A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.

A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.

An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.

Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna's ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. - Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions - New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications - New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.

Table of contents

Stochastic local search (SLS) algorithms are among the most prominent and successful techniques for solving computationally difficult problems. Offering a systematic treatment of SLS algorithms, this book examines the general concepts and specific instances of SLS algorithms and considers their development, analysis and application.

How can organizations ensure that they can get best value for money in their procurement decisions? How can they stimulate innovations from their dedicated suppliers? With contributions from leading academics and professionals, this 2006 handbook offers expert guidance on the fundamental aspects of successful procurement design and management in firms, public administrations, and international institutions. The issues addressed include the management of dynamic procurement; the handling of procurement risk; the architecture of purchasing systems; the structure of incentives in procurement contracts; methods to increase suppliers' participation in procurement contests and e-procurement platforms; how to minimize the risk of collusion and of corruption; pricing and reputation mechanisms in e-procurement platforms; and how procurement can enhance innovation. Inspired by frontier research, it provides practical recommendations to managers, engineers and lawyers engaged in private and public procurement design.

This book develops allocation mechanisms that aim to ensure an efficient resource allocation in modern IT-services. Recent methods of artificial intelligence, such as neural networks and reinforcement learning, and nature-oriented optimization methods, such as genetic algorithms and simulated annealing, are advanced and applied to allocation processes in distributed IT-infrastructures, or grid systems.