Oil, diamonds, timber, food aid - just some of the suggestions put forward as explanations for African wars in the past decade. Another set of suggestions focuses on ethnic and clan considerations. These economic and ethnic or clan explanations contend that wars are specifically not fought by states for political interests with mainly conventional military means, as originally suggested by Carl von Clausewitz in the 19th century. This study shows how alternative social organizations to the state can be viewed as political actors using war as a political instrument.

For over twenty years, the South African Border War was fought to counter the influence of Marxism-Leninism and to maintain control of Namibia. The South African people relied on cultural tools and adaptive strategies to protect their own interests. John S. McCain IV isn't interested in taking sides on this issue; instead, he analyzes the military's tactics, operational effectiveness, and strategy. Angola, Clausewitz, and the American Way of War explores the concept of strategy making in war within the context of the South African Border War. It describes the danger of leaning on middle-range theories over general theories and of starting the decision-making process in the middle rather than at the top. Wars should not be forced into a type as one thing or another-and then assumed to be all the same, based on that type. Each individual war should be seen for what it is, unique, and those in charge should be prepared to make changes and reevaluate every step of the way to account for all the moving pieces and the realities on the ground. In the same vein as The Direction of War by Hew Strachan, McCain recognizes that US wars since 9/11 have been poorly strategized. This heavily researched volume challenges traditional approaches to conflict and suggests ways they could be improved.

This book shows that wars that have hitherto been mainly interpreted as driven by economic, resource, ethnic or clan interests (such as the conflicts in Liberia and Somalia in the early 1990s) do have an overriding political rationale, which revalidates Carl von Clausewitz’s nineteenth-century understanding of war.

Rebooting Clausewitz offers an entirely new take on the work of history's greatest theorist of war. Written for an undergraduate readership that often struggles with Clausewitz's master work On War--a book that is often considered too philosophical and impenetrably dense--it seeks to unpack some of Clausewitz's key insights on theory and strategy. In three fictional interludes Clausewitz attends a seminar at West Point; debates the War on Terror at a Washington think tank; and visits a Robotics Institute in Santa Fe where he discusses how scientists are reshaping the future of war. Three separate essays situate Clausewitz in the context of his times, discuss his understanding of the culture of war, and the extent to which two other giants--Thucydides and Sun Tzu--complement his work. Some years ago the philosopher W.B. Gallie argued that Clausewitz needed to be 'saved from the Clausewitzians'. Clausewitz doesn't need saving and his commentators have contributed a great deal to our understanding of On War's seminal status as a text. But too often they tend to conduct a conversation between themselves. This book is an attempt to let a wider audience into the conversation.

Carl von Clausewitz's On War, his chef d'oeuvre of strategic and military theory, was first published in 1832, after his death. The book remains a touchstone, dissected and debated by scholars, students, and military personnel around the world who consider it the founding document of the field. Yet to Clausewitz himself, far more important than achieving recognition for his written works was glory on the field of battle. He dreamed of winning renown not with his pen, but with his sword, and wielded both with the same determination and zeal. In this new biographical study of Clausewitz, Donald Stoker moves skillfully between his career as a soldier and his work as a theoretician. Conventional wisdom holds that Clausewitz was "merely a staff officer" who didn't see much combat, but Stoker shows this to be far from true. As a soldier during the era of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars - perhaps the most intense period of continuous large-scale warfare in history - Clausewitz gained an enormous amount of battle experience. By reconstructing his role in various compaigns, from Jena-Auerstedt to Waterloo, this work offers new insights into Clausewitz as both a soldier in an a witness to the momentous fighting of his time. Taking readers through the heat of these battles, Stoker provides historical overview and strategic analysis, showing the connection between events and Clausewitz's own words, taken both from his works and the abundant letters written to his wife, Marie, and friends throughout his life. Clausewitz's contributions to military theory have solidified his reputation, which seems continually to rise, and Stoker assesses each of his significant works and their contribution to his legacy. Grounding Clausewitz's theoretical analyses on the field of battle, Stoker traces the road to On War, and provides an absorbing reassessment of both the warrior and the theorist. -- from dust jacket.

This book comprises contributions by leading experts in the field of international humanitarian law on the subject of the categorisation or classification of armed conflict. It is divided into two sections: the first aims to provide the reader with a sound understanding of the legal questions surrounding the classification of hostilities and its consequences; the second includes ten case studies that examine practice in respect of classification. Understanding how classification operates in theory and practice is a precursor to identifying the relevant rules that govern parties to hostilities. With changing forms of armed conflict which may involve multi-national operations, transnational armed groups and organized criminal gangs, the need for clarity of the law is all-important. The case studies selected for analysis are Northern Ireland, DRC, Colombia, Afghanistan (from 2001), Gaza, South Ossetia, Iraq (from 2003), Lebanon (2006), the so-called war against Al-Qaeda, and future trends. The studies explore the legal consequences of classification particularly in respect of the use of force, detention in armed conflict, and the relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law. The practice identified in the case studies allows the final chapter to draw conclusions as to the state of the law on classification.

This book focuses on the different types of combatants in conflicts in Africa, exploring the fine lines between what might be classified as a militia in one conflict, a rebel in another, or a terrorist in a third. Drawing on the work of Carl von Clausewitz, this book provides a conceptually stable and analytically sound new typology on combatants. Analysing the relationships between state and society, and drawing on Clausewitz's Trinity of passion, chance, and reason, the book presents a set of five types of armed actors: Professionals, Praetorians, Militias, Insurgents, and Mercenaries. Each type is developed through a close reading of foundational theoretical texts, reviews of contemporary studies, and a historical analysis of their unique characteristics. Unlike a reductionist binary perspective, this typology accounts for the dynamic, complex, and evolving relationships of these actors with the state and society. A typology of combatants in conflicts in Africa can provide avenues for more in-depth analysis of such conflicts and holds implications for Security Sector Reform projects and other peace-building programmes. As such, this book will be an essential reference for scholars and students of African Politics and Military and Security Studies.

Anything but a detached theorist, Clausewitz was as fully engaged in the intellectual and cultural currents of his time as in its political and military conflicts. Late-eighteenth century thought helped shape the analytic methods he developed for the study of war. The essays in this volume follow his career in a complex military society, together with that of other students of war, both friends and rivals, providing a broad perspective that leads to significant documents so far unknown or ignored. They add to our understanding of Clausewitz’s early ideas and their expansion into a comprehensive theory that continues to challenge our thinking about war today.

The first comprehensive treatment of how the United States has handled the final stages of its conflicts-from World War I to Iraq-spoiled repeatedly by leaders' failures to plan clearly for what to do when the guns fall silent. Concerned with not repeating past errors, our leaders miscalculate and prolong the conflict or invite unwelcome results. In his penetrating analysis of past, present, and future wars, Rose suggests how to break this cycle.