The growth of Italian exports has lagged that of euro area peers. Against the backdrop of unit labor costs that have risen faster than those in euro area peers, this paper examines whether there is a competitiveness challenge in Italy and evaluates the framework of wage bargaining. Wages are set at the sectoral level and extended nationally. However, they do not respond well to firm-specific productivity, regional disparities, or skill mismatches. Nominally rigid wages have also implied adjustment through lower profits and employment. Wage developments explain about 45 percent of the manufacturing unit labor cost gap with Germany. In a search-and-match DSGE model of the Italian labor market, this paper finds substantial gains from moving from sectoral- to firm-level wage setting of at least 3.5 percentage points lower unemployment (or higher employment) rate and a notable improvement in Italy’s competitiveness over the medium term.

This Selected Issues paper analyzes the competitiveness and wage bargaining reform in Italy. The growth of Italian exports has lagged that of euro area peers. Wages are set at the sectoral level and extended nationally. However, they do not respond well to firm-specific productivity, regional disparities, or skill mismatches. Nominally rigid wages have also implied adjustment through lower profits and employment. The analysis also suggests substantial gains from moving from sectoral- to firm-level wage setting of at least 3.5 percentage points, lower unemployment (or higher employment) rate and a notable improvement in Italy’s competitiveness over the medium term.

Since the mid-1990s, Italy has been characterised by a lack of labour productivity growth, combined with a 60 percent growth in labour costs, 20 percentage points above euro-area average consumer price growth. As a consequence, Italy has become less competitive compared to its euro-area partners, the profitability of its firms has dropped and real GDP-per-capita has flatlined. At the root of the substantial discrepancy between wages and productivity is Italy's current system of centralised wage bargaining which, in many ways, is designed without regard for the underlying industrial structure and geographical heterogeneity of the Italian economy. This has fostered perverse incentives and imbalances within Italy. Collective wage bargaining, and in particular the determination of base salaries, should be moved from the national to the regional level for all contracts, in the public and private sectors. The Mezzogiorno, which might superficially be seen as losing out from this policy, would actually gain the most in competitiveness terms. Furthermore, measures should be taken so that, in the long run, the Italian industrial structure evolves into a less fragmented small-company-based economy. This firm consolidation would likely expand the use of firm-level agreements and performance payments, and would improve Italy's productivity and competitiveness overall.

Despite improvements in labor market performance over the past decade, owing in part to past reforms, Italy's employment and productivity outcomes continue to lag behind those of its European peers. This paper reviews Italy's institutional landscape and labor market trends from a cross-country perspective, and discusses possible avenues for further reform. The policy discussion draws on international reform experience and on simulations based on a calibrated labor market matching model. A key lesson is that the details of reform design, and the sequencing of reforms, matter greatly for labor market outcomes and for the fiscal costs associated with these reforms.

This paper seeks to quantify the net benefits of a comprehensive reform package aimed at addressing Italy’s inter-related challenges. Specifically, it simulates the growth and competitiveness effects of a package of fiscal, financial, wage bargaining, and other structural reforms. Credible implementation of such a package yields substantial mediumterm dividends at negligible near-term growth costs. Real GDP growth is estimated to be substantially higher over the medium term, while the real effective exchange rate depreciates notably.

Within the framework of the new European economic governance, neoliberal views on wages have further increased in prominence and have steered various reforms of collective bargaining rules and practices. As the crisis in Europe came to be largely interpreted as a crisis of competitiveness, wages were seen as the core adjustment variable for ‘internal devaluation’, the claim being that competitiveness could be restored through a reduction of labour costs. This book proposes an alternative view according to which wage developments need to be strengthened through a Europe-wide coordinated reconstruction of collective bargaining as a precondition for more sustainable and more inclusive growth in Europe. It contains major research findings from the CAWIE2 – Collectively Agreed Wages in Europe – project, conducted in 2014–2015 for the purpose of discussing and debating the currently dominant policy perspectives on collectively-bargained wage systems under the new European economic governance.

This paper provides a synthesis of existing and new empirical perspectives on the structure of the Italian labor market, using data at different levels of disaggregation. The analysis indicates that aggregate data mask considerable disparities in labor market outcomes across regions and demographic groups. The evolutions of sectoral wage and employment structures also point to some dimensions of labor market rigidities. A micro data set with individual data is then used to highlight key structural problems that affect labor supply and demand. The implications of these different strands of empirical analysis for the formulation and effective implementation of labor market policy are then discussed.

Abstract: Wage bargaining structures in Italy and Spain changed significantly in the 1990s. This is usually seen as an employer-led response to exogenous pressures such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This article shows that while EMU acted as a catalyst for negotiated adjustments, changes in wage bargaining are better explained through factors endogenous to national systems, in particular union strategies and interactions in the policy-making arena. By means of policy concertation and political exchange, unions have shaped institutional change in collective bargaining so as to avoid a disorganized decentralization of labour relations

This paper seeks to quantify the net benefits of a comprehensive reform package aimed at addressing Italy’s inter-related challenges. Specifically, it simulates the growth and competitiveness effects of a package of fiscal, financial, wage bargaining, and other structural reforms. Credible implementation of such a package yields substantial mediumterm dividends at negligible near-term growth costs. Real GDP growth is estimated to be substantially higher over the medium term, while the real effective exchange rate depreciates notably.

This 2018 Article IV Consultation highlights that Italy has been struggling with low economic growth and poor social outcomes and structural weaknesses have been at the core of this economic underperformance. Growth is projected to slow further, and the risk of recession has risen. The extent to which risks materialize depends largely on Italy’s policies. The authorities felt strongly that a fiscal stimulus is needed to promote economic growth and improve social outcomes. The authorities are also seeking to reduce temporary employment and support job search. The report suggests that faster potential growth is the only durable way for Italy to improve outcomes and enhance resilience. A package of structural reforms, a credible fiscal consolidation based on growth-friendly and inclusive measures, and bank balance sheet strengthening structural reforms, fiscal policy, and financial stability are also recommended. As by facilitating re-alignment of wages with productivity at the firm and regional levels, Italy’s high structural unemployment would fall, as would the continued heavy resort to temporary employment.