Examines three limited fund class action settlements of mass tort claims (including one settlement attempt that was abandoned in favor of bankruptcy) and four bankruptcy reorganizations precipitated by mass tort litigation. Each case is unique in the circumstances that precipitated it and the dynamics of its proceedings. Despite those differences, an examination of the class action settlements as a group in contrast to the bankruptcy reorganizations that were studied allows some comparisons about the fairness and effectiveness of these two means of achieving global resolutions of mass tort liabilities.

The future of aggregation is uncertain. Recent cases have established limits on class actions as devised for national resolution of mass tort claims. In the evolving world of mass tort litigation, once thing is for certain: lawyers and judges have to ensure that the resolution of these cases is fair to the individual litigants on both sides. For that reason, the analysis of the five settlement class action cases contained herein will continue to be relevant to mass tort litigation - and to other class-action litigation - no matter what twists and turns the ongoing debate may take. Through analysis of five mass tort cases, this monograph explores such questions as: Should discovery be allowed into arguably secret settlement negotiations when the negotiations represent tens of thousands, or even millions of individuals? Should judges conduct proceedings in the nature of trials to review the merits of the proposed settlement? Who should get what kind of notice at whose expense? How should judges assess the adequacy of class representatives and counsel?