In this book the author examines and ultimately rejects the conventional economic view that workers who have more dangerous jobs accept their risks voluntarily and are compensated through higher wages. In doing so, he attacks widely used techniques for assigning a monetary value to human life for cost-benefit analysis and other purposes. Arguments are drawn from the history of occupational safety and health, econometric analysis of wage and risk data, and formal models of the labour market. In place of the conventional view, Peter Dorman proposes a view based on new work in decision theory (thick rationality) and the theory of repeated games. These insights are combined with comparative policy analysis to support an approach to risk that promotes both regulatory effectiveness and democratic values. Despite its technical content, the book is written in highly accessible style, and is concerned with matters of general interest in the development of critical social science.

Compensating wage differentials is Adam Smith's idea that wage differences equalize differences in job and worker characteristics. Other than risk of death, however, no job characteristics have consistently been found to affect wages, likely because of problems with self-selection and unobservable job characteristics. We run experiments in an online labor market, randomizing offered pay and job characteristics, thereby overcoming both problems. We find, as predicted by our model, that increasing job disamenities significantly reduces both likelihood of working and amount of work supplied. Correspondingly, the wage increases necessary to compensate workers for worse job disamenities are substantial, supporting the theory.