How effective are capital account restrictions? We provide new answers based on a novel panel data set of capital controls, disaggregated by asset class and by inflows/outflows, covering 74 countries during 1995-2005. We find the estimated effects of capital controls to vary markedly across the types of capital controls, both by asset categories, by the direction of flows, and across countries' income levels. In particular, both debt and equity controls can substantially reduce outflows, with little effect on capital inflows, but only high-income countries appear able to effectively impose debt (outflow) controls. The results imply that capital controls can affect both the volume and the composition of capital flows.

Controlling Capital examines three pressing issues in financial market regulation: the contested status of public regulation, the emergence of ‘culture’ as a proposed modality of market governance, and the renewed ascendancy of private regulation. In the years immediately following the outbreak of crisis in financial markets, public regulation seemed almost to be attaining a position of command – the robustness and durability of which is explored here in respect of market conduct, European Union capital markets union, and US and EU competition policies. Subsequently there has been a softening of command and a return to public-private co-regulation, positioned within a narrative on culture. The potential and limits of culture as a regulatory resource are unpacked here in respect of occupational and organisational aspects, stakeholder connivance and wider political embeddedness. Lastly the book looks from both appreciative and critical perspectives at private regulation, through financial market associations, arbitration of disputes and, most controversially, market ‘policing’ by hedge funds. Bringing together a distinguished group of international experts, this book will be a key text for all those concerned with issues arising at the intersection of financial markets, law, culture and governance.

This book examines pressing issues in financial market regulation, in the face of continuing systemic concerns and widespread wrongdoing in financial markets. Contributors explore how public and private tendencies are evolving, how they might work together, and their relation to policies in the European Union, the United States and internationally.

Managing Capital Flows provides analyses that can help policymakers develop a framework for managing capital flows that is consistent with prudent macroeconomic and financial sector stability. While capital inflows can provide emerging market economies with invaluable benefits in pursuing economic development and growth, they can also pose serious policy challenges for macroeconomic management and financial sector supervision. The expert contributors cover a wide range of issues related to managing capital flows and analyze the experience of emerging Asian economies in dealing with surges in capital inflows. They also discuss possible policy measures to manage capital flows while remaining consistent with the goals of macroeconomic and financial sector stability. Building on this analysis, the book presents options for workable national policies and regional policy cooperation, particularly in exchange rate management. Containing chapters that bring in international experiences relevant to Asia and other emerging market economies, this insightful book will appeal to policymakers in governments and financial institutions, as well as public and private finance experts. It will also be of great interest to advanced students and academic researchers in finance.

This paper borrows the tradition of estimating policy reaction functions from monetary policy literature to ask whether capital controls respond to macroprudential or mercantilist motivations. I explore this question using a novel, weekly dataset on capital control actions in 21 emerging economies from 2001 to 2015. I introduce a new proxy for mercantilist motivations: the weighted appreciation of an emerging-market currency against its top five trade competitors. This proxy Granger causes future net initiations of non-tariff barriers in most countries. Emerging markets systematically respond to both mercantilist and macroprudential motivations. Policymakers respond to trade competitiveness concerns by using both instruments—inflow tightening and outflow easing. They use only inflow tightening in response to macroprudential concerns. Policy is acyclical to foreign debt; however, high levels of this debt reduces countercyclicality to mercantilist concerns. Higher exchange rate pass-through to export prices, and having an inflation targeting regime with non-freely floating exchange rates, increase responsiveness to mercantilist concerns.

This paper presents a new dataset of capital control restrictions on both inflows and outflows of 10 categories of assets for 100 countries over the period 1995 to 2013. Building on the data in Schindler (2009) and other datasets based on the analysis of the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), this dataset includes additional asset categories, more countries, and a longer time period. The paper discusses in detail the construction of the dataset and characterizes the data with respect to the prevalence and correlation of controls across asset categories and between controls on inflows and controls on outflows, the aggregation of the separate categories into broader indicators, and the comparison of this dataset with other indicators of capital controls.

Epstein (economics, U. of Massachusetts) and colleagues look at connections between financial liberalization, financial crises, and capital flight in the 1980s and 1990s during the rise of neoliberalism. Opening chapters set the context with an overview of the impacts of capital account liberalization on income distribution and growth and an descri

Using a panel data set for international corporate bonds and capital account restrictions in advanced and emerging economies, we show that restrictions on capital inflows produce a substantial and economically meaningful increase in corporate bond spreads. A number of heterogeneities suggest that the effect of capital controls on inflows is particularly strong for more financially constrained firms, establishing a novel channel through which capital controls affect economic outcomes. By contrast, we do not find a robust significant effect of restrictions on outflows.

The right of governments to employ capital controls has always been the official orthodoxy of the International Monetary Fund, and the organization's formal rules providing this right have not changed significantly since the IMF was founded in 1945. But informally, among the staff inside the IMF, these controls became heresy in the 1980s and 1990s, prompting critics to accuse the IMF of indiscriminately encouraging the liberalization of controls and precipitating a wave of financial crises in emerging markets in the late 1990s. In Capital Ideas, Jeffrey Chwieroth explores the inner workings of the IMF to understand how its staff's thinking about capital controls changed so radically. In doing so, he also provides an important case study of how international organizations work and evolve. Drawing on original survey and archival research, extensive interviews, and scholarship from economics, politics, and sociology, Chwieroth traces the evolution of the IMF's approach to capital controls from the 1940s through spring 2009 and the first stages of the subprime credit crisis. He shows that IMF staff vigorously debated the legitimacy of capital controls and that these internal debates eventually changed the organization's behavior--despite the lack of major rule changes. He also shows that the IMF exercised a significant amount of autonomy despite the influence of member states. Normative and behavioral changes in international organizations, Chwieroth concludes, are driven not just by new rules but also by the evolving makeup, beliefs, debates, and strategic agency of their staffs.

"The rise of global financial markets in the last decades of the twentieth century was premised on one fundamental idea: that capital ought to flow across country borders with minimal restriction and regulation. Freedom for capital movements became the new orthodoxy. In an intellectual, legal, and political history of financial globalization, Rawi Abdelal shows that this was not always the case. Transactions routinely executed by bankers, managers, and investors during the 1990s—trading foreign stocks and bonds, borrowing in foreign currencies—had been illegal in many countries only decades, and sometimes just a year or two, earlier. How and why did the world shift from an orthodoxy of free capital movements in 1914 to an orthodoxy of capital controls in 1944 and then back again by 1994? How have such standards of appropriate behavior been codified and transmitted internationally? Contrary to conventional accounts, Abdelal argues that neither the U.S. Treasury nor Wall Street bankers have preferred or promoted multilateral, liberal rules for global finance. Instead, European policy makers conceived and promoted the liberal rules that compose the international financial architecture. Whereas U.S. policy makers have tended to embrace unilateral, ad hoc globalization, French and European policy makers have promoted a rule-based, “managed” globalization. This contest over the character of globalization continues today."