If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's "tit for tat," only strategies based on an ideal type of "enhanced contingent restraint" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the basic security behaviors of states, the book has implications that go beyond the three bilateral arms control cases Weber discusses--implications that remain important despite the end of superpower rivalry. "An important theoretical analysis of cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the area of arms control... An excellent work on a subject that has received very little attention."--Choice Originally published in 1991. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

This book puts the widely-held view that 'arms control in space is not possible' to the test and aims to explore how, and under what conditions, arms control could become a reality. Drawing upon international regimes and IR theory, Mutschler examines the success of space weapons and anti-ballistic missiles.

The essential history of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) during the Nixon Administration How did Richard Nixon, a president so determined to compete for strategic nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union, become one of the most successful arms controllers of the Cold War? Drawing on newly opened Cold War archives, John D. Maurer argues that a central purpose of arms control talks for American leaders was to channel nuclear competition toward areas of American advantage and not just international cooperation. While previous accounts of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have emphasized American cooperative motives, Maurer highlights how Nixon, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird shaped negotiations, balancing their own competitive interests with proponents of cooperation while still providing a coherent rationale to Congress. Within the arms control agreements, American leaders intended to continue deploying new weapons, and the arms control restrictions, as negotiated, allowed the United States to sustain its global power, contain communism, and ultimately prevail in the Cold War.

This book shows how peace movements affected US decisions to enter nuclear arms control talks during the Cold War. Most scholarship assumes that state policies on pursuing international cooperation are set by national leaders, in response either to international conditions, or to their own interests and ideas. By demonstrating the importance of public protest and citizen activism, Jeffrey Knopf shows how state preferences for cooperation can be shaped from below.

"Historical Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament also provides information that is comprehensible to all readers. Jeffrey A. Larsen and James M. Smith present a context for the broader range of international relations at a given point in time, extending the utility of the dictionary beyond just a narrow examination of arms control."--BOOK JACKET.

In this work, an expert on biological weapons offers a thoughtful examination of the political and technical issues that have affected the implementation of arms control agreements from the 1960s to the present. Arms Control Policy: A Guide to the Issues examines the history of the major arms control treaties since the early 1960s. It offers readers a broad understanding of the ways in which arms control agreements were negotiated and implemented during the Cold War, the international and national events that affected treaty negotiation and implementation, and how the arms control landscape has changed in the war's aftermath. Specifically, the handbook overviews the obligations contained in bilateral U.S.-Soviet/Russian and multilateral arms control agreements covering nuclear and nonnuclear weapons. It also treats such agreements as the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Treaty to Ban Land Mines, and the Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions. The book concludes with a look at the current challenges in the implementation of arms control agreements and the future of arms control.

Contents: Bridging the Gaps on Arms Control Nancy W. Gallagher. Arms Control in the Information Age Emily O. Goldman. A New Role for Transparency Ann M. Florini. Beyond Deterrence, Defence, and Arms Control Gloria Duffy. Nuclear Arms Control through Multilateral Negotiations Rebecca Johnson. The Impact of Govermental Context on Negotiation and Implementation: Constraints and Opportunities for Change Amy Sands. The Politics of Verification: Why How Much?' is Not Enough Nancy W. Gallagher.

Are policymakers capable of learning about the complex international environment they must deal with when formulating foreign policy? Interest in the phenomenon of "learning" has been growing, driven in part by the advent of Gorbachev, and by prospects for ending the Cold War. In this book, leading scholars explore the theoretical and practical imp

DIVExplains why, despite the fierce rivalry of the Cold War, Russians and Americans could negotiate arms control agreements /div

Discusses the contemporary role of nuclear weapons in international relations