Public confidence in the security of the US food and fiber system has been sustained by the quality, variety, abundance, and affordability of agricultural products in the United States. Although the system in place to defend against unintentional threats to agriculture has weaknesses and needs, the demonstrated ability of the system to resolve, accommodate, or manage critical food safety problems, temporary shortages of some commodities, plant and animal infestations and diseases, and natural disasters indicates that, in general, such confidence has been warranted. However, over the last several years, there has been recognition of the possibility and consequences of intentional threats directed at US agriculture. Such attacks could come from foreign or domestic terrorists and use biological, chemical, or radiological agents. They could be directed at the pre harvest (live plant and live animal) or post harvest (processing and distribution) stages of food and fiber production. Countering Agricultural Bioterrorism asseses the vulnerability of US agriculture to intentional threats and provides recommendations needed to strengthen and adapt the US system for defense against biological threats to agriculture.

The astonishing specter of September 11, 2001, jarred America and, indeed, all free nations, into accepting the previously unthinkable- the world's only remaining superpower is vulnerable to catastrophic attack and asymmetric warfare, even within its own borders. In a few short hours Americans came to realize that, for a fanatical, resourceful, and patient enemy, there are neither ethical bounds nor societal mores to delineate the nature of the target, the weapon of choice, or the scale of the violence. To put it another way, for these enemies there are no rules of engagement and there is no honor. Since September 11, our national sense of vulnerability has steadily risen. We have been in a near-constant state of high alert because of credible threats to our Nation's nuclear installations, power plants, transportation nodes, and other critical national infrastructures. We know that at least nine countries support offensive terrorism programs, and that Al Qaeda -Osama bin Laden's international terrorist organization- has been committed to developing and deploying weapons of mass destruction against U.S. targets. And the possibility that the recent anthrax attacks were perpetrated by a domestic terrorist with access to a Federal Government, academic, or private laboratory that possessed anthrax for legitimate scientific reasons has brought fear to the doorsteps of virtually every home, business, and public institution in the country. We are now also facing up to a less publicized, but potentially devastating threat-terrorism directed against the Nation's food and agricultural infrastructure. As this paper elucidates, American farms, food, and agriculture systems are exceedingly vulnerable to deliberate disruption by hostile interests intent on undermining confidence in food supplies or wreaking havoc on the agricultural sector of the American economy, which accounts for one-sixth of our gross domestic product. Because of its breadth, diversity, and unparalleled success, U.S. agriculture is an inviting target for terrorists. Not only are food supplies vital for feeding our own population and others around the world, and important for the Nation's economic health, but American agriculture is a vivid example of the capabilities of modern scientific farming. Intelligence reports indicate that a number of countries have active research programs that could produce biological agents to threaten crops and livestock. Naturally occurring outbreaks of diseases signal the devastation that could result from a carefully choreographed intentional release. Thus the recent Foot and mouth disease epidemics in Taiwan and Great Britain, or hog cholera in the Netherlands, or the infection of Florida citrus trees with citrus canker, aptly demonstrate the vulnerability of living targets to biological pathogens and the economic chaos that can result from an outbreak-intentional or otherwise. Floyd P. Horn Director for Food, Agriculture, and Water Security Office of Homeland Security Executive Office of the President

The United States ignores the potential for agricultural bioterrorism at its peril. The relative ease of a catastrophic bio-weapons attack against the American food and agriculture infrastructure, and the devastating economic and social consequences of such an act, demand that the Nation pursue an aggressive, focused, coordinated, and stand-alone national strategy to combat agricultural bioterrorism. The strategy should build on counterterrorism initiatives already underway; leverage existing Federal, state, and local programs and capabilities; and involve key customers, stakeholders, and partners. The U.S. Department of Agriculture should lead the development of this strategy. We know that at least nine countries support offensive terrorism programs, and that Al Qaeda-Osama bin Laden's international terrorist organization-has been committed to developing and deploying weapons of mass destruction against U.S. targets. And the possibility that the recent anthrax attacks were perpetrated by a domestic terrorist with access to a Federal Government, academic, or private laboratory that possessed anthrax for legitimate scientific reasons has brought fear to the doorsteps of virtually every home, business, and public institution in the country. We are now also facing up to a less publicized, but potentially devastating threat-terrorism directed against the Nation's food and agricultural infrastructure. As this paper elucidates, American farms, food, and agriculture systems are exceedingly vulnerable to deliberate disruption by hostile interests intent on undermining confidence in food supplies or wreaking havoc on the agricultural sector of the American economy, which accounts for one-sixth of our gross domestic product. Because of its breadth, diversity, and unparalleled success, U.S. agriculture is an inviting target for terrorists. Not only are food supplies vital for feeding our own population and others around the world, and important for the Nation's economic health, but American agriculture is a vivid example of the capabilities of modern scientific farming. Intelligence reports indicate that a number of countries have active research programs that could produce biological agents to threaten crops and livestock. Naturally occurring outbreaks of diseases signal the devastation that could result from a carefully choreographed intentional release. Thus the recent Foot and mouth disease epidemics in Taiwan and Great Britain, or hog cholera in the Netherlands, or the infection of Florida citrus trees with citrus canker, aptly demonstrate the vulnerability of living targets to biological pathogens and the economic chaos that can result from an outbreak-intentional or otherwise. Chapter One * Bioterrorism, Biowarfare, and National Security * Chapter Two * An Emerging Threat to Food Security * Chapter Three * Countering the Threat * Chapter Four * Recommendations and Conclusion * Appendix A * Framework for National Coordination for Security, Critical Infrastructure, and Counterterrorism * Appendix B * High-Priority Research Needs * Appendix C * Federal Agencies with Counterterrorism Responsibilities * Appendix D * Key Federal Programs and Capabilities to Combat Bioterrorism * Appendix E * Selected Agricultural and Environmental Organizations * Appendix F * Acronyms * Endnotes * References

