Brings together three installments of General George C. Marshall's wartime reports. Provides a comprehensive picture of global war as seen from the perspective of the Chief of Staff George C. Marshall. Includes Marshall's comments on such topics as: technology; the "90-division gamble;" the replacement system; troop morale and the citizen-soldier; and demobilization.

The U.S. Army entered World War II unprepared. In addition, lacking Germany's blitzkrieg approach of coordinated armor and air power, the army was organized to fight two wars: one on the ground and one in the air. Previous commentators have blamed Congressional funding and public apathy for the army's unprepared state. David E. Johnson believes instead that the principal causes were internal: army culture and bureaucracy, and their combined impact on the development of weapons and doctrine. Johnson examines the U.S. Army's innovations for both armor and aviation between the world wars, arguing that the tank became a captive of the conservative infantry and cavalry branches, while the airplane's development was channeled by air power insurgents bent on creating an independent air force. He maintains that as a consequence, the tank's potential was hindered by the traditional arms, while air power advocates focused mainly on proving the decisiveness of strategic bombing, neglecting the mission of tactical support for ground troops. Minimal interaction between ground and air officers resulted in insufficient cooperation between armored forces and air forces. Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers makes a major contribution to a new understanding of both the creation of the modern U.S. Army and the Army's performance in World War II. The book also provides important insights for future military innovation.

This book talks about the Second World War of the USA Army (1945-1950), the Interests of Russia on China-United States (US) Trade War, Biafra, Islam, Insecurity and World Economic Crisis and Conflict in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan and other historical facts that are very vital and necessary.

Covering the period between George C. Marshall becoming Chief of Staff in September 1939 and the first military successes in 1942 (Guadalcanal, El Alamein, Northwest Africa), this volume describes how Marshall built up an army and air corps of fewer than 200,000 in 1939 with key players such as Harry Hopkins, FDR’s confidant, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, President Roosevelt and Congress. “This work on Marshall continues to be the fine scholarly product that one expects from its author.” — C. P. Stacey, International Journal “Dr. Pogue has written a splendid account of the army high command in World War II. It makes an important contribution to the history of our times and complements previously-published memoirs and official histories. The military specialist will be impressed by the systematic coverage Dr. Pogue gives to the way in which Marshall used his staff and managed the war. General readers will be fascinated by the new information provided about the characters and wartime actions of such leaders as Roosevelt, Churchill, MacArthur, and Eisenhower... This is a thoroughly satisfying book and a splendid companion to the first volume.” — H. A. De Weerd, The Virginia Quarterly Review “The United States, [Sir John Dill] told General Brooke, ‘has not — repeat not — the slightest conception of what the war means, and their armed forces are more unready for war than it is possible to imagine.’ Mr. Pogue has as his subject the movement of the country from such material and spiritual limitation to the landings in North Africa and as his special thesis the contribution of General George C. Marshall in the production of this remarkable transition... What General Marshall did was to plan, negotiate, organize, and, above all, decide... [Mr. Pogue’s] narrative is lean, clear, and well controlled... What so often he is dealing with in these pages is the resolution of endless conflicts of prejudice and interest. His capacity to recognize and define the issues in debate, to expose with clinical balance the motives and feelings of the debaters, to weigh out honestly the merits and defects of the conclusions reached is impressive and a valuable aid to fuller understanding. Mr. Pogue succeeds as well in giving the reader a good feeling for the administrative situation in which General Marshall spent most of his time — how policies were developed, officers selected for special tasks, decisions taken, and all the rest of it... [A] solidly constructed, carefully developed book.” — Elting E. Morison, The Journal of Southern History “This second volume of Forrest Pogue’s long-awaited authorized biography of General George C. Marshall has reached the period of Marshall’s first three years as Chief of Staff... when [he] initiated the vast expansion of the US Army for World War II... Excellent footnotes and detailed appendixes, interviews, and bibliographical notes will ensure Pogue’s Marshall a permanent place in US military history and biography.” — Trumbull Higgins, The American Historical Review