"Argues that a constitution acquires an identity through experience--from a mix of the political aspirations and commitments that express a nation's past and the desire to transcend that past. It is changeable but resistant to its own destruction and manifests itself in various ways, as Jacobsohn shows in examples as far flung as India, Ireland, Israel, and the United States. Jacobsohn argues that the presence of disharmony--both the tensions within a constitutional order and those that exist between a constitutional document and the society it seeks to regulate--is critical to understnading the theory and dynamics of constitutional identity"--Jacket.

Presents a critical outline and comparison of selected EU Member State constitutional identities in the context of EU multilevel constitutionalism.

The last fifty years has seen a worldwide trend toward constitutional democracy. But can constitutionalism become truly global? Relying on historical examples of successfully implanted constitutional regimes, ranging from the older experiences in the United States and France to the relatively recent ones in Germany, Spain and South Africa, Michel Rosenfeld sheds light on the range of conditions necessary for the emergence, continuity and adaptability of a viable constitutional identity - citizenship, nationalism, multiculturalism, and human rights being important elements. The Identity of the Constitutional Subject is the first systematic analysis of the concept, drawing on philosophy, psychoanalysis, political theory and law from a comparative perspective to explore the relationship between the ideal of constitutionalism and the need to construct a common constitutional identity that is distinct from national, cultural, ethnic or religious identity. The Identity of the Constitutional Subject will be of interest to students and scholars in law, legal and political philosophy, political science, multicultural studies, international relations and US politics.

Over the past few years, 'national constitutional identity' has become the new buzzword in European constitutionalism. Much has been written about the concept involving the Member States' national constitutional identities: it has been welcomed for (finally) accommodating constitutional particularities in EU law, demonized for potentially disintegrating the EU, and wielded as a 'sword' by certain constitutional courts. Scholars, judges, and advocates in general have rendered the concept currently so fashionable and, yet, so ambivalent, that an in-depth analysis is warranted to put some order into the intense debate over constitutional identity. This collection brings together a series of contributions in order to shed some light into the dark corners of constitutional identity. To this end, a threefold approach has been followed: a conceptual or philosophical approach, an approach based on EU law, and an analysis of the case-law of several European courts. First, the book explores what constitutional identity means and who decides on it. Further, the contributions analyze (and at times unveil) the areas that might collide or at least interact with constitutional identity. Among other issues, the book touches upon EU law primacy , Article 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, EU criminal law and the essential functions of the State, and the existence of an EU 'constitutional core' enjoyable and enforceable through EU citizenship. Finally, the book deals with the case-law of European courts on national constitutional identity, including the perspective of various national constitutional courts, such as those of Eastern and Central European Member States, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the much-less analyzed European Court of Human Rights. (Series: Law and Cosmopolitan Values - Vol. 4)

The essays in this collection were first presented at an October 1991 conference on comparative constitutionalism under the auspices of the Jacob Burns Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, and the Cardozo-New School Project on Constitutionalism. Essays are organized in sections on the rebirth of constitutionalism, the legitimation of constitution making, the identity of the constitutional subject, the struggle between identity and difference, and the role of property rights. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

What does it mean to say you're English, Scottish, British? Does it matter much to people? Has devolution and constitutional change made a difference to national identity? Does the future of the UK depend on whether or not people think they are British? Social and political scientists answer these questions vital to the future of the British state.

An analysis of selective aspects of India’s constitutional identity, this book provides an analytical account of the changing and changed texture of India’s constitutional identity bearing in mind the historical context in which it is articulated. The book conceptualizes the gradual evolution of an idea by tracing the history of India’s constitutionalism with reference to its conceptual roots, historical antecedents and the landmark judicial pronouncements in which the concern for its retention and protection is always privileged. The author examines specific constitutional designs that the 1950 Constitution of India put in place and argues that constitutional identity, despite being drawn on specific constitutional provisions, is also changeable in view of the rapidly transforming socio-economic milieu. He demonstrates that there are numerous instances where India’s constitutional identity has undergone a metamorphosis in circumstances where newer politico-ideological values and norms are privileged. A valuable addition to the literature on constitutionalism and constitutional practices in general and their manifestation in India's democratic experiences, in particular, this book will be of interest to academics in the fields of Government, Political Science, Law and Jurisprudence, Constitutional and Legal History and Asian Studies.

With a focus on how national identity impacts the decision-making of the European Court of Justice, Elke Cloots provides an innovative adjudication scheme that purports to assist the ECJ in its search for a proper balance between respect for national identity and European integration.

Christine M. Korsgaard presents an account of the foundation of practical reason and moral obligation, based on a new theory of action and interaction. She proposes that the function of an action is to constitute the agency and therefore the identity of the person who does it, and that only morally good action can serve this function. -;Christine M. Korsgaard presents an account of the foundation of practical reason and moral obligation. Moral philosophy aspires to understand the fact that human actions, unlike the actions of the other animals, can be morally good or bad, right or wrong. Few moral philosophers, however, have exploited the idea that actions might be morally good or bad in virtue of being good or bad of their kind - good or bad as actions. Just as we need to know that it is the function of the. heart to pump blood to know that a good heart is one that pumps blood successfully, so we need to know what the function of an action is in order to know what counts as a good or bad action. Drawing on the work of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant, Korsgaard proposes that the function of an action is to. constitute the agency and therefore the identity of the person who does it. As rational beings, we are aware of, and therefore in control of, the principles that govern our actions. A good action is one that constitutes its agent as the autonomous and efficacious cause of her own movements. These properties correspond, respectively, to Kant's two imperatives of practical reason. Conformity to the categorical imperative renders us autonomous, and conformity to the hypothetical imperative. renders us efficacious. And in determining what effects we will have in the world, we are at the same time determining our own identities. Korsgaard develops a theory of action and of interaction, and of the form interaction must take if we are to have the integrity that, she argues, is essential for. agency. On the basis of that theory, she argues that only morally good action can serve the function of action, which is self-constitution. -

Constructs an original dialogue between constitutional law, film, and identity by using Hong Kong as a case study.