Combating a Modern Hydra: Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism is number eight in the Combat Studies Institute s Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Paper series. This work resulted from discussions at Fort Leavenworth about the nature of the enemy facing the United States and its allies since 11 September 2001. Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network had been present at some level in the national and international consciousness since the late 1990s. The events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent global operations taken against Al Qaeda have brought this group to the forefront of the GWOT. While successes have been achieved in the GWOT, the enemy has proven to be resilient and adaptive. This study by Mr. Sean Kalic, of the Department of Military History, US Army Command and General Staff College, examines modern transnational terrorism from the 1960s to the present day, with special emphasis on the adaptation Al Qaeda and other nonstate actors have taken in response to the actions of the United States and its allies. This work provides a cautionary warning about the likelihood Al Qaeda will continue to survive and execute missions in the current operating environment. Mr. Kalic synthesizes much of the pertinent literature and offers insights into the actions taken to ght terrorists. Most importantly, he advises a continual reevaluation of the threat, based on Al Qaeda's exibility, resiliency, and adaptability. Of cers and soldiers who have recently served in operations against the terrorist worldwide will certainly see utility here. As the US Army continues its efforts in combating terrorists, the thoughts found in this narrative are well worth considering.

Combating a Modern Hydra: Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism is number eight in the Combat Studies Institute's Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Paper series. This work resulted from discussions at Fort Leavenworth about the nature of the enemy facing the United States and its allies since 11 September 2001. Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network had been present at some level in the national and international consciousness since the late 1990s. The events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent global operations taken against Al Qaeda have brought this group to the forefront of the GWOT. While successes have been achieved in the GWOT, the enemy has proven to be resilient and adaptive. This study by Mr. Sean Kalic, of the Department of Military History, US Army Command and General Staff College, examines modern transnational terrorism from the 1960s to the present day, with special emphasis on the adaptation Al Qaeda and other nonstate actors have taken in response to the actions of the United States and its allies. This work provides a cautionary warning about the likelihood Al Qaeda will continue to survive and execute missions in the current operating environment. Mr. Kalic synthesizes much of the pertinent literature and offers insights into the actions taken to fight terrorists. Most importantly, he advises a continual reevaluation of the threat, based on Al Qaeda's flexibility, resiliency, and adaptability. Officers and soldiers who have recently served in operations against the terrorist worldwide will certainly see utility here. As the US Army continues its efforts in combating terrorists, the thoughts found in this narrative are well worth considering.~

Terror Groups. Global War on Terrorism Combating a Modern Hydra Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism Sean N. Kalic Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 8 On 11 September 2001 a new epoch in warfare emerged. With Al Qaeda's attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington DC, the United States suffered one of the most catastrophic attacks on the continental United States in the nation's history. Nineteen days after the attacks, President George W. Bush addressed a joint session of Congress and stated, "Our war on terrorism begins with Al Qaeda, but does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated."I n essence, the president confirmed the opening of the US-led global war on terrorism (GWOT). Unlike previous experiences in which the United States has gone to war, in this new era of warfare, the enemy is fundamentally different. In the past, the United States went to war against nations, regimes, and alliances. In stark contrast within the parameters of the GWOT, the enemy is not a traditional nation-state, regime, or alliance structure. Rather, non-state actors seek to use terrorism and violence to advance their political, theological, and ideological agendas. Since the entire international community structure has been and is based upon traditional nation-states, the GWOT era presents some specific legal, political, and social complications. The objective of this study, however, is to analyze how the terrorist organizations have adapted to the actions taken by the United States and its international allies to win the war on terrorism. Since 11 September 2001, the United States and its allies have pursued terrorist organizations by using a wide variety of law enforcement, financial, military, and diplomatic tools. While the conglomerate of actions taken by the US-led coalition have impacted the organizational structure, finances, and operations of terrorist regimes, these non-state actor remain flexible, resilient, and adaptive in the current security environment.

The author examines three features of the war on terrorism as currently defined and conducted: (1) the administration's postulation of the terrorist threat, (2) the scope and feasibility of U.S. war aims, and (3) the war's political, fiscal, and military sustainability. He believes that the war on terrorism--as opposed to the campaign against al-Qaeda-- lacks strategic clarity, embraces unrealistic objectives, and may not be sustainable over the long haul. He calls for downsizing the scope of the war on terrorism to reflect concrete U.S. security interests and the limits of American military power.

