Sensory experience seems to be the basis of our knowledge and conception of mind-independent things. The puzzle is to understand how that can be: even if the things we experience (apples, tables, trees, etc), are mind-independent how does our sensory experience of them enable us to conceive of them as mind-independent? George Berkeley thought that sensory experience can only provide us with the conception of mind-dependent things, things which cannot exist when they aren't being perceived. It's easy to dismiss Berkeley's conclusion but harder to see how to avoid it. In this book, John Campbell and Quassim Cassam propose very different solutions to Berkeley's Puzzle. For Campbell, sensory experience can be the basis of our knowledge of mind-independent things because it is a relation, more primitive than thought, between the perceiver and high-level objects and properties in the mind-independent world. Cassam opposes this 'relationalist' solution to the Puzzle and defends a 'representationalist' solution: sensory experience can give us the conception of mind-independent things because it represents its objects as mind-independent, but does so without presupposing concepts of mind-independent things. This book is written in the form of a debate between two rival approaches to understanding the relationship between concepts and sensory experience. Although Berkeley's Puzzle frames the debate, the questions addressed by Campbell and Cassam aren't just of historical interest. They are among the most fundamental questions in philosophy.

A lucid and comprehensive introduction to one of Berkeley's major works which mirrors the structure of that work.

This volume focuses on Berkeley's doctrine of signs. The 'doctrine of signs' refers to the use that Berkeley makes of a phenomenon that is central to a great deal of everyday discourse: one whereby certain perceivable entities are made to stand in for (as 'signs' of) something else. Things signified might be other perceivable entities or they might also be unperceivable notions - such as the meanings of words. From his earliest published work, A New Theory of Vision in 1710, to those works written towards the end of life, including Alciphron in 1732, Berkeley is at pains to emphasise the crucial role that sign-usage, particularly (but not only) in language, plays in human life. Berkeley also connects sign-usage to our (human) relationship with God: an issue that was right of the heart of his philosophical project. The contributions in this volume explore the myriad ways that Berkeley built on such insights to better understand a range of philosophical issues - issues of epistemology, language, perception, mental representation, mathematics, science, and theology. The aim of this volume is to establish that the doctrine of signs can be seen as one of the unifying themes of Berkeley's philosophy. What's more, this theme is one which spans his whole philosophical corpus; not just his best-known works like the Principles and the Three Dialogues, but also his works on science, mathematics, and theology.

George Berkeley (1685–1753) is, with John Locke and David Hume, one of the three major figures in the British empiricist school of philosophy. He has been the centre of much attention recently and his philosophical profile has gradually changed. In the 20th century he was almost exclusively known for his denial of the existence of matter (as this term was defined in those days), but today it is no longer reasonable to confine an account of Berkeley to the challenging philosophical inventions that he published when he was a young fellow at Trinity College in Dublin. This is a welcome trend. It shows Berkeley as a contributor not only to epistemology, metaphysics and moral and social philosophy, but also to a wide range of subjects including mathematics, philosophy of science, empirical psychology, political economy and monetary policy. The present collection aims at meeting this new trend by presenting a broad and comprehensive picture of Berkeley’s works in their historical context. The contributors are some of the finest international experts in the field. The editors hope that this collection will show George Berkeley as he was: a wide-ranging, widely influential and courageous philosophical innovator. This volume has been published to celebrate the 300th anniversary of George Berkeley’s Principles.

In the early 18th century George Berkeley made the astonishing claim that physical objects such as tables and chairs are nothing but collections of ideas. Samuel Rickless presents a new account of Berkeley's controversial argument, and suggests it is the philosopher's greatest legacy: not only is it valid, but it may well be sound.

To be a 'commonsense realist' is to hold that perceptual experience is (in general) an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects, and a source of direct knowledge of what such objects are like. Over the past few centuries this view has faced formidable challenges from epistemology, metaphysics, and, more recently, cognitive science. However, in recent years there has been renewed interest in it, due to new work on perceptual consciousness, objectivity, and causal understanding. This volume collects nineteen original essays by leading philosophers and psychologists on these topics. Questions addressed include: What are the commitments of commonsense realism? Does it entail any particular view of the nature of perceptual experience, or any particular view of the epistemology of perceptual knowledge? Should we think of commonsense realism as a view held by some philosophers, or is there a sense in which we are pre-theoretically committed to commonsense realism in virtue of the experience we enjoy or the concepts we use or the explanations we give? Is commonsense realism defensible, and if so how, in the face of the formidable criticism it faces? Specific issues addressed in the philosophical essays include the status of causal requirements on perception, the causal role of perceptual experience, and the relation between objective perception and causal thinking. The scientific essays present a range of perspectives on the development, phylogenetic and ontogenetic, of the human adult conception of perception.

Originally published in 1976, the bibliography presented here was intended to provide a useful research tool for scholars and students of perception. The primary concentration of the authors’ efforts has been on the philosophical literature during the period of 1935-1974.

This volume showcases fourteen essays, written by leading experts on the notion of acquaintance, which span philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Together they present the main issues and debates that surround the concept and explore such related topics as phenomenal consciousness, perceptual experience, and reference.

In Learning from Our Mistakes: Epistemology for the Real World, William J. Talbott provides a new framework for understanding the history of Western epistemology and uses it to propose a new way of understanding rational belief that can be applied to pressing social and political issues. Thisframework is used to articulate a new theory of prejudice and a new diagnosis of the sources of inequity in the U.S. criminal justice system, as well as insight into the proliferation of tribal and fascist epistemologies based on alt-facts and alt-truth.Talbott's new model of rational belief is not a model of a theorem prover in mathematics - It is a model of a good learner. Being a good learner requires sensitivity to clues, the imaginative ability to generate alternative explanatory narratives that fit the clues, and the ability to select themost coherent explanatory narrative. Sensitivity to clues requires sensitivity not only to evidence that supports one's own beliefs, but also to evidence that casts doubt on them. One of the most important characteristics of a good learner is the ability to correct mistakes.From this model, Talbott articulates nine principles that help to explain the difference between rational and irrational belief. Talbott contrasts his approach with the approach of historically important philosophers, including Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, and Kuhn, as wellas with a range of contemporary approaches, including pragmatism, Bayesianism, and naturalism. Learning from Our Mistakes offers a new lens through which to interpret the history of Western epistemology and analyze the complicated social and political phenomena facing us today.