This volume explores the promise and limitations of competitive market dynamics, looking at the threats to competition - cartels, agreements, monopolies, and mergers - and the laws in place across the US and European Union to safeguard the process of competition.

These recognized leaders in competition and antitrust law offer an in-depth comparison of Canadian and U.S. competition laws, from their origins in the nineteenth century to the most recent cases involving mergers, pricing practices, cartels, advertising and abuse of dominance, with a special chapter on antitrust economics, which makes economics accessible to lawyers."--Pub. desc.

Written by leading members of the Competition Practice Groups of Davies Ward Phillps & Vineberg LLP and Blake Cassels & Graydon LLP, Competition Law of Canada is the definitive work on the subject and is recognized by the Canadian legal Expert Directory 2002 as most frequently cited as the leading loose leaf service on Canadian competiton law. Organized in a logical, easily accessible format, this work provides comprehensive analysis, historical perspective and practical examination of Canadian competition law. All the major areas of competition law are examined in individual detailed chapters.

Competition law now affects virtually all aspects of economic life in many parts of the world. This book provides an overview of competition law's substantive content and methods as well as an analysis of its dynamics. It is a critical tool for anyone dealing with competition law.

This title covers international and comparative issues of antitrust law, economics, and policy. It can be used to enrich U.S. antitrust casebooks or by itself for courses on global antitrust. It addresses all major issues of competition law and global competition policy, including extraterritoriality; global norms; cooperation, convergence, and divergence; the state's role in restraining or facilitating competition; process and procedures; and substantive areas including cartels, horizontal and vertical agreements, abuse of dominance, and mergers. It compares developed and developing jurisdictions. It references numerous jurisdictions, including the European Union, China, Japan, India, Russia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Latin American countries.

Preface p. xi 1 Economics p. 1 I. Definitions p. 1 II. Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly p. 9 III. Further Topics p. 21 2 Law and Policy p. 27 I. Some Interpretation Issues p. 28 II. Enacting the Antitrust Law p. 30 III. What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do? p. 40 3 Enforcement p. 43 I. Optimal Enforcement Theory p. 43 II. Enforcement Provision of the Antitrust Laws p. 47 Appendix p. 64 4 Cartels p. 68 I. Cartels p. 68 II. Conscious Parallelism p. 73 III. Conclusion p. 89 5 Development of Section 1 Doctrine p. 90 I. The Sherman Act Versus the Common Law p. 90 II. Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 104 III. Conclusion p. 112 6 Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 113 I. The Case for Price Fixing p. 113 II. Per-Se and Rule of Reason Analysis: Further Developments p. 116 III. Per-Se Versus Rule of Reason Tests: Understanding the Supreme Court's Justification for the Per-Se Rule p. 129 7 Agreement p. 132 I. The Development of Inference Doctrine p. 133 II. Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theory p. 140 8 Facilitating Mechanisms p. 144 I. Data Dissemination Cases p. 145 II. Basing Point Pricing and Related Practices p. 154 III. Basing Point Pricing: Economics p. 160 9 Boycotts p. 166 I. Pre-Socony p. 166 II. Post-Socony p. 170 III. Post-BMI/Sylvania p. 181 IV. Conclusion p. 184 10 Monopolization p. 186 I. Development of Section 2 Doctrine p. 186 II. Leveraging and Essential Facility Cases p. 202 III. Predatory Pricing p. 212 IV. Conclusion p. 228 11 Power p. 230 I. Measuring Market Power p. 230 II. Determinants of Market Power p. 235 III. Substitutability and the Relevant Market: Cellophane p. 237 IV. Multimarket Monopoly and the Relevant Market: Alcoa p. 239 V. Measuring Power: Guidelines p. 243 12 Attempts p. 244 I. The Swift Formula and Modern Doctrine p. 244 II. Dangerous Probability Requirement p. 248 13 Vertical Restraints p. 252 I. Resale Price Maintenance p. 252 II. Vertical Nonprice Restraints p. 262 III. Manufacturer Retains Title p. 267 IV. Agreement p. 270 14 Tying and Exclusive Dealing p. 279 I. Introduction p. 279 II. Early Cases p. 284 III. Development of Per-Se Rule p. 286 IV. Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and Per-Se Rule p. 295 V. Technological Tying p. 301 VI. Exclusive Dealing p. 303 Appendix p. 307 15 Horizontal Mergers p. 311 I. Reasons for Merging and Implications for Law p. 311 II. Horizontal Merger Law p. 317 III. Conclusion p. 330 Appendix p. 330 16 Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate p. 333 I. Vertical Mergers p. 333 II. Conglomerate Mergers p. 344 III. Concluding Remarks p. 351 17 Antitrust and the State p. 352 I. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine p. 354 II. Parker Doctrine p. 371 III. Some Final Comments: Error Costs and Immunity Doctrines p. 375 Index p. 379.

Previous edition, 1st, published 1994.

The United States and the European Union operate the world’s two most powerful systems of competition law and policy, whose enforcement and judicial institutions employ similar concepts and legal language. Yet the two regimes sometimes reach very different results on significant antitrust issues. In The Atlantic Divide in Antitrust, Daniel Gifford and Robert Kudrle show that a combination of differences in social values, political institutions, and legal precedent inhibit close convergence. The book explores the main contested areas of contemporary antitrust: mergers, price discrimination, predatory pricing, exclusive supply, conditional rebating, intellectual property, and Schumpeterian competition. The authors explore how the prevailing antitrust analyses differ in the EU and the U.S., the policy ramifications of these differences, and how the analyses used by the enforcement authorities or the courts in each of these several areas relate to each other. Several themes run through the substantive areas treated in the book: pricing incentives and constraints, welfare effects, and whether competition tends to be viewed as an efficiency generating process or as rivalry. The notorious Microsoft case offers a useful lens to examine copyright, patents, and trade secrets, and the authors take the opportunity to contemplate competition policy in dynamic, innovative industries more broadly. For the EU, competition policy has also functioned as a mechanism to bond national markets together in the EU structure; the USA, federal from the beginning, did not require this instrumental aspect in its antitrust doctrines. The Atlantic Divide concludes with forecasts and suggestions about how greater compatibility, if not convergence, might ultimately be attained.