This report examines the contributions and limitations of air power in the Persian Gulf War. The authors conclude that, for the first time in modern combat, air power was the equal partner of land and sea power, performing the "critical enabling function" that led to victory. The authors seek to moderate, however, certain claims made by airpower advocates after the war: they maintain that the war did not demonstrate that a strategic air campaign guarantees victory, but rather that air power, skillfully employed under the right conditions, can neutralize, if not completely destroy, a modern army in the field. Nor did the war display breakthroughs in weapon technology, but rather the prowess of well-trained and motivated airmen and their support crews in using maturing technology. Moreover, the authors maintain, the air war was not fought as "jointly" as many supposed. The sheer mass of available air power allowed it to be used inefficiently at times to cater to doctrinal preferences of the various services.

This collection of essays reflects the proceedings of a 1991 conference on "The United States Air Force: Aerospace Challenges and Missions in the 1990s," sponsored by the USAF and Tufts University. The 20 contributors comment on the pivotal role of airpower in the war with Iraq and address issues and choices facing the USAF, such as the factors that are reshaping strategies and missions, the future role and structure of airpower as an element of US power projection, and the aerospace industry's views on what the Air Force of the future will set as its acquisition priorities and strategies. The authors agree that aerospace forces will be an essential and formidable tool in US security policies into the next century. The contributors include academics, high-level military leaders, government officials, journalists, and top executives from aerospace and defense contractors.

Integrating interviews with individuals ranging from senior policymakers to frontline soldiers, a look at the Persian Gulf War shows how the conflict transformed modern warfare.

In January 1995 the Institute of Medicine released a preliminary report containing initial findings and recommendations on the federal government's response to reports by some veterans and their families that they were suffering from illnesses related to military service in the Persian Gulf War. The committee was asked to review the government's means of collecting and maintaining information for assessing the health consequences of military service and to recommend improvements and epidemiological studies if warranted. This new volume reflects an additional year of study by the committee and the full results of its three-year effort.

Twenty years ago, the Persian Gulf War captured the attention of the world as the first test of the U.S. Army since the Vietnam War and the first large-scale armor engagement since World War II. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and his subsequent ouster by the U.S.-led coalition are keys to understanding today's situation in the Middle East. The coalition partnerships cemented in that initial operation and in the regional peacekeeping operations that followed provided the basis for a growing series of multinational efforts that have characterized the post-Cold War environment. Moreover, the growing interoperability of U.S. air, sea, and land forces coupled with the extensive employment of more sophisticated weapons first showcased in Desert Storm have become the hallmark of American military operations and the standard that other nations strive to meet.

Many individuals, groups, and federal agencies have a strong interest in finding answers to the numerous and complex questions regarding the health of Gulf War veterans. Various types of research and health measurement are needed to address these diverse issues. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) was asked by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Defense (DoD) to undertake a study to identify important questions concerning the health of Gulf War veterans and then to design a study to answer those questions. The committee determined that it is of fundamental importance to ask how healthy are Gulf War veterans? Are they as healthy as others? What characteristics are associated with differences between the health of Gulf War veterans and the health of others? To address these questions, it will be necessary to measure not only the health status of those who served in the Gulf War, but also to compare Gulf War veterans with other groups. Further, one must continue to follow these groups through time to determine whether the groups differ in the way their health status is changing. As the committee began to develop a design that would address the fundamental questions identified, it realized that such a study could have important implications for understanding not only the health of Gulf War veterans, but also the health of veterans of other conflicts.

Phillip Thompson had kept a journal for years, from the time he was in college in the 1980s at the University of Mississippi until he attended the Artillery Officers' Advanced Course, when the demands of school interrupted. His desire to keep track of the events in his life was re-ignited with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, his impending deployment to the Persian Gulf in August 1990, and the beginning of Operation Desert Shield. While in the Persian Gulf, Thompson kept a small green, military-issue notebook with him at all times, writing down everything he could, drawing maps, explaining his emotions, and oftentimes, venting his anger. Upon his return from Saudi Arabia in 1991, he had filled three notebooks, which evolved into this work. Here are Thompson's personal experiences and his observations of those around him in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.