In 2003, the United States and other countries began implementing the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) to curtail the trade of rough diamonds that had fueled severe conflicts in Africa, known as conflict diamonds. CDTA provides the statutory framework for U.S. implementation of the KPCS. As mandated in CDTA, this report (1) describes the institutional framework established to implement the act, (2) examines implementation of the domestic provisions of the act and challenges it faces, and (3) examines how the United States has helped to strengthen the KPCS and challenges it faces. The United States has used multiple U.S. agencies and a private, not-for-profit entity to implement the domestic and international provisions of the Clean Diamond Trade Act (CDTA). The Departments of State and the Treasury have led U.S. efforts to implement the domestic provisions of the act; State has led the U.S. efforts to curtail trade in conflict diamonds abroad. Domestically, the Departments of State, the Treasury, Homeland Security, and Commerce, and the private entity, called the U.S. Kimberley Process Authority (USKPA), have been responsible for controlling U.S. imports and exports of rough diamonds. Internationally, State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. Geological Survey have helped to strengthen KPCS. Domestically, the U.S. systems for reporting rough diamond statistics and for controlling imports and exports of these diamonds are vulnerable to illicit trade. The United States has enhanced the quality of its rough diamond trade data by improving its collection processes, but work remains to be done. Also, the United States does not periodically inspect rough diamond imports or exports to ensure that the contents of the rough diamond parcels match the Kimberley Process certificates. In addition, the United States lacks an effective system for confirming receipt of imports-a Kimberley Process requirement for avoiding possible diversions of rough diamond imports. Finally, the United States has not had a plan for monitoring USKPA, but is developing and testing one. Internationally, the United States has helped to strengthen KPCS by participating in KPCS activities and providing assistance to Sierra Leone and Liberia in their efforts to comply with KPCS, but donor assistance to these countries faces challenges. Donors and diamond producing countries are considering a regional approach to help enhance the effectiveness of donor diamond-related assistance because this assistance is constrained by the limited capacity and resources of these countries and the need to harmonize diamond policies among countries vulnerable to illicit cross border diamond trading. Diamond Mining Site in Sierra Leone-A Recipient Country of U.S. Assistance Source: GAO.

GAO-06-978 Conflict Diamonds: Agency Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of the Clean Diamond Trade Act

Corporate strategy expert Prakash Sethi takes an in-depth look at global structures and how regulation works from a corporate perspective, providing case studies of several industries and governments who have begun implementing voluntary codes of conducts, including Equator Principles, ICMM, and The Kimberly Process.

Criminalized power structures (CPS) are illicit networks that profit from transactions in black markets and from criminalized state institutions while perpetuating a culture of impunity. These criminalized power structures are the predominant spoilers of peace settlements and stability operations. This volume focuses on the means available to practitioners to cope with the challenges posed by CPS along with recommendations for improving their efficacy and an enumeration of the conditions essential for their success. The means range from economic sanctions and border controls to the use of social media and criminal intelligence-led operations. Each step of this toolkit is detailed, explaining what each tool is, how it can be used, which type of CPS it is best suited to address, and what is necessary to ensure success of the peace operations. The effectiveness of the tool is also assessed and its use is illustrated through real life situations, such as international supply chain controls to prevent the looting of natural resources in Western Africa or the intervention of international judges and prosecutors in Kosovo. A companion volume, Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace, articulates a typology for assessing the threats of CPS illustrated by many case studies.

Building upon a range of case studies that range from civil war to maritime security and cyber crime, the contributors analyse how non-state actors can and should be involved in contributing to state and human security.

Informal International Lawmaking: Case Studies compiles case studies on instances of informal international lawmaking (IN-LAW) in diverse policy areas, including finance, investment, competition, pharmaceuticals and medical device regulation, food regulation, human rights, disaster management, and trade in diamonds. The term 'informal' international lawmaking is used in contrast and opposition to 'traditional' international lawmaking. More concretely, IN-LAW is informal in the sense that it dispenses with certain formalities traditionally linked to international law. These formalities may have to do with the process, actors and output involved. The literature has mostly criticized IN-LAW for its 'accountability deficits'. The chapters in this book, hence, do not simply give a descriptive overview of the case studies, but approach them from an accountability perspective. In this context, different questions are raised, such as: Is IN-LAW subject to any accountability measures? How accountable are IN-LAW participants to their constituents? How accountable are they towards those affected by their decisions? Are the accountability measures available at the international or at the domestic level? The book also examines how IN-LAW is elaborated and subsequently received in domestic legal systems, using the Netherlands and Brazil as case studies.

Asks whether governments choose the best institutional designs to enable effective measures against criminal trafficking.