The attacks of September 11 and the release of anthrax spores revealed enormous vulnerabilities in the U.S. public-health infrastructure and suggested similar vulnerabilities in the agricultural infrastructure as well. The traditional public health response-surveillance (intelligence), prevention, detection, response, recovery, and attribution-is the paradigm for the national response not only to all forms of terrorism but also to emerging infectious diseases. Thus, investments in research on bioterrorism will have enormous potential for application in the detection, prevention, and treatment of emerging infectious diseases that also are unpredictable and against which we must be prepared. The deciphering of the human genome sequence and the complete elucidation of numerous pathogen genomes, our rapidly increasing understanding of the molecular mechanisms of pathogenesis and of immune responses, and new strategies for designing drugs and vaccines all offer unprecedented opportunities to use science to counter bioterrorist threats. But these same developments also allow science to be misused to create new agents of mass destruction. Hence the effort to confront bioterrorism must be a global one. Countering Bioterrorism makes the following recommendations: Recommendation 1: All agencies with responsibility for homeland security should work together to establish stronger and more meaningful working ties between the intelligence, S&T, and public health communities. Recommendation 2: Federal agencies should work cooperatively and in collaboration with industry to develop and evaluate rapid, sensitive, and specific early-detection technologies. Recommendation 3: Create a global network for detection and surveillance, making use of computerized methods for real-time reporting and analysis to rapidly detect new patterns of disease locally, nationally, and ultimately- internationally. The use of high-throughput methodologies that are being increasingly utilized in modern biological research should be an important component of this expanded and highly automated surveillance strategy. Recommendation 4: Use knowledge of complex biological patterns and high-throughput laboratory automation to classify and diagnose infections in patients in primary care settings. Recommendation 5: USDA should create an agency for control and prevention of plant disease. This agency should have the capabilities necessary to deal effectively with biothreats.

The threat of agricultural terrorism in the United States has awakened the nation to the stark reality that its agricultural industry may be in jeopardy. Intentional attacks delivered by land air and sea are capable of devastating this nation's agricultural infrastructure its economy and ultimately threaten the survival of the citizens and the quality of life we have taken for granted. Preparations taken to identify vulnerabilities implementation of prevention measures and actions taken in response to an attack will determine the magnitude of the impact of an agricultural incident. This paper will present the bioterrorism threat the United States agricultural infrastructure faces. It will review the nature and threat of agricultural terrorism against livestock and croplands and demonstrate the degree of vulnerability the United States agricultural industry has against a bioterrorism attack. This paper will identify current plans policies initiatives and capabilities available at the local state and federal levels. It will review actions that should be implemented in order to strengthen this nation's ability to prevent prepare for respond to and mitigate long-term consequences that could devastate the nation's economy.

The astonishing specter of September 11, 2001, jarred America and, indeed, all free nations, into accepting the previously unthinkable-the world's only remaining superpower is vulnerable to catastrophic attacks and asymmetric warfare, even within its own boarders. In a few short hours Americans came to realize that, for a fanatical, resourceful, and patient enemy, there are neither ethical bounds nor societal more to delineate the nature of the target, the weapon of choice, or the scale of the violence. To put it another away, for these enemies there are no rules of engagement and there is no honor.

Over the past decade, the United States has endeavored to increase its ability to detect, prevent, and respond to terrorist threats and incidents. The agriculture sector and the food industry in general, however, have received comparatively little attention with respect to protection against terrorist incidents. This study aims to expand the current debate on domestic homeland security by assessing the vulnerabilities of the agricultural sector and the food chain to a deliberate act of biological terrorism and exploring the likely outcomes of a successful attack.