Grégoire C. N. Webber explores how open-ended constitutional rights leave a constitution open to re-negotiation by the political process.

This topical book analyses the practice of negotiating constitutional demands by regional and dispersed national minorities in eight multinational systems. It considers the practices of cooperation and litigation between minority groups and central institutions in Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, Italy, Spain, and the U.S. and includes an evaluation of the implications of the recent Catalan, Puerto Rican and Scottish referenda. Ultimately, the author shows that a flexible constitution combined with a versatile constitutional jurisprudence tends to foster institutional cooperation and the recognition of the pluralistic nature of modern states

Countries often amend their constitutions or enact new ones following major political events, such as the founding of newly independent states, the fall of an authoritarian regime or the end of violent conflict. Significant constitutional reform at a crucial moment is often a high-stakes process because a constitution regulates access to public power and resources among different groups. While disagreements over divisive topics are likely and even inherent to constitution-making, they may also result in a serious deadlock when stakeholders are unable to reach agreement. A prolonged deadlock can delay or even derail the whole reform process. In this context, it may be advisable to create incentives that can help parties to the negotiations overcome divergence and resolve deadlocks should they occur. This Constitution Brief focuses on strategies and mechanisms for breaking a deadlock in constitutional negotiations conducted in an environment of competitive democratic politics.

This volume is a very interesting research project that includes the most careful work on constitutional power and limits to authority of which I am aware. In general, the contributors find that constitutional negotiations normally took place in settings where uncertainty was considerable. They also find that the more detailed the characterization of power relationships, the more liberal and durable the democracy tends to be. Roger D. Congleton This book addresses the issue of the impact of uncertainty in constitutional design. To what extent do constitution drafters and adopters make their decisions behind a veil of ignorance? More fundamentally, can we infer from constitutional texts the degree of uncertainty faced by constitution drafters and adopters? After an introduction (chapter 1), the book proceeds in two parts. The first part (chapters 2 to 4) introduces to the intellectual filiation of the project and to its theoretical and methodological foundations. The second part (chapters 5 to 13) presents nine case studies built on the same structure: historical account of the making of the Constitution, results of the content analysis of the constitutional text, and discussion of specific issues raised in the analysis. Chapter 14 concludes.

In 2005, Iraq drafted its first constitution and held the country’s first democratic election in more than fifty years. Even under ideal conditions, drafting a constitution can be a prolonged process marked by contentious debate, and conditions in Iraq are far from ideal: Iraq has long been racked by ethnic and sectarian conflict, which intensified following the American invasion and continues today. This severe division, which often erupted into violence, would not seem to bode well for the fate of democracy. So how is it that Iraq was able to surmount its sectarianism to draft a constitution that speaks to the conflicting and largely incompatible ideological view of the Sunnis, Shi’ah, and Kurds? Haider Ala Hamoudi served in 2009 as an adviser to Iraq’s Constitutional Review Committee, and he argues here that the terms of the Iraqi Constitution are sufficiently capacious to be interpreted in a variety of ways, allowing it to appeal to the country’s three main sects despite their deep disagreements. While some say that this ambiguity avoids the challenging compromises that ultimately must be made if the state is to survive, Hamoudi maintains that to force these compromises on issues of central importance to ethnic and sectarian identity would almost certainly result in the imposition of one group’s views on the others. Drawing on the original negotiating documents, he shows that this feature of the Constitution was not an act of evasion, as is sometimes thought, but a mark of its drafters’ awareness in recognizing the need to permit the groups the time necessary to develop their own methods of working with one another over time.

This book analyses the EU's Constitutional Treaty, which emerged in draft form from the European Convention in the summer of 2003 and which was finalised by an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in June 2004. It describes the main novelties of the treaty and looks at policies of important actors, Member States and Community actors (the Commission and European Parliament) and the roles played by the Convention and the Italian and Irish Presidencies during the process of deliberation and negotiation that produced the treaty. It further studies the failure of ratification in France and the Netherlands and the implications for the process of European integration of this failure. It finally touches on the question whether a constitutional equilibrium has been reached. Since the new Lisbon Treaty negotiated in 2007 contains much of what was in the Constitutional Treaty the analyses of the book remain pertinent for this latest EU treaty.

Constitution making is a divisive process, and it must be so. In any healthy constitutional negotiation, issues will be brought to the table on which the interests of the negotiating parties diverge. Parties to constitutional negotiations are thus faced with the challenge of developing a final document in which each group within the nation can take pride and ownership, even though with respect to many divisive issues that group will not have obtained what it wanted. There can be no fool-proof algorithms for resolving divisive issues to achieve this end, but there are mechanisms with which every negotiation process should be equipped. This paper addresses mechanisms for resolving divisive issues in constitutional negotiations.