THE CONSCIENCE OF JUDGES AND APPLICA nON OF LEGAL RULES The book is devoted to the problem of the influence of moral judgements on the result of judicial decision-making in the process of application of the established (positive) law. It is the conscience of judges that takes the central place in the research. Conscience is understood in the meaning developed in the theory of Thomas Aquinas as the complex capacity of the human being to make moral judgements which represent acts of reason on the question of what is right or wrong in a particular situation. The reason why we need a theory of conscience in making judicial decisions lies in the nature of the positive law itself. On the one hand, there is an intrinsic conflict between the law as the body of rigid rules and the law as an living experience of those who are involved in social relationships. This conflict particularly finds its expression in the collision of strict justice and equity. The idea of equity does not reject the importance of rules in legal life. What is rejected is an idolatrous attitude to the rules when the uniqueness of a human being, his well being and happiness are disregarded and sacrificed in order to fulfil the observance of the rules. The rules themselves are neither good or bad. What makes them good or bad is their application.

Being Apart from Reasons deals with the question of how we should go about using reasons to decide what to do. More particularly, the book presents objections to the most common response given by contemporary legal and political theorists to the moral complexity of decision-making in modern societies, namely: the attempt to release public agents from their argumentative burden by insulating a particular set of reasons from the general pool of reasons and assigning the former systematic priority over all other reasons. That strategy is apparent both in Rawls’ claim that reasons concerning the right are systematically prior to reasons concerning the good and in Raz’s claim that pre-emptive reasons are systematically prior to first-order reasons. The same strategy is also instantiated by certain arguments for the procedural value of law, such as Jeremy Waldron’s. In the book, each of those arguments for the insulation of reasons is objected to in order to defend the thesis the reasoning by public agents must always be as comprehensive as possible. The remaining chapters object to those arguments mentioned above which aim at justifying the exclusion of certain reasons from public agents' decision-making.

The legitimacy and performance of the traditional criminal justice system is the subject of intense scrutiny as the world economic crisis continues to put pressure on governments to cut the costs of the criminal justice system. This volume brings together the leading work on restorative justice to achieve two objectives: to construct a comprehensive and up-to-date conceptual framework for restorative justice suitable even for newcomers; and to challenge the barriers of restorative justice in the hope of taking its theory and practice a step further. The selected articles start by answering some fundamental questions about restorative justice regarding its historical and philosophical origins, and challenge the concept by bringing into the debate the human rights and equality discourses. Also included is material based on empirical testing of restorative justice claims especially those impacting on reoffending rates, victim satisfaction and reintegration. The volume concludes with a critique of restorative justice as well as with analytical thinking that aims to push its barriers. It is hoped that the investigations offered by this volume not only offer hope for a better system for abolitionists and reformists, but also new and convincing evidence to persuade the sceptics in the debate over restorative justice.

Studies in Legal Logic is a collection of nine interrelated papers about the logic, epistemology and ontology of law. All of the papers were written after the publication of the author’s Reasoning with Rules and supplement the issues addressed therein. Some of the papers are new; others have been revised substantially after the publication of their original versions. The emphasis is on analysis, not on logical technicalities. Studies in Legal Logic contains chapters about the nature of norms, the role of coherence in the law, the nature of defeasibility, the role of dialectics in law and artificial intelligence, the statics and dynamics of the law, and the consistency of rules. Moreover, it contains a new, simplified and yet more powerful version of Reason-based Logic and extensive examples of how it can be used for the analysis of legal reasoning. The examples deal with legal theory construction, case-based reasoning, and judicial proof.

Building on his contributions to institutional legal theory in Institutional Legal Facts of 1993 (Law and Philosophy Library, volume 18), the author presents a comprehensive theory of legal institutions. To that end, the initial theoretical approach, which mainly concentrated on problems connected with legal powers and legal acts (acts-in-law), is widened to allow for the development of a theory of legal judgements capable of accounting not only for enacted but also unwritten law (legal principles and customary law). With the use of the concept of institutional legal facts, the structure of legal institutions is analyzed in detail. In addition to that, a classification of legal institutions is provided. Extensive attention is given to logical, as well as doctrinal problems connected with a conception of legal validity as the mode of existence of legal conditions rather than as a value of legal norms similar to the truth of propositions. The study results in an elaborate conceptual framework for institutional analysis of positive law. In a final chapter the analytical potential of the framework is put to the test by applying it to the branch of public international law known as the `law of treaties'. Readership: Specialists in legal theory and lawyers interested in theoretical issues, particularly in linguistic approaches and questions related to the institutional nature of law.

Talk about law often includes reference to ideals of justice, equality or freedom. But what do we refer to when we speak about ideals in the context of law? This book explores the concept of ideals by combining an investigation of different theories of ideals with a discussion of the role of ideals in law. A comparison of the theories of Gustav Radbruch and Philip Selznick leads up to a pragmatist theory of legal ideals, which provides an interesting new position in the debate about values in law between legal positivists and natural law thinkers. Attention for law's central ideals enables us to understand law's autonomous character, while at the same time tracing its connection to societal values. Essential reading for anyone interested in the role of values or ideals in law.

The intertwinement of EC law and national law may create unforeseeability in situations where EC law invades the national cases. This study contributes to the contemporary discussion, which wrestles with questions such as: What have been the visions and objectives for European integration in the last decades? How to describe European Union as a political entity and a legal system? What is the relationship between legal certainty, rule of law, various general principles and human rights?

We cannot see the world as it is because we face it in a 'contaminated' vein. That is, our conceptual scheme and biological constitution condition our world view. The legal normative world we are dealing with has some special features, like the primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason and the primacy of the internal point of view over the external point of view. Although it is not a feature of all legal traditions, 'legal dogmatics' is a privileged way of knowing legal normative object, that is, our legal orders. But we are not undertaking - as legal scholars - an empiricist enterprise because, among other reasons, we are not interested in the reality 'in itself' but in the 'relevant' reality, at least for us. In this respect, we do not only depend on theories (like physicists) but also on legal authoritative sources, that is, power and legitimacy. Legal scholars (and other participants in the legal life) are not neutral observers of their own world, trying to discover some hidden truth. They are committed experts trying to describe, justify and improve the legal order.

The legal essays by Michael Bayles in this collection display his commitment to utilitarianism both as a moral theory and an analytical device. A utilitarian must choose between the best of all possible alternatives and so must lay out the alternatives and thus their consequences carefully and completely. As it happens, there is no better way of understanding why something is as it is in the law, and no better way to lay the foundations for criticism and improvement, than to lay out what the alternatives are, carefully distinguishing them, their justifications, and their implications for changing other areas of the law and for changing our relation to the law. Bayles was a master at such work, and each essay thus repays careful study for anyone concerned about the law. The essays cover a wide variety of topics, from contract law to the criminal law, from torts to theory, and form a natural set. Laying out the alternatives in one area makes it much clearer how and why alternatives in other areas are acceptable or required. Interconnections within the legal system as a whole not readily visible when studying one area of the law become obvious when several are laid out side-by-side using the analytical skill required by a good utilitarian.