Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising. What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms? Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy.

For many Americans, capitalism is a dynamic engine of prosperity that rewards the bold, the daring, and the hardworking. But to many outside the United States, capitalism seems like an initiative that serves only to concentrate power and wealth in the hands of a few hereditary oligarchies. As A History of Corporate Governance around the World shows, neither conception is wrong. In this volume, some of the brightest minds in the field of economics present new empirical research that suggests that each side of the debate has something to offer the other. Free enterprise and well-developed financial systems are proven to produce growth in those countries that have them. But research also suggests that in some other capitalist countries, arrangements truly do concentrate corporate ownership in the hands of a few wealthy families. A History of Corporate Governance around the World provides historical studies of the patterns of corporate governance in several countries-including the large industrial economies of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States; larger developing economies like China and India; and alternative models like those of the Netherlands and Sweden.

The governance of companies is of importance to developing countries due to the link between effective corporate governance and economic development. Ownership and control of public companies, except in the US and UK, is often in the hands of a few individuals, families or corporate groups and impact on corporate governance and economic development.Using Sri Lanka as an illustrative example, Corporate Ownership and Control sets out the implications of corporate ownership and control structures on the governance of companies, and suggests a reform agenda to meet the challenges posed by such structures. Any analysis into the reform of corporate governance in developing countries should begin with a focus on the local market structures that define its adaptation and effectiveness. The issues explored in the book provide an insight into ownership and control structures in Sri Lanka, the costs and benefits of such structures, and the necessary reform framework to promote effective corporate governance. The analysis can be used to both understand the impact of ownership structures on corporate governance, and suggest how corporate governance issues arising from such structures should be resolved in order to promote economic development and growth.

People have worried for many years about the concentration of private power over the media, as evidenced by controversy over Federal Communication Commission rulings on broadcast ownership limits. The fear, it seems, is of a media mogul with a political agenda: a new William Randolph Hearst who could help start wars or run for political office using the power of the media. In the light of these concerns about freedom of speech, Eli Noam provides a comprehensive survey of media concentration in America, covering everything from the early media empire of Benjamin Franklin to the modern-day cellular phone industry.

In a painstaking analysis, Roe (law, Harvard Law School) examines the impact of a nation's strong social policies on the corporate governance, suggesting that stronger social policies can cause an American style of diffuse ownership among shareholders to fail. The link between social policies and corporate governance is examined statistically for a large number of countries, and in case studies for seven: Italy, Germany, Sweden, the UK, France, Japan, and the US. Product markets, securities markets, and the ability of corporate and economic structures to induce a political backlash are discussed. Annotation (c)2003 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com).

The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.

Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.

Corporate law and governance are at the forefront of regulatory activities worldwide, and subject to increasing public attention in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. Comprehensively referencing the key debates, the Handbook provides a much-needed framework for understanding the aims and methods of legal research in the field.

Concentrated ownership is considered to be the best protection for shareholders in economies where legal protection is relatively weak. This book investigates and concludes, for Indian business groups, that concentrated-inside ownership provides opportunities for the expropriation of minority shareholders. While more concentrated direct ownership of controlling families results in a higher market value of equity, indirect ownership obtained through cross-holding provides incentives to extract private benefits and results in value loss. This finding requires the prompt attention of regulatory bodies, outside investors and other interested parties. This book examines the effect of ownership structure and disclosure of related-party transactions on firm valuation of group-affiliated firms in India, by using a sample of 317 listed firms comprising 1350 firm-year observations from 2008 to 2017. Well-accepted value-relevance models are employed to examine the effect of ownership rights on market value of equity and valuation effect of RP trading, asset transfer, investment and loan transactions.