This book examines the viability of non-provocative defence - the controversial idea that defensive military policies and practices reduce the risk of wars and provide a viable basis for defending a society should war break out. Drawing on case studies from Europe, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and Asia-Pacific, the author concludes that non-provocative defence concepts remain relevant and that they can help in deterring, conducting, and settling wars.

This clear and concise text offers a comprehensive comparison of national, international, and human security concepts and policies. Laura Neack argues that security remains elusive because of a centuries-old ethic insisting that states are the primary and most important international actors, can rely ultimately only on themselves for protection, and must keep all options on the table for national security. The author compellingly demonstrates how a state-first security ethic ultimately fails to secure states, the international community and--most important--human beings. Although security as a concept can be widened to include almost any aspect of existence, Neack focuses especially on security from physical violence, beginning with efforts by states to defend themselves against violent attack. She explores such topics as the internal and external dimensions of security, terrorism, and defending the homeland; threat perception and responses; preemptive and preventive wars; and other military interventions. Next, Neack examines efforts over the past century to protect states through the construction of the United Nations international security system and how collective security, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement have been used in that system. Throughout, Neack shows that human security has only mattered in terms of servicing the state's security needs, a critique she takes up directly in the final chapters. A range of short and extended case studies are offered to illustrate the conceptual materials and policy debates over security. In this state-first world, we only can choose between degrees of insecurity; true security remains elusive.

Recoge: Murder among nations -- How to talk about self-defense -- A theory of legitimate defense -- The six elements of legitimate defense -- Excusing international aggression -- Humanitarian intervention -- Preemptive and preventitive wars -- The collective dimension of war.

This clear and concise new edition offers a comprehensive comparison of national, international, and human security concepts and policies. Laura Neack skillfully argues that security remains elusive because of a centuries-old ethic insisting that states are the primary and most important international actors, that they can rely ultimately only on themselves for protection, and that they must keep all options on the table for national security. This is particularly apparent with the increase in “glocalized” terrorism and the forced migration of millions of people. Although security as a concept can be widened to encompass almost any aspect of existence, Neack focuses especially on security from physical violence. Case studies throughout bring life to the concepts. New cases in this revised edition include the Syrian refugee crisis and the responses from European states, the growth and reach of jihadist terrorist groups and the unilateral and multilateral military actions taken to confront them, drug trafficking organizations and the Mexican government’s failure to protect citizens, the overt use of preventive war by major and regional powers and the increasing American reliance on drone warfare, multilateral "train-and-assist" operations aimed at peacekeeping and counterterrorism in Africa, UN civilian protection mandates in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire and their absence in Syria, and how terrorism and refugee crises are intimately connected. The first edition of this book was published under the title Elusive Security: States First, People Last in 2007.

"This book is the result of a workshop of the ASEAN Studies Centre (ASC) held in July 2010"--P. ix.

The basic idea of common security is not complex. It is that no country can obtain security, in the long run, simply by taking unilateral decisions about its own military forces. This is because security depends also on the actions and reactions of potential adversaries. Security has to be found in common with those adversaries. These ideas were considered in a SIPRI conference held in 1983. The conference had two main objectives. The first was to undertake a critical examination of the concept. The second was to consider the implications of the idea for policy in general, and for disarmament and arms control policy in particular. Originally published in 1985, this book contains revised versions of some of the papers presented at the conference.

One of the most dominant security issues of the twenty-first century has been the US led battle against transnational terrorism – the aptly named Long War. Over the past fifteen years the Long War has been examined using multiple perspectives. However, one central mechanism is missing in current Long War analyses: defence diplomacy. Defence diplomacy enhances the diplomatic and security capacity of a state, providing the only link between executive office and the ministries of foreign affairs and defence, two vital institutions in the Long War. Using a case study of US defence diplomacy in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014, the paper argues simply that the practice of defence diplomacy far outweighs current theories on what it is, how it works and why it matters. The paper aims to generate a more nuanced understanding of defence diplomacy, as well as identify it as a key component of the US CT/COIN strategy to achieve their Long War policy objectives.