Recently, monetary authorities have increasingly focused on implementing policies to ensure price stability and strengthen central bank independence. Simultaneously, in the fiscal area, market development has allowed public debt managers to focus more on cost minimization. This “divorce” of monetary and debt management functions in no way lessens the need for effective coordination of monetary and fiscal policy if overall economic performance is to be optimized and maintained in the long term. This paper analyzes these issues based on a review of the relevant literature and of country experiences from an institutional and operational perspective.

This book studies the international coordination of monetary and fiscal policies in the world economy. It carefully discusses the process of policy competition and the structure of policy cooperation. As to policy competition, the focus is on monetary and fiscal competition between Europe and America. Similarly, as to policy cooperation, the focus is on monetary and fiscal cooperation between Europe and America. The spillover effects of monetary policy are negative while the spillover effects of fiscal policy are positive. The policy targets are price stability and full employment. The policy makers follow either cold-turkey or gradualist strategies. Policy expectations are adaptive or rational. The world economy consists of two, three or more regions. The present book is part of a larger research project on European Monetary Union, see the references at the back of the book. Some parts of this project were presented at the World Congress of the International Economic Association in Lisbon. Other parts were presented at the International Institute of Public Finance, at the Macro Study Group of the German Economic Association, at the Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic Association, at the Gottingen Workshop on International Economics, at the Halle Workshop on Monetary Economics, at the Research Seminar on Macroeconomics in Freiburg, and at the Passau Workshop on International Economics.

International coordination of macroeconomic policies has attracted much attention in recent years. The main issue has been whether economic performance can be improved by coordination Although it is still a controversial issue many economists have argued that coordination would make a positive contribution to economic performance. This paper deals with the requirements for successful fiscal coordination. It concludes that those requirements are such that the best fiscal policies that countries can pursue are those aimed at putting their houses in order.

Discontent with the functioning of the world monetary system has led to many proposals for international monetary reform. These proposals range from enhanced consultations under the current regime of floating exchange rates to a regime of fixed exchange rates, as proposed by Ronald McKinnon. In this paper we examine the implications of several alternative monetary arrangements for fiscal policy in the world economy. In particular we focus upon two issues. The first is the effects of alternative monetary arrangements on the international transmission of fiscal policy. The second is the implications of the alternative regimes for strategic aspects of fiscal policymaking.As is generally the case in the discussion of exchange regimes we find that the choice of the monetary system is crucially dependent upon the source and nature of the shocks hitting the world economy. In this paper we show that the monetary regime also has important implications for the transmission offiscal policy in the world economy and for the nature of the strategic games played by fiscal authorities. Rigid rules of the game, as under fixedexchange rates, do not necessarily eliminate the inefficient equilibriathat can occur when fiscal authorities behave non-cooperatively

This paper examines issues in the current debate over coordination between fiscal and monetary policies. Section I1 uses the traditional targets-instruments approach to assess the potential gains from greater coordination. Since greater coordination is often equated with looser money and tighter fiscal policy, two econometric models of the economy are used to estimate the quantitative importance of the policy mix. Expectational effects that arise from the government budget constraint are also analyzed. Section III shows that our attitudes toward the non- coordination problem may be quite different depending on why policies were not coordinated to begin with, and argues that there are plausible circumstances under which it may be better to have uncoordinated policies. Section IV turns to the design of a coordination system. The game-theoretic aspects of having two independent authorities are stressed, and I offer a general reason to expect that uncoordinated behavior will result in tight money and loose fiscal policy even when both parties would prefer easy money and tight fiscal policy. Finally, Section, considers the old "rules versus discretion" debate from the particular perspective of this paper

Research Paper (postgraduate) from the year 2010 in the subject Economics - Finance, grade: A, The ESC Rennes School of Business (-), course: MSc, language: English, abstract: This paper attempts to study the importance of both Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy in the international context. And also to understand the chemistry between Monetary and Fiscal policy and extent to which the coordination can be achieved. In any open economy, Monetary policy is designed, formulated and being conducted by the central Bank, wherein the National Planning or Ministry of Finance of the respective country is responsible for designing, formulating and conducting the Fiscal policy for the nation. This research paper finds that there is a close linkage between Monetary and Fiscal policy and hence the proper coordination leads to addressing today's biggest talk of nation‟s deficit. Currently there is an abundance of literature available on both Monetary and Fiscal policy. There is also good number of books available containing plethora of information on the subject. This research paper addresses the importance, impact, and issues of Monetary and Fiscal policy in open economy.

This paper discusses the scope, methods, and effects of international coordination of economic policies. In analyzing the scope for and of coordination, the paper addresses the rationale for coordination, barriers to coordination, the range and specificivity of policies to be coordinated, and the frequency of coordination. In evaluating the methods of coordination, the emphasis is on the broad issues of rules versus discretion, single-indicator versus multi-Indicator systems, and hegemonic versus symmetric systems. Finally, using the MULTIMOD global macroeconomic model, some simulations are presented of several rule-based proposals for coordination.

A comprehensive study of the international coordination of economic policy in a monetary union. It carefully discusses the process of policy competition and the structure of policy cooperation. As to policy competition, the focus is on competition between the union central bank, the German government, and the French government. Similarly, as to policy cooperation, the focus is on cooperation between the union central bank, the German government, and the French government. The key questions are: Does the process of policy competition lead to full employment and price stability? Can these targets be achieved through policy cooperation? And is policy cooperation superior to policy competition? Another important issue is monetary competition / monetary cooperation between Europe and America.

This paper uses two of the IMF’s DSGE models to simulate the benefits of international fiscal and macroprudential policy coordination. The key argument is that these two policies are similar in that, unlike monetary policy, they have long-run effects on the level of GDP that need to be traded off with short-run effects on the volatility of GDP. Furthermore, the short-run effects are potentially much larger than those of conventional monetary policy, especially in the presence of nonlinearities such as the zero interest rate floor, minimum capital adequacy regulations, and lending risk that depends in a convex fashion on loan-to-value ratios. As a consequence we find that coordinated fiscal and/or macroprudential policy measures can have much larger stimulus and spillover effects than what has traditionally been found in the literature on conventional monetary policy.