This book examines the determinants of real exchange rates (RERs), with an emphasis on the roles of a pegged exchange rate regime and capital account opening in driving the persistent real exchange rates appreciation in the lead-up to the 1997 currency crisis, through an in-depth case study of Thailand. The book aims to inform the debate, rekindled by the recent currency crises in emerging market economies, on exchange rate policy choice and the timing and sequencing of capital account opening.

In this paper I analyze, within the context of the new 'financial architecture, ' the relationship between exchange rate regimes, capital flows and currency crises in emerging economies. The paper draws on lessons learned during the 1990s, and deals with some of the most important policy controversies that emerged after the Mexican, East Asian, Russian and Brazilian crises. I evaluate some recent proposals for reforming the international financial architecture that have emphasized exchange rate regimes and capital mobility. I discuss emerging markets' ability to have floating exchange rate regime, and I analyze issues related to 'dollarization.'

If flexible exchange rates are not adopted, central banks should at least avoid the widespread practice of trying to sterilise the monetary effects of capital flows." "The author argues that the implementation of this plan will be a far more effective way of enhancing financial stability than controlling international capital flows, or trying to force private lenders to make new loans to countries that suffer crises."--BOOK JACKET.

In the 1990s, currency crises in Europe, Mexico, and Asia have drawn worldwide attention to speculative attacks on government-controlled exchange rates and have prompted researchers to undertake new theoretical and empirical analysis of these events. This paper provides some perspective on this work and relates it to earlier research. It derives the optimal commitment to a fixed exchange rate and proposes a common framework for analyzing currency crises. This framework stresses the important role of speculators and recognizes that the government’s commitment to a fixed exchange rate is constrained by other policy goals. The final section finds that some crises may be particularly difficult to predict using currently popular methods.

The Asian crisis of 1997-1998 was a major influence on macroeconomic thinking concerning exchange rate regimes, the functioning of international institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, and international contagion of macroeconomic instability from one country to another. Exchange Rate Regimes and Macroeconomic Stability offers perspectives on these issues from the viewpoints of two Nobel Laureates, an IMF economist, and Asian economists. This book contributes new ideas to the ongoing debate on the role of domestic monetary authorities and international institutions in reducing the likelihood of international financial crises, as well as the problems associated with various exchange rate regimes from the standpoint of macroeconomic stability. Overall, the chapters contained in this volume offer interesting perspectives, which have been stimulated by the recent events in the foreign exchange market. They provide a useful reference for anyone interested in the development of exchange rate regimes, and represent considerable reflection by economists half a century after Bretton Woods.

An empirical study of exchange rate regimes based on data compiled from 150 member countries of the International Monetary Fund over the past thirty years. Few topics in international economics are as controversial as the choice of an exchange rate regime. Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, countries have adopted a wide variety of regimes, ranging from pure floats at one extreme to currency boards and dollarization at the other. While a vast theoretical literature explores the choice and consequences of exchange rate regimes, the abundance of possible effects makes it difficult to establish clear relationships between regimes and common macroeconomic policy targets such as inflation and growth. This book takes a systematic look at the evidence on macroeconomic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes, drawing on the experience of some 150 member countries of the International Monetary Fund over the past thirty years. Among other questions, it asks whether pegging the exchange rate leads to lower inflation, whether floating exchange rates are associated with faster output growth, and whether pegged regimes are particularly prone to currency and other crises. The book draws on history and theory to delineate the debate and on standard statistical methods to assess the empirical evidence, and includes a CD-ROM containing the data set used.

Recent international financial crises have brought the issue of reforming the international financial system to the forefront of debates. Is the current international monetary system a sufficient foundation? Or do the recent crises indicate that the current architecture is inadequate? This issue of The Annals takes stock of both arguments and presents positions held both by leading proponents of reform and to leading proponents of the existing architecture. It reviews the core of the debate: · reform of the exchange rate arrangements · the role of the International Monetary Fund · and the role of the private sector in crisis resolution. Presenting a wide spectrum of viewpoints and reviewing the lessons learned from recent financial crises, the exchange rate debate is placed in a clear context, making this critical issue more accessible.

In the aftermath of the Asian/global financial crises of 1997-98, how should emerging markets now structure their exchange rate systems to prevent new crises from occurring? This study challenges current orthodoxy by advocating the revival of intermediate exchange rate regimes. In so doing, Williamson presents a reasoned challenge to the new prevailing attitude which claims that all countries involved in the international capital markets need to polarize to one of the extreme regimes (to a fixed rate with either a currency board or dollarization, or to a lightly-managed float). He concludes that although there is some truth in the allegation that intermediate regimes are vulnerable to speculative crises, they still offer offsetting advantages. He also contends that it would be possible to redesign them to be more flexible so as to reduce their vulnerability to crises.

According to many economists, the increasing mobility of capital across borders has made it more costly to peg exchange rates. This phenomenon has contributed to some of the more famous examples of exchange rate crises in recent times, such as the Mexican peso crisis in 1994 and the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Yet despite the increasing costs of pegging in today's accelerated financial markets, some developing countries try to maintain a peg for as long as they can. This work is the first to theorize the role of bankers as a domestic interest group involved in exchange rate policy. It adds to our understanding of how interest groups affect economic policy in developing countries and explains why some of the largest and fastest growing economies in the developing world were the most prone to crisis. The volume also refines our understanding of the 'hollowing-out thesis', the argument that increasing capital mobility is forcing states to abandon pegging.

ical) and to self-fulfilling currency crisis, respectively. Research stressing the former approach was pioneered by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984). According to this line of research, the failure of governments to adopt domestic monetary and fiscal policies consistent with their stated exchange rate targets leads to a gradual diminution of reserves and eventually a stock adjustment that depletes reserves suddenly in one attack (Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco, 1996, page 47). The result is either a devaluation of the exchange rate or a switch to floating. Subsequent work of this genre has specified a number of other channels, in addition to that involving inconsistent and unsustainable monetary and fiscal policies, that can precipitate an attack: 1. Inconsistency between external and internal objectives. The stances of monetary and fiscal policies may be consistent with the authorities' exchange rate target, but domestic economic indicators (such as the unemployment rate) may be inconsistent with internal balance, resulting in pressures on the authorities to relax macroeconomic policies. Private agents, aware of this inconsistency, perceive an opportunity for profits from a currency devaluation and precipitate an attack. 2. Contagion effects. Prior to an attack on another currency (say that of country B), the market may view a country's (say, country A's) exchange rate as consistent with economic fundamentals and, thus, sustainable.