A proposal for moving from price-centric to innovation-centric competition policy, reviewing theory and available evidence on economic incentives for innovation. Competition policy and antitrust enforcement have traditionally focused on prices rather than innovation. Economic theory shows the ways that price competition benefits consumers, and courts, antitrust agencies, and economists have developed tools for the quantitative evaluation of price impacts. Antitrust law does not preclude interventions to encourage innovation, but over time the interpretation of the laws has raised obstacles to enforcement policies for innovation. In this book, economist Richard Gilbert proposes a shift from price-centric to innovation-centric competition policy. Antitrust enforcement should be concerned with protecting incentives for innovation and preserving opportunities for dynamic, rather than static, competition. In a high-technology economy, Gilbert argues, innovation matters.

There is growing consensus among international trade negotiators and policymakers that a prime area for future multilateral discussion is competition policy. Competition policy includes antitrust policy (including merger regulation and control) but is often extended to include international trade measures and other policies that affect the structure, conduct, and performance of individual industries. This study includes country studies of competition policy in Western Europe, North America, and the Far East (with a focus on Japan) in the light of increasingly globalized activities of business firms. Areas where there are major differences in philosophy, policy, or practice are identified, with emphasis on those differences that could lead to economic costs and international friction. Alternatives for eliminating these costs and frictions are discussed, including unilateral policy changes, bilateral or multilateral harmonization of policies, and creation of new international regimes to supplement or replace national or regional regimes.

This volume contains a selection of papers that were presented at the CRESSE Conferences held in Chania, Crete, from July 6th to 8th, 2012, and in Corfu from July 5th to 7th, 2013. The chapters address current policy issues in competition and regulation. The book contains contributions at the frontier of competition economics and regulation and provides perspectives on recent research findings in the field. Written by experts in their respective fields, the book brings together current thinking on market forces at play in imperfectly competitive industries, how firms use anti-competitive practices to their advantage and how competition policy and regulation can address market failures. It provides an in-depth analysis of various ongoing debates and offers fresh insights in terms of conceptual understanding, empirical findings and policy implications. The book contributes to our understanding of imperfectly competitive markets, anti-competitive practices and competition policy and regulation.

This new Sixth Edition of a major work by the well-known competition law team at Van Bael & Bellis in Brussels brings the book up to date to take account of the many developments in the case law and relevant legislation that have occurred since the Fifth Edition in 2010. The authors have also taken the opportunity to write a much-extended chapter on private enforcement and a dedicated section on competition law in the pharmaceutical sector. As one would expect, the new edition continues to meet the challenge for businesses and their counsel, providing a thoroughly practical guide to the application of the EU competition rules. The critical commentary cuts through the theoretical underpinnings of EU competition law to expose its actual impact on business. In this comprehensive new edition, the authors examine such notable developments as the following: important rulings concerning the concept of a restriction by object under Article 101; the extensive case law in the field of cartels, including in relation to cartel facilitation and price signalling; important Article 102 rulings concerning pricing and exclusivity, including the Post Danmark and Intel judgments, as well as standard essential patents; the current block exemption and guidelines applicable to vertical agreements, including those applicable to the motor vehicle sector; developments concerning online distribution, including the Pierre Fabre and Coty rulings; the current guidelines and block exemptions in the field of horizontal cooperation, including the treatment of information exchange; the evolution of EU merger control, including court defeats suffered by the Commission and the case law on procedural infringements; the burgeoning case law related to pharmaceuticals, including concerning reverse payment settlements; the current technology transfer guidelines and block exemption; procedural developments, including in relation to the right to privacy, access to file, parental liability, fining methodology, inability to pay and hybrid settlements; the implementation of the Damages Directive and the first interpretative rulings. As a comprehensive, up-to-date and above all practical analysis of the EU competition rules as developed by the Commission and EU Courts, this authoritative new edition of a classic work stands alone. Like its predecessors, it will be of immeasurable value to both business persons and their legal advisers.