From the publisher. Insurgencies are like the hydra, the many-headed beast of Greek mythology. Once one begins, the measures a government takes to eliminate militants -- to cut off the insurgency's head -- can provoke countless others to join the enemy ranks. Tactical victories often breed strategic defeats. Traditional "search, destroy, and withdraw" missions that rely on firepower to wipe out rebels frequently destroy the livelihoods and loved ones of innocent people caught in the cross fire. U.S. troops have seen the pattern repeated as their initially successful offensives toppled enemy regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq but soon transformed into grueling guerrilla wars. Hearts, Minds, and Hydras outlines the reasons for these worsening situations. The most crucial were self-defeating decisions made by the George W. Bush administration, whose neoconservatism and hubris rather than careful analysis of genuine threats, national interests, and reasonable options shaped its policies. Although the Americans were eventually able to contain and diminish the insurgency in Iraq, the one in Afghanistan not only steadily intensified but also spread into neighboring Pakistan. The near abandonment of the war in Afghanistan and the neoconservative campaign in Iraq were godsends for al Qaeda and all other enemies of the United States. Then, as America's position deteriorated in both wars, the neoconservatives became even more determined to stay the course. William Nester analyzes some of the more prominent dilemmas haunting American policymakers now struggling to win in Afghanistan, fight terrorism in the United States, and reshape their relationship with Pakistan. In doing so, he reveals the nature of that all-too-real monster of insurgency, what feeds it, and how to starve it.

Although terrorism is an age-old phenomenon, jihadi ideology is distinctive in its ambition to abandon the principle of state sovereignty, overthrow the modern state system, and replace it with an extremely radical interpretation of an Islamic world order. These characteristics reflect a radical break from traditional objectives promoted by terrorist groups. In Combating Jihadism Barak Mendelsohn argues that the distinctiveness of the al-Qaeda threat led the international community to change its approach to counterterrorism. Contrary to common yet erroneous conceptions, the United States, in its role as a hegemon, was critical for the formulation of a multilateral response. While most analyses of hegemony have focused on power, Mendelsohn firmly grounds the phenomenon in a web of shared norms and rules relating to the hegemon’s freedom of action. Consequently, he explains why US leadership in counterterrorism efforts was in some spheres successful, when in others it failed or did not even seek to establish multilateral collaborative frameworks. Tracing the ways in which international cooperation has stopped terrorist efforts, Combating Jihadism provides a nuanced, innovative, and timely reinterpretation of the war on terrorism and the role of the United States in leading the fight against al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

Al Qaeda killed over 3,000 US citizens on September 11, 2001, and terrorism leapt to the fore of US strategic and political priorities. Yet, after nearly six years of concentrated effort by the United States, the dominant power in the international system, Al Qaeda survives and is still acknowledged as a potent threat. This begs the question not just of why, but also of what the United States can do to redress the situation. Confronting Al-Qaeda asserts that Al-Qaeda is primarily a political threat, not a military one. This is because terrorists subvert legitimate political processes to achieve political ends. Al-Qaeda challenges not only specific U.S. policy decisions, but also the very nature of the U.S. political system and the U.S.-lead international order created after World War II. Therefore the character of the U.S. political response to the threat from Al-Qaeda is critical. Al-Qaeda’s capacity for violence is the direct source of its power. This must be reduced, and coercive means, such as the military, intelligence, and law enforcement, are necessary, for they alone directly degrade Al-Qaeda’s potential. A singularly coercive approach, however, is insufficient. As the leader of the international system, the United States is in a position to politically undercut Al-Qaeda. The United States can do so by adhering to globally revered traditional US political values and foreign policy.

This fascinating reference chronicles the individuals, operations, and events of the War on Terror around the world, exploring its causes and consequences through the lens of policy, doctrine, and tactics of combat. The War on Terror is more than a political movement to identify and prosecute terrorists ... it has become a cornerstone of economic and military importance. This campaign has shaped policy in the Middle East, prompted uprisings of Islamic fundamentalists against the West, and redefined the ideology of warfare. This single-volume encyclopedia provides readers with more than 200 engaging entries on the myriad events, key individuals, and organizations that have played a major role in the War on Terror. The A–Z entries define the policies and doctrines; describe the armies, battlefields, and weapons employed; and profile the figures whose actions and decisions set the course of history. The expert contributors decode military jargon for non-specialist readers and explain the unconventional tactics used in the War on Terror, shedding light on the reason behind the attacks, the political maneuvering of the leaders involved, and the internal conflicts and external clashes that drove terrorists to settle all over the world. The book also includes detailed essays on the impact of the September 11 attacks on U.S. foreign policy, presidential powers, and public opinion.

This monograph reviews events since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and discusses the current state of al Qaeda and the kinds of actions that can be expected of it in the future. Al Qaeda constitutes the most serious immediate threat to the security of the United States, so the campaign against terrorism must remain focused. The monograph describes the central elements that must be emphasized in the next, more-complex phase of that campaign.