Since the end of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, there has been growing discussion of the possibility that technological advances in the means of combat would produce ftmdamental changes in how future wars will be fought. A number of observers have suggested that the nature of war itself would be transformed. Some proponents of this view have gone so far as to predict that these changes would include great reductions in, if not the outright elimination of, the various impediments to timely and effective action in war for which the Prussian theorist and soldier Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) introduced the term "friction." Friction in war, of course, has a long historical lineage. It predates Clausewitz by centuries and has remained a stubbornly recurring factor in combat outcomes right down to the 1991 Gulf War. In looking to the future, a seminal question is whether Clausewitzian friction would succumb to the changes in leading-edge warfare that may lie ahead, or whether such impediments reflect more enduring aspects of war that technology can but marginally affect. It is this question that the present essay will examine.

The original version of this paper, completed in December 1995, was condensed by Williamson Murray, editor of Brassey's Mershon American Defense Annual, for the 1996-1997 edition. This condensation did not include three entire sections that are part of this present study (chapter 3 on Scharnhorst's influence, chapter 6 on strategic surprise, and chapter 9, which contained air combat data bearing on the role of friction in future war). Dr. Murray also cut significant parts of other sections, especially in chapter 10, and precipitated a fair amount of rewriting as he and I worked toward a version that met his length constraint but still reflected the essence of the original paper. While this process led to many textual improvements, it did not generate any substantive changes.

Failure and folly are inevitable in war and in security policy related to war. Technology cannot rescue flawed policy or strategy. In his review of U.S. military strategy, Cimbala points to the possibility that excessive faith in technology may lead American strategy into a cul-de-sac.

Since the end of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, there has been growing discussion of the possibility that technological advances in the means of combat would produce ftmdamental changes in how future wars will be fought. A number of observers have suggested that the nature of war itself would be transformed. Some proponents of this view have gone so far as to predict that these changes would include great reductions in, if not the outright elimination of, the various impediments to timely and effective action in war for which the Prussian theorist and soldier Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) introduced the term "friction." Friction in war, of course, has a long historical lineage. It predates Clausewitz by centuries and has remained a stubbornly recurring factor in combat outcomes right down to the 1991 Gulf War. In looking to the future, a seminal question is whether Clausewitzian friction would succumb to the changes in leading-edge warfare that may lie ahead, or whether such impediments reflect more enduring aspects of war that technology can but marginally affect. It is this question that the present essay will examine.

Examines the possibility that technological advances in the means of combat would produce transformation in the fundamental nature of future war. Discusses predictions that changes would include great reductions in, or elimination of, various impediments to timely and effective action in war for which the Prussian theorist and soldier Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) introduced the term "friction." The primary question is whether Clausewitzian friction would succumb to future changes in warfare, or whether such impediments reflect more enduring aspects of war that technology can but marginally affect.

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Two centuries after Carl von Clausewitz wrote On War, it lines the shelves of military colleges around the world and even showed up in an Al Qaeda hideout. Though it has shaped much of the common parlance on the subject, On War is perceived by many as a “metaphysical fog,” widely known but hardly read. In War as Paradox, Youri Cormier lifts the fog on this iconic work by explaining its philosophical underpinnings. Building up a genealogy of dialectical war theory and integrating Hegel with Clausewitz as a co-founders of the method, Cormier uncovers a common logic that shaped the fighting doctrines and ethics of modern war. He explains how Hegel and Clausewitz converged on method, but nonetheless arrived at opposite ethics and military doctrines. Ultimately, Cormier seeks out the limits to dialectical war theory and explores the greater paradoxes the method reveals: can so-called “rational” theories of war hold up under the pressures of irrational propositions, such as lone-wolf attacks, the circular logic of a “war to end all wars,” or the apparent folly of mutually assured destruction? Since the Second World War, commentators have described war as obsolete. War as Paradox argues that dialectical war theory may be the key to understanding why, despite this, it continues.

Carl von Clausewitz's On War, his chef d'oeuvre of strategic and military theory, was first published in 1832, after his death. The book remains a touchstone, dissected and debated by scholars, students, and military personnel around the world who consider it the founding document of the field. Yet to Clausewitz himself, far more important than achieving recognition for his written works was glory on the field of battle. He dreamed of winning renown not with his pen, but with his sword, and wielded both with the same determination and zeal. In this new biographical study of Clausewitz, Donald Stoker moves skillfully between his career as a soldier and his work as a theoretician. Conventional wisdom holds that Clausewitz was "merely a staff officer" who didn't see much combat, but Stoker shows this to be far from true. As a soldier during the era of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars - perhaps the most intense period of continuous large-scale warfare in history - Clausewitz gained an enormous amount of battle experience. By reconstructing his role in various compaigns, from Jena-Auerstedt to Waterloo, this work offers new insights into Clausewitz as both a soldier in an a witness to the momentous fighting of his time. Taking readers through the heat of these battles, Stoker provides historical overview and strategic analysis, showing the connection between events and Clausewitz's own words, taken both from his works and the abundant letters written to his wife, Marie, and friends throughout his life. Clausewitz's contributions to military theory have solidified his reputation, which seems continually to rise, and Stoker assesses each of his significant works and their contribution to his legacy. Grounding Clausewitz's theoretical analyses on the field of battle, Stoker traces the road to On War, and provides an absorbing reassessment of both the warrior and the theorist. -- from dust jacket.