This is the first book to provide a systematic treatment of the economics of antitrust (or competition policy) in a global context. It draws on the literature of industrial organisation and on original analyses to deal with such important issues as cartels, joint-ventures, mergers, vertical contracts, predatory pricing, exclusionary practices, and price discrimination, and to formulate policy implications on these issues. The interaction between theory and practice is one of the main features of the book, which contains frequent references to competition policy cases and a few fully developed case studies. The treatment is written to appeal to practitioners and students, to lawyers and economists. It is not only a textbook in economics for first year graduate or advanced undergraduate courses, but also a book for all those who wish to understand competition issues in a clear and rigorous way. Exercises and some solved problems are provided.

A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.

Although it is commonly assumed that consumers benefit from the application of competition law, this is not necessarily always the case. Economic efficiency is paramount; thus, competition law in Europe and antitrust law in the United States are designed primarily to protect business competitors (and in Europe to promote market integration), and it is only incidentally that such law may also serve to protect consumers. That is the essential starting point of this penetrating critique. The author explores the extent to which US antitrust law and EC competition law adequately safeguard consumer interests. Specifically, he shows how the two jurisdictions have gone about evaluating collusive practices, abusive conduct by dominant firms and merger activity, and how the policies thus formed have impacted upon the promotion of consumer interests. He argues that unless consumer interests are directly and specifically addressed in the assessment process, maximization of consumer welfare is not sufficiently achieved. Using rigorous analysis he develops legal arguments that can accomplish such goals as the following: replace the economic theory of ‘consumer welfare’ with a principle of consumer well-being; build consumer benefits into specific areas of competition policy; assess competition cases so that income distribution effects are more beneficial to consumers; and control mergers in such a way that efficiencies are passed directly to consumers. The author argues that, in the last analysis, the promotion of consumer well-being should be the sole or at least the primary goal of any antitrust regime. Lawyers and scholars interested in the application and development and reform of competition law and policy will welcome this book. They will find not only a fresh approach to interpretation and practice in their field – comparing and contrasting two major systems of competition law – but also an extremely lucid analysis of the various economic arguments used to highlight the consumer welfare enhancing or welfare reducing effects of business practices.

Competition authorities are increasingly interested in understanding the impact of their activities on markets and consumers. The goal is to improve competition policy rules and decision-making practices and to get robust evidence on the benefits of competition and competition policy for society as a whole. Discussions with competition authorities, practitioners and academics have shown the need to take stock of the experience gained in this field by the European Commission and to present it in an easily accessible way. The studies collected in this volume – prepared by senior Commission officials and competition policy experts – range from the ex post evaluation of specific policy interventions to the assessment of the broader impact of competition policy. The issues and topics examined include the following: objectives and scope of evaluations by the European Commission; description of counterfactual evaluation techniques used; conditions for a successful ex post evaluation of a competition policy intervention; a wide selection of individual cases covering a variety of economic sectors; applications in merger control, antitrust and State aid; direct benefits of competition policy interventions for consumers; deterrent effects of such interventions on market participants; and macroeconomic outcomes in terms of job creation, productivity and GDP growth. This matchless book assembles within a single volume all that is needed for competition policy analysts and practitioners to undertake ex post economic evaluations. While its collection of state-of-the-art ex post evaluation studies has a clear value for competition authorities, it is sure to be welcomed as well by competition law practitioners in the private sector, who will greatly appreciate the effort made to cast a critical eye on decisions taken in the past. Moreover, it allows for addressing some of the new challenges facing competition policymakers. Fabienne Ilzkovitz is Principal Advisor responsible for the economic evaluation of competition policy within the Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission, and since 2014, she has coordinated various ex post evaluation projects in the Directorate-General. She is also Associate Professor of Economics in the Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium. Adriaan Dierx is Senior Expert on ex post economic evaluation within the Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission. He has managed a number of studies aimed at assessing the economic impact of the European Commission’s competition policy interventions.