This book provides a sustained and penetrating critique of a wide range of views in modern cognitive science and philosophy of the mind, from Turing's famous test for intelligence in machines to recent work in computational linguistic theory. While discussing many of the key arguments and topics, the authors also develop a distinctive analytic approach. Drawing on the methods of conceptual analysis first elaborated by Wittgenstein and Ryle, the authors seek to show that these methods still have a great deal to offer in the field of the cognitive theory and the philosophy of mind, providing a powerful alternative to many of the positions put forward in the contemporary literature. Amoung the many issues discussed in the book are the following: the Cartesian roots of modern conceptions of mind; Searle's 'Chinese Room' thought experiment; Fodor's 'language of thought' hypothesis; the place of 'folk psychology' in cognitivist thought; and the question of whether any machine may be said to 'think' or 'understand' in the ordinary senses of these words. Wide ranging, up-to-date and forcefully argued, this book represents a major intervention in contemporary debates about the status of cognitive science an the nature of mind. It will be of particular interest to students and scholars in philosophy, psychology, linguistics and computing sciences.

An important collection of studies providing a fresh and original perspective on the nature of mind, including thoughtful and detailed arguments that explain why the prevailing paradigm - the computational conception of language and mentality - can no longer be sustained. An alternative approach is advanced, inspired by the work of Charles S. Peirce, according to which minds are sign-using (or `semiotic') systems, which in turn generates distinctions between different kinds of minds and overcomes problems that burden more familiar alternatives. Unlike conceptions of minds as machines, this novel approach has obvious evolutionary implications, where differences in semiotic abilities tend to distinguish the species. From this point of view, the scope and limits of computer and AI systems can be more adequately appraised and alternative accounts of consciousness and cognition can be more thoroughly criticised. Readership: Intermediate and advanced students of computer science, AI, cognitive science, and all students of the philosophy of the mind.

Computing Methodologies -- Artificial Intelligence.

The basic questions addressed in this book are: what is the computational nature of cognition, and what role does it play in language and other mental processes?; What are the main characteristics of contemporary computational paradigms for describing cognition and how do they differ from each other?; What are the prospects for building cognition and how do they differ from each other?; and what are the prospects for building an artificial intelligence?

Winner of the Wolf Prize for his contribution to our understanding of the universe, Penrose takes on the question of whether artificial intelligence will ever approach the intricacy of the human mind. 144 illustrations.

For many decades, the proponents of `artificial intelligence' have maintained that computers will soon be able to do everything that a human can do. In his bestselling work of popular science, Sir Roger Penrose takes us on a fascinating tour through the basic principles of physics, cosmology, mathematics, and philosophy to show that human thinking can never be emulated by a machine. Oxford Landmark Science books are 'must-read' classics of modern science writing which have crystallized big ideas, and shaped the way we think.

This work offers a selection of seminal papers on the foundations of cognitive science, from leading figures in artificial intelligence, linguistics, philosophy and cognitive psychology. Each category includes papers that show the conception in question, illustrate, interpret or criticise it.

A new computationalist view of the mind that takes into account real-world issues of embodiment, interaction, physical implementation, and semantics.

Presents the author's thesis that consciousness, in its manifestation in the human quality of understanding, is doing something that mere computation cannot; and attempts to understand how such non-computational action might arise within scientifically comprehensive physical laws.