Should the US deploy ballistic-missile defences? The arguments for and against are becoming increasingly polarised. This paper offers what is currently lacking in the debate: a quantitative analysis of how well defences would have to work to meet specific security objectives, and what level of defence might upset strategic stability.

As ballistic missile technology proliferates, and as ballistic missile defenses are deployed by both the Russian Federation and the United States, it is increasingly important for these two countries to seek ways to reap the benefits of systems that can protect their own national security interests against limited missile attacks from third countries without undermining the strategic balance that the two governments maintain to ensure stability. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability examines both the technical implications of planned missile defense deployments for Russian and U.S. strategic deterrents and the benefits and disadvantages of a range of options for cooperation on missile defense.

As ballistic missile technology proliferates, and as ballistic missile defenses are deployed by both the Russian Federation and the United States, it is increasingly important for these two countries to seek ways to reap the benefits of systems that can protect their own national security interests against limited missile attacks from third countries without undermining the strategic balance that the two governments maintain to ensure stability. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability examines both the technical implications of planned missile defense deployments for Russian and U.S. strategic deterrents and the benefits and disadvantages of a range of options for cooperation on missile defense--Publisher's description

Ballistic missile defenses (BMD) have been an issue in U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian arms control talks since the 1970s. During the Cold War, the nations sought to balance limits on offensive weapons and defensive weapons so that they could maintain ¿strategic stability,¿ which refers to the ability of each side to launch a retaliatory strike after absorbing a first strike by the other side. Contents of this report: (1) Intro.; (2) Strategic Stability and the Relationship Between Offensive and Defensive Forces; (3) BMD and the 1991 START Treaty: The Negotiating Framework; START Ratification; Resolving Competing Priorities; BMD Programs and Budgets; BMD in the 1980s, and 1990s; Current BMD Plans and Programs; (4) BMD Budgets Over Time.

In 2002 the Bush administration completed a Nuclear Posture Review that introduced a ‘new triad’ based on offensive-strike systems, defences and a revitalized defence infrastructure. The new triad is designed for a new strategic threat environment, characterized not by a long-standing nuclear rivalry with another superpower, but by unstable relationships with rogue-state proliferators, alongside more ambiguous relations with nuclear-weapon powers. Providing a historical context to these modifications to US nuclear strategy, Nuclear Superiority details how the new triad, which strongly emphasizes the need to bolster the credibility of the nuclear deterrent and to prepare for nuclear use when deterrence fails, is founded on previous efforts to secure nuclear superiority against the Soviet Union and counter-proliferation capabilities against WMD-proliferant adversaries. It illustrates how the evolution of American nuclear strategy towards more effective counter-force capabilities, regardless of the current threat environment, has led to a host of counter-force developments. David S. McDonough explores how this strategy is based on the long-standing American desire to control conflict escalation and how it may invite crisis instability with regional adversaries and disquiet among established nuclear powers.

Statement Of President George W. Bush Regarding His Intention To Introduce National Missile Defence (Nmd) Has Given Rise To A Lively Discussion On The Subject All Over The World. In This Book An Attempt Has Been Made To Present The Viewpoints Of Eminent Experts From Different Countries, Particularly Those From Countries Directly Affected By The Nmd E.G. The United States Of America, Russia, China, The United Kingdom, North Korea, India, Etc.It Is Hoped That The Book Would Be Of Great Value To The Researchers And Students Of Defence Studies, Parliamentarians, Senior Executives Concerned With Defence And The Common Readers.

Missiles came of age after World War II and the United States has pursued missile defences ever since. The issue has turned out to be one of the most divisive of the past generation taking into account the Russian position and their threat or perceived threat and the technical difficulties of actually implementing any missile defence. The Bush Administration claims that for the first time an effective missile defence is technically possible and that the threat of weapons of mass destruction has spread to many nations and groups other that Russia. The two factors, according to them, make missile defence an urgent priority justifying the breaking of the widely-revered ABM Treaties. Their argument rests partially on a bet that the Russians have now fallen so far behind since the Yeltsin government took over that they cannot keep up technologically. Although terrorism groups will not be deterred by the missile defence being planned, countries like China, North Korea etc., might well be. This book frames the current debate and also presents the legal considerations for withdrawal from the ABM Treaties.