Specifically, three classes of institutional discontinuities are discussed: privatization processes, mergers and acquisitions and liberalization of the market. The authors aim to show that the effects of such institutional discontinuities may seriously affect, in the short term, the market value of the firm, and in the medium/long term, the performance of the national system of innovation as a whole.

This book aims to disentangle the complex relationship between innovation and its potential determinants, paying special attention to the roles of governance and regulatory frameworks, and the ways in which the latter interact with other drivers of innovation such as competition and the innovators closeness to the technology frontier. The contributors provide theoretically grounded and empirically-rich findings indicating that governance and regulation affect innovation directly and indirectly through interaction with other drivers of innovation. The direct effects are positive in the case of governance quality and prescriptive regulations that set standards for compliance. However, the direct effects of corporate governance are not uniform and depend on the corporate governance dimension under investigation. The authors demonstrate that the direct effects are only part of the story. Both governance and regulatory standards interact with the level of competition and the distance to the technology frontier that may have complementary or offsetting effects. Overall, the findings in the book indicate that the relationship between innovation and its potential determinants is more complex and hence calls for more nuanced policy design compared to what is assumed in policy statements by national and international policy actors. This thought-provoking book will provide a stimulating read for a wide-ranging audience, including scholars and researchers in the fields of economics, industrial organization, public policy and innovation studies.

"This provocative book applies law and finance theory to a wide range of issues bearing on corporate governance and business history. Brouwer's analysis should hold particular interest for students and scholars interested in comparative governance."Joseph A. McCahery, Professor of Corporate Governance and Innovation, University of Amsterdam Center

Technical advance requires resources and is motivated by the quest for profits; therefore, the rate and direction of advance is determined by the economic system. Recognition of this fact has focused attention on the performance of the market economy in the allocation of resources to technical advance, and the consequent body of research is surveyed and synthesised in this book. The theories of market structure and innovation proposed by Schumpeter, Galbraith, Arrow, Schmookler, Scherer, Mansfield, Phillips, Barzel, Kamien and Schwartz, Loury, Nelson and Winter, Grabowski, Dasgupta and Stiglitz, and others are presented in an integrated form. These theories deal with the nature of competition, the incentives to innovate and the pace of innovative activity under different market structures, and the existence of a market structure that yields the most rapid rate of innovation. In addition, the findings of seventy empirical studies dealing with various facets of the microeconomics of technical innovation are presented. The book is designed to be accessible to economists working in a variety of situations - in universities, business and government - and who are concerned with questions of technical innovation. It is also suitable for senior-level undergraduates and first year graduate students approaching the subject in a comprehensive way for the first time.

This publication examines the role of corporate governance arrangements in providing right incentives to contribute the value creation process within the private enterprises and the implications of the differences in ownership structures on corporate governance practices and frameworks.

This book systematically defines and analyses the rise of China’s innovation system and Chinese corporate governance model. China’s achievement in artificial intelligence and high technology innovation has attracted the global attention. The country’s innovation system and Chinese model arose during the period between the mid-1990s and the first decade of 21 century, making it one of the leading countries in those fields. This revised and expanded edition examines the Chinese innovation business model based on the basic concept of firm’s governance structure. It builds upon five dimensions: ownership and shareholding structure; interrelation between employer and employee; interrelation between firms; financing pattern and performance criteria; and innovation system and core competitiveness. This book also compares China’s innovation system with the American model and with the European model exemplified by Germany.

Existing literature has identified the effects of competition and firms' ownership and management structure on firms' decisions to invest in innovation. We extend this literature by examining the role of market-demand uncertainty on the relationship between firm ownership, management structure and management turnover, on the one hand, and firms' innovation on the other hand. We evaluate the effects of product-market competition, concentration of firms' ownership, presence of foreigners on owner-appointed corporate boards of directors, management independence, and management turnover rates on firms' patent applications under varying degrees of uncertainty. The validity of alternative hypotheses about management motivation - lazy manager, career concerns, prospect theory, and special East-Asian institutional constraints hypotheses - is evaluated, controlling for firms' prior investment in innovation and firm characteristics. Unique data for 711 Korean firms and nine years, 2003-2011, are used (4,339 records). We find support for the lazy-manager hypothesis by identifying substitutability between market-competitive pressures and owner-manager separation in driving managers' effort to pursue innovation. Demand uncertainty raises managers' incentives to innovate, by increasing the potential stake from innovation and increasing the risk of default if firms fail to innovate. There is little evidence that Korean managers pursue innovation to ease their career concerns or to meet an expected performance yardstick, or that they follow a special East-Asian pattern. Management turnover has little effect on innovation, and firms' existing performance increases it. Foreign management and the share of the largest firm owner (proxying for conglomerate or family ownership) have little effect on firms' innovation.

The paper analyses the effect of the stock market on firm innovation through the lens of initial public offering (IPO) using uniquely matched Chinese firm-level data. We find that IPOs lead to an increase in both the quantity and quality of firm innovation activity. In addition, IPOs expand a firm’s scope of innovation beyond its core business. The impact of IPOs on firm innovation varies across financial constraints, corporate governance, and ownership structures. Our results further illustrate that IPOs induce a firm to increase the number of inventors and enable better retention of existing inventors after the IPO. Finally, we show that the enhanced innovation activity resulting from IPOs increases a firm’s Tobin’s Q in the long run.

This is a study of peasant-state relations and village politics as they have evolved in response to the state's attempts to control the division of the harvest and extract the state-defined surplus. To provide the reader with a clearer sense of the evolution of peasant-state relations over almost a forty-year period and to highlight the dramatic changes that have taken place since 1978,1 have divided my analysis into two parts: Chapters 2 through 7 are on Maoist China, and chapters 8 and 9 are on post-Mao China. The first part examines the state's grain policies and patterns of local politics that emerged during the highly collectivized Maoist period, when the state closed free grain markets and established the system of unified purchase and sales (tonggou tongxiao). The second part describes the new methods for the production and division of the harvest after 1978, when the government decollectivized agriculture and abolished its unified procurement program.