The book reports on recent experimental research on expectations and decision making in bargaining, markets, auctions, or coalition formation situations. The investi- gated topics deliver building stones for a bounded rational theory as an approach to explain behavior and interpersonal interactions in economic and social relationships.

In a complex and uncertain world, humans and animals make decisions under the constraints of limited knowledge, resources, and time. Yet models of rational decision making in economics, cognitive science, biology, and other fields largely ignore these real constraints and instead assume agents with perfect information and unlimited time. About forty years ago, Herbert Simon challenged this view with his notion of "bounded rationality." Today, bounded rationality has become a fashionable term used for disparate views of reasoning. This book promotes bounded rationality as the key to understanding how real people make decisions. Using the concept of an "adaptive toolbox," a repertoire of fast and frugal rules for decision making under uncertainty, it attempts to impose more order and coherence on the idea of bounded rationality. The contributors view bounded rationality neither as optimization under constraints nor as the study of people's reasoning fallacies. The strategies in the adaptive toolbox dispense with optimization and, for the most part, with calculations of probabilities and utilities. The book extends the concept of bounded rationality from cognitive tools to emotions; it analyzes social norms, imitation, and other cultural tools as rational strategies; and it shows how smart heuristics can exploit the structure of environments.

Issues relating to the emergence, persistence, and stability of cooperation among social agents of every type are widely recognized to be of paramount importance. They are also analytically difficult and intellectually challenging. This book, arising from a NATO Advanced Study Institute held at SUNY in 1994, is an up-to-date presentation of the contribution of game theory to the subject. The contributors are leading specialists who focus on the problem from the many different angles of game theory, including axiomatic bargaining theory, the Nash program of non-cooperative foundations, game with complete information, repeated and sequential games, bounded rationality methods, evolutionary theory, experimental approaches, and others. Together they offer significant progress in understanding cooperation.

Experimental economics involves the use of controlled, experimental methods both in the laboratory and the field to better comprehend how individuals and groups make economic decisions and to more clearly identify causal relationships. This book takes the reader to the frontier of research in this exciting and rapidly growing field. Unlike other texts, this book discusses both the methodology of experimental economics and some of the main application areas.The material is organized as a series of 12 chapters or lectures that can be covered in a single academic term. The first five chapters cover the reasons for experimentation as well as basic experimental methodology. The last seven chapters discuss applications of experimental economics to areas such as game theory, public economics, social preferences, auctions and markets. The book assumes only a basic knowledge of economics and game theory and is written at a level that is suitable for advanced undergraduate, master's or PhD students.

This collection of papers is an outgrowth of the "Game Practice I" th th conference held in Genoa from 28 to 30 June 1998. More precisely, it is the result of the call for papers that was issued in association with that conference: actually, nearly half of the contributions to this book are papers that were presented in Genoa. The name chosen for the conference and for this book is in evident and provocative contrast with "Game Theory": this choice needs some explanation, and to that we shall devote a few words of this Preface. Let us say at the outset that "Game Practice" would not exist without Game Theory. As one can see, the overall content of this book is firmly rooted in the existing Game Theory. It could be hardly otherwise, given the success and influence of Game Theory (just think of the basic issues in Economic Theory), and the tremendous development that has taken place within Game Theory. This success, however, makes even more evident the existence of problems with respect to the verification of the theory. This is patent from the point of view of the predictive value of Game Theory (the "positive" side): a lot of experimental and observational evidence demon strates that there is a large gap between theory and "practice".

The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in the 1950s by Herbert Simon; only recently has it influenced mainstream economics. In this book, Ariel Rubinstein defines models of bounded rationality as those in which elements of the process of choice are explicitly embedded. The book focuses on the challenges of modeling bounded rationality, rather than on substantial economic implications. In the first part of the book, the author considers the modeling of choice. After discussing some psychological findings, he proceeds to the modeling of procedural rationality, knowledge, memory, the choice of what to know, and group decisions.In the second part, he discusses the fundamental difficulties of modeling bounded rationality in games. He begins with the modeling of a game with procedural rational players and then surveys repeated games with complexity considerations. He ends with a discussion of computability constraints in games. The final chapter includes a critique by Herbert Simon of the author's methodology and the author's response. The Zeuthen Lecture Book series is sponsored by the Institute of Economics at the University of Copenhagen.

The international system comprises a plurality of sovereign states often pursuing conflicting interests. One means of resolving or managing conflicts between those states is diplomatic bargaining or negotiation. In the last fifteen years, the study of negotiation has attracted researchers from various disciplines in the social sciences, and the vol

The question of how cooperation and social order can evolve from a Hobbesian state of nature of a “war of all against all” has always been at the core of social scientific inquiry. Social dilemmas are the main analytical paradigm used by social scientists to explain competition, cooperation, and conflict in human groups. The formal analysis of social dilemmas allows for identifying the conditions under which cooperation evolves or unravels. This knowledge informs the design of institutions that promote cooperative behavior. Yet to gain practical relevance in policymaking and institutional design, predictions derived from the analysis of social dilemmas must be put to an empirical test. The collection of articles in this book gives an overview of state-of-the-art research on social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation. It covers theoretical contributions and offers a broad range of examples on how theoretical insights can be empirically verified and applied to cooperation problems in everyday life. By bringing together a group of distinguished scholars, the book fills an important gap in sociological scholarship and addresses some of the most interesting questions of human sociality.

This is the first book to describe the entire developmental history of the human aspects of economics. The issue of “self-interest” is discussed throughout, from pre-Adam Smith to contemporary neuroeconomics, representing a unique contribution to economics. Though the notion of self-interest has been interpreted in several ways by various schools of economics and economists since Smith first placed it at the heart of the field, this is the first book to focus on this important but overlooked topic. Traditionally, economic theory has presupposed that the core of human behavior is self-interest. Nevertheless, some economists, e.g. recent behavioral economists, have cast doubt on this “self-interested” explanation. Further, though many economists have agreed on the central role of self-interest in economic behavior, each economist’s positioning of self-interest in economic theory differs to some degree. This book helps to elucidate the position of self-interest in economic theory. Given its focus, it is a must-read companion, not only on the history of economic thought but also on economic theory. Furthermore, as today’s capitalism is increasingly causing people to wonder just where self-interest lies, it also appeals to general readers.

Nonlinear Labor Market Dynamics discusses adjustment processes in labor markets. Contrary to linear-stochastic approaches this book is based on a non-linear deterministic framework. It is shown that even textbook-like-models of the labor market can generate long lasting adjustment processes, local instabilities, and chaotic movements, once nonlinear relationships and widely accepted adjustment rules are introduced. Thus, labor market dynamics may have an endogenous component that is governed by a nonlinear deterministic core. Of course, all results are tied to the particular models discussed in this book. Nevertheless, these models imply that by incorporating nonlinear relationships, one may arrive at an explanation of labor market behavior where linear stochastic approaches fell. Time series studies for German labor market data support this point of view.