, in an achievable and practical manner, the potentially negative effect that the Big Three rating agencies – Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch – may have upon the financial sector and society moreover. The book contains an extensive and in-depth discussion about how the agencies ascended to their current position, why they were able to do so and ultimately their behaviour once their position was cemented. This work offers a new framework for the reader to follow, suggesting that investors, issuers and the state have a ‘desired’ version of the agencies in their thinking and operate upon that basis when, in fact, those imagined agencies do not exist, as demonstrated by the ‘actual’ conduct of the agencies. The book primarily aims to uncover this divergence and reveal the ‘real’ credit rating agencies, and then on that basis propose a real and potentially achievable reform to limit the negative effects that result from poor performance in this Industry. It addresses the topics with regard to financial regulation and the financial crisis, and will be of interest to legal scholars interested in the intersection between business and he law as well as researchers, academics, policymakers, industry and professional associations and students in the fields of corporate law, banking and finance law, financial regulation, corporate governance and corporate finance.

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.

This study provides a comprehensive analysis of credit rating economics and draws conclusions on the nature of regulation. It starts with an overview of the credit rating industry and introduces a framework that structures multiple rating agency functions. At the heart of the credit rating business model lies the reputation mechanism, which is analyzed in detail. After analyzing the reputation mechanism, the study takes a wider look at the industry and identifies the forces behind credit rating supply and demand. From an industrial organization perspective competition in the credit rating industry is limited. A comprehensive review of potential reasons for regulating the credit rating industry, however, reveals that there are only few compelling arguments. The regulatory approaches of the EU under the Capital Requirements Directive of 2005 and the USA under the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 are contrasted against an optimal regulatory regime.

John Coffee traces the evolution of the four main gatekeeping professions: auditors, lawyers, securities analysts and credit-rating agencies, in the wake of corporate governance disasters, such as Enron and WorldCom.