Review text: "With all these contributions, this collection definitely constitutes a high quality volume in this research area and is a valuable reference to anyone who is interested in discourse and cognition."Han-wei in: Discourse Studies 3/2011

Causal reasoning is one of our most central cognitive competencies, enabling us to adapt to our world. Causal knowledge allows us to predict future events, or diagnose the causes of observed facts. We plan actions and solve problems using knowledge about cause-effect relations. Without our ability to discover and empirically test causal theories, we would not have made progress in various empirical sciences. The handbook brings together the leading researchers in the field of causal reasoning and offers state-of-the-art presentations of theories and research. It provides introductions of competing theories of causal reasoning, and discusses its role in various cognitive functions and domains. The final section presents research from neighboring fields.

This title provides an introduction to assumptions, algorithms, and techniques of causal Bayes nets and graphical causal models in the context of psychological examples. It demonstrates their potential as a powerful tool for guiding experimental inquiry.

In the last decade, "evolutionary psychology" has come to refer exclusively to research on human mentality and behavior, motivated by a nativist interpretation of how evolution operates. This book encompasses the behavior and mentality of nonhuman as well as human animals and a full range of evolutionary approaches. Rather than a collection by and for the like-minded, it is a debate about how evolutionary processes have shaped cognition. The debate is divided into five sections: Orientations, on the phylogenetic, ecological, and psychological/comparative approaches to the evolution of cognition; Categorization, on how various animals parse their environments, how they represent objects and events and the relations among them; Causality, on whether and in what ways nonhuman animals represent cause and effect relationships; Consciousness, on whether it makes sense to talk about the evolution of consciousness and whether the phenomenon can be investigated empirically in nonhuman animals; and Culture, on the cognitive requirements for nongenetic transmission of information and the evolutionary consequences of such cultural exchange. ContributorsBernard Balleine, Patrick Bateson, Michael J. Beran, M. E. Bitterman, Robert Boyd, Nicola Clayton, Juan Delius, Anthony Dickinson, Robin Dunbar, D.P. Griffiths, Bernd Heinrich, Cecilia Heyes, William A. Hillix, Ludwig Huber, Nicholas Humphrey, Masako Jitsumori, Louis Lefebvre, Nicholas Mackintosh, Euan M. Macphail, Peter Richerson, Duane M. Rumbaugh, Sara Shettleworth, Martina Siemann, Kim Sterelny, Michael Tomasello, Laura Weiser, Alexandra Wells, Carolyn Wilczynski, David Sloan Wilson

In this investigation of the psychological relationship between shape and time, Leyton argues compellingly that shape is used by the mind to recover the past and as such it forms a basis for memory. Michael Leyton's arguments about the nature of perception and cognition are fascinating, exciting, and sure to be controversial. In this investigation of the psychological relationship between shape and time, Leyton argues compellingly that shape is used by the mind to recover the past and as such it forms a basis for memory. He elaborates a system of rules by which the conversion to memory takes place and presents a number of detailed case studies--in perception, linguistics, art, and even political subjugation--that support these rules. Leyton observes that the mind assigns to any shape a causal history explaining how the shape was formed. We cannot help but perceive a deformed can as a dented can. Moreover, by reducing the study of shape to the study of symmetry, he shows that symmetry is crucial to our everyday cognitive processing. Symmetry is the means by which shape is converted into memory. Perception is usually regarded as the recovery of the spatial layout of the environment. Leyton, however, shows that perception is fundamentally the extraction of time from shape. In doing so, he is able to reduce the several areas of computational vision purely to symmetry principles. Examining grammar in linguistics, he argues that a sentence is psychologically represented as a piece of causal history, an archeological relic disinterred by the listener so that the sentence reveals the past. Again through a detailed analysis of art he shows that what the viewer takes to be the experience of a painting is in fact the extraction of time from the shapes of the painting. Finally he highlights crucial aspects of the mind's attempt to recover time in examples of political subjugation.

Studies of tool use have been used to examine an exceptionally wide range of aspects of cognition, such as planning, problem-solving and insight, naive physics, social relationship between action and perception.

Causality is one of the core concepts in any attempt to make sense of the world, and the explanations people come up with shape their judgments, emotions, intentions and actions. This renders causal cognition a core topic for the social as well as the cognitive sciences. In the past, however, research has been split into diverging paradigms, each pertaining to a distinct (sub)discipline and focusing on a specific domain, thus creating a rather fragmented picture of causal cognition. Furthermore, most of this previous research paid only incidental attention to culture as a possibly constitutive factor, leaving important questions unanswered: Is causality always perceived in the same way? Are causal explanations affected by the concepts to which people refer and/or the language they use? Is causal cognition domain-specific, and if so, how does it differ from agency construal? Is causal reasoning always based on the same cognitive mechanisms, or does the cultural background of people shape how they process respective information - and perhaps even their willingness to search for causal explanations in the first place? By soliciting contributions that address questions like these, this research topic aimed at assessing the extent to which causal cognition may vary across species, cultures, or individuals at various stages of their development, and at integrating different perspectives across a broad range of disciplines. Originating from the work of a research group funded by the Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF) at Bielefeld University, Germany, the scope of this research topic was broadened by inviting additional contributions from researchers with expertise in different fields of causal cognition, agency construal, and/or cultural impacts on cognition. In order to fully exploit the potential of cognitive science, we explicitly encouraged submissions from scholars from all its classic sub-disciplines (i.e., anthropology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, neuroscience, philosophy, psychology) as well as scholars from comparative psychology, cognitive archeology, economics, and any other discipline interested in causal cognition. We welcomed empirical findings as well as theoretical contributions, with an emphasis on those factors that do – or may – constrain, trigger, or shape the way in which humans and other primates think about causal relationships and inform us about both the diversity and the universality of causal cognition.

Twelve essays explore what bearing empirical findings might have on philosophical concerns about counterfactuals and causation, and how, in turn, work in philosophy might help clarify issues in empirical work on the relationships between causal and counterfactual thought.