ÔThis volume is long overdue. Integrated legal and economic analysis of competition law is crucial given the nature of the sector. However to carry this off successfully, one either needs intensive editorial work to bring different teams together; or one has to rely on the few who master both economic and legal analysis to a tee. Stefan WeishaarÕs analysis not only looks at a stubborn issue in competition law. He does so in three jurisdictions, in detailed yet clear fashion, with clear insight and ditto conclusions. Over and above its relevance to academic analysis, this book can go straight into competition authoritiesÕ decision making, and therefore also in compliance and remediation advice.Õ Ð Geert Van Calster, University of Leuven, Belgium Cartels, Competition and Public Procurement uses a law and economics approach to analyse whether competition and public procurement laws in Europe and Asia deal effectively with bid rigging conspiracies. Stefan Weishaar explores the ways in which economic theory can be used to mitigate the adverse effects of bid rigging cartels. The study sheds light on one of the vital issues for achieving cost-effective public procurement Ð which is itself a critical question in the context of the global financial crisis. The book comprehensively examines whether different laws deal effectively with bid rigging and the ways in which economic theory can be used to mitigate the adverse effects of such cartels. The employed industrial economics and auction theory highlights shortcomings of the law in all three jurisdictions Ð the European Union, China and Japan Ð and seeks to raise the awareness of policymakers as to when extra precautionary measures against bid rigging conspiracies should be taken. Students and researchers who have a keen interest in the relationship between law and economics, competition law and public procurement law will find this topical book invaluable. Practitioners can see how economic theory can be used to identify situations that lend themselves to bid rigging and policymakers will be informed about the shortcomings of existing legislation from a legal and economics perspective and will be inspired by approaches taken in different jurisdictions.

Public procurement markets differ from all others because quantities do not adjust with prices, but are fixed by the bidding authority. As a result, there is a high incentive for organizing cartels (the price elasticity of demand is zero below the base price) that are quite stable because there are no lasting benefits for cheaters. In such circumstances leniency programs are unlikely to help discovering cartels. Since all public procurement cartels operate through some form of bid rotation, public procurement officials have all the information necessary (but they have to collect evidence on a number of bids) to discover them, contrary to what happens in normal markets where customers are not aware of the existence of a cartel. However in order to promote reporting, the structure of incentives has to change. For example, the money saved from a carte, should at least in part remain with the administration that helped discovering it and the reporting official should have some career advantages. In any case, competition authorities should create a channel of communication with public purchasers, so that they would know that informing the Authority on any suspicion they may have on bid rigging is easy and does not require them to provide a full proof.

'This publication is written to assist procurement professionals understand cartel behaviour. It reviews the provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 that relate to your procurement practices by describing several types of prohibited, anti-competitive behaviour that can target your purchasing budget. It considers some steps you might take to maximise competition and save your organisation money, while also disrupting the possible operation of cartels by suppliers.' -- p. 2.

This paper studies cartels in public infrastructure procurement and analyzes the conditions under which they succeed in generating rents. It first conceptualizes the interplay of the central actors of a procurement project, notably the contractor, the procurement agency, as well as the supervision and design consultants. By focusing on consultants, the framework includes important yet understudied actors in cartels that design tenders, evaluate bids, and supervise the implementation of projects. The paper then explores an original data set of infrastructure procurement contracts in Lebanon and analyzes the conditions under which powerful political elites can broker deals to overprice and/or over-spend contracts. To examine how cartels operate, the analysis identifies the political connections of contractors and consultants and classifies them according to their "quality” in terms of access to institutional functions of the implementing agency. The paper argues that design consultants serve as the lynchpin of the cartel by reducing transaction costs for searching, bargaining, and enforcing of corrupt deals.

"Public sector procurement agencies show how to identify and deal with illegal cartel behaviour. This CD describes cartel conduct; highlights the warning signs; gives brief instructions on what to do if you believe you have been subject to cartel conduct."--Disc.

This book highlights the case of Brazil, a major economic player among developing countries. In seventeen years of enforcing the Brazilian Antitrust Law, Brazil’s Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) has achieved outstanding results and has been recognized as the most effective antitrust enforcement agency in the developing world. This book is the first to describe and analyse the workings and case law of the CADE, emphasizing the agency’s fundamental methodology and focusing on the contributory roles of such factors as the following: mechanisms and procedures of enforcement of the Antitrust Law in Brazil; methodologies (tests) used for antitrust assessment (for merger and conduct controls); evaluation of barriers to entry and rivalry in analysed markets; assessment of proof and circumstantial evidence within CADE case law and court decisions; examination of rational justifications for practices under investigation; legality of exchange of information; leniency agreements; cease and desist agreements; cultural issues and modifications; civil and criminal enforcement; private damages considerations; and the role of international and regional competition law regimes (OECD, UNCTAD, WTO, ICN, Mercosur). The book’s consolidated research on Brazil’s cartel investigations clearly describes the main defence theories and the courts’ decisions. The authors also explore the relationship of Brazil’s antitrust law to the country’s public policies in the areas of consumer rights, public procurement, and measures against corruption, with special emphasis on the synergies arising from antitrust law and consumer protection. It is worth noting that the studies carried out in this book discussed Law No. 8884/94 (Brazilian Antitrust Law) and the New Brazilian Antitrust Law, which was passed on 5 October 2011 and which will be enforced in 2012. With its unique synthesis of constitutional law, comparative antitrust law, and CADE’s case law, this book will be welcomed by competition lawyers and other parties interested in methods and procedures used in merger and conduct control, and especially in anti-cartel enforcement, in developing countries.

We study the mechanics of cartel enforcement and its interaction with bidding constraints in the context of repeated procurement auctions. Under collusion, bidding constraints weaken cartels by limiting the scope for punishment. This yields a test of collusive behavior exploiting the counter-intuitive prediction that introducing minimum prices can lower the distribution of winning bids. The model's predictions are borne out in procurement data from Japan, where we find considerable evidence that collusion is weakened by the introduction of minimum prices.