Counternarcotics strategies in Latin America : hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, second session, March 30, 2006.

For supplementary documentation and useful websites, click here. This perceptive book critically explores why the United States continues to pursue failed policies in Latin America. What elements of the U.S. and Latin American political systems have allowed the Cold War, the war on drugs, and the war on terror to be conflated? Why do U.S. policies--ostensibly designed to promote the rule of law, human rights, and democracy--instead contribute to widespread corruption, erosion of government authority, human rights violations, and increasing destabilization? Why have the war on drugs and the war on terror neither reduced narcotics trafficking nor increased citizen security in Latin America? Why do Latin American governments, the European Union, and U.S. policymakers often work at cross-purposes when they all claim to be committed to "democratization" and "development" in the region? Leading scholars answer these questions by detailing the nature of U.S. economic and security strategies in Latin America and the Andean region since 1990. They analyze the impacts and responses to these strategies by policymakers, political leaders, and social movements throughout the region, explaining how programs often generate or exacerbate the very problems they were intended to solve. Reviewing official policy and its defenders and critics alike, this indispensable book focuses on the reasons for the failure of U.S. policies and their disastrous significance for Latin America and the United States alike. Contributions by: Adri n Bonilla, Pilar Gait n, Monica Herz, Kenneth Lehman, Brian Loveman, Enrique Obando, Orlando J. P rez, Eduardo Pizarro, Philipp Sch nrock-Mart nez, and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian

The role of the U.S. Military in counternarcotics operations in Latin America has evolved significantly since its first -tentative efforts in 1977. As an institution it has changed from a reluctant participant to an active leader in the counter drug arena. This study will explore the military's evolution in stemming the flow of illicit narcotics from Latin America, and the current model of participation in order to determine first, its level of criticality to the national counter drug effort, second, if it has been successful in accomplishing Congressionally mandated tasks, and third, if it is an appropriate model to accomplish national counter narcotics (CN) strategy for supply suppression. Critical to this study will be an analysis of the DOD's participation in the interagency process at the sub-national and sub-institutional levels, and an assessment of the military's unit selection and command structure choices. My hypothesis is that the current organizational model for DOD involvement in CN efforts is fundamentally flawed, because it has allowed short-term tactical and operational successes, but has not permitted long-term strategic success in supply suppression.

Transnational crime remains a particularly serious problem in Latin America, with most issues connected to the drug trade. There are several relevant roles that the U.S. Air Force can and should play in boosting Mexico's capacity to counter drug production and trafficking, as well as further honing and adjusting its wider counternarcotics effort in Latin America.