One of the cherished beliefs of those who do not know is that the logistical services of the Army lead a safe and boring life, even in the combat zone. The Combat Engineers and the Signal Corps began to cloud this belief in World War I. The Medical Corps, the Chemical Corps and the Bomb Disposal squads of the Ordnance Corps began to demand respect as dangerous assignments in World War II. In Korea all the services won the right to be shot at. War becomes increasingly a matter of logistics. The thin cutting edge of infantry, armor and artillery still contains the larger proportion of heroes, dead and alive, but these combat arms depend more and more on the services to provide them not only with the traditional beans and bullets, but with gasoline, transportation, medical service, concealing smoke, communications equipment, graves registration, potable water, laundry service—the list is endless. Here are some true accounts that tell how the services fulfilled their missions in a tough and dirty little war. There are tales of devotion to duty that match those of any combat arm. There are roles of technical proficiency combined with the foresight to seize opportunities as they arose. But because these are true stories, there are descriptions of actions whose only value is to indicate what should not be done, what lock of preparedness means in lives and dollars. Here is an honest book—one that had to be honest because it was conceived to tell the whole truth, for the education of our army. This is a book for every soldier, every youth who might become a soldier, every parent of every such youth. He succeeded, and the fruit of his labors is here.

Covers the participation in the Korean War of these arms and services of the United States Army: Corps of Engineers; Transportation Corps; Chemical Corps; Signal Corps; Medical Corps; Ordnance Corps; Quartermaster Corps; Security, Combat, Morale.

The history of the 24th Infantry regiment in Korea is a difficult one, both for the veterans of the unit & for the Army. This book tells both what happened to the 24th Infantry, & why it happened. The Army must be aware of the corrosive effects of segregation & the racial prejudices that accompanied it. The consequences of the system crippled the trust & mutual confidence so necessary among the soldiers & leaders of combat units & weakened the bonds that held the 24th together, producing profound effects on the battlefield. Tables, maps & illustrations.

This book looks at several troop categories based on primary function and analyzes the ratio between these categories to develop a general historical ratio. This ratio is called the Tooth-to-Tail Ratio. McGrath's study finds that this ratio, among types of deployed US forces, has steadily declined since World War II, just as the nature of warfare itself has changed. At the same time, the percentage of deployed forces devoted to logistics functions and to base and life support functions have increased, especially with the advent of the large-scale of use of civilian contractors. This work provides a unique analysis of the size and composition of military forces as found in historical patterns. Extensively illustrated with charts, diagrams, and tables. (Originally published by the Combat Studies Institute Press)

Despite American success in preventing the conquest of South Korea by communist North Korea, the Korean War of 1950-1953 did not satisfy Americans who expected the kind of total victory they had experienced in WW II. In Korea, the U.S. limited itself to conventional weapons. Even after communist China entered the war, Americans put China off-limits to conventional bombing as well as nuclear bombing. Operating within these limits, the U.S. Air Force helped to repel 2 invasions of South Korea while securing control of the skies so decisively that other U.N. forces could fight without fear of air attack.

A description of selected small unit actions, written primarily to acquaint junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers with combat experiences in Korea.

This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.