Many social or economic conflict situations can be modeled by specifying the alternatives on which the involved parties may agree, and a special alternative which summarizes what happens in the event that no agreement is reached. Such a model is called a bargaining game, and a prescription assigning an alternative to each bargaining game is called a bargaining solution. In the cooperative game-theoretical approach, bargaining solutions are mathematically characterized by desirable properties, usually called axioms. In the noncooperative approach, solutions are derived as equilibria of strategic models describing an underlying bargaining procedure. Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides the reader with an up-to-date survey of cooperative, axiomatic models of bargaining, starting with Nash's seminal paper, The Bargaining Problem. It presents an overview of the main results in this area during the past four decades. Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides a chapter on noncooperative models of bargaining, in particular on those models leading to bargaining solutions that also result from the axiomatic approach. The main existing axiomatizations of solutions for coalitional bargaining games are included, as well as an auxiliary chapter on the relevant demands from utility theory.

The problem to be considered here is the one faced by bargainers who must reach a consensus--i.e., a unanimous decision. Specifically, we will be consid ering n-person games in which there is a set of feasible alternatives, any one of which can be the outcome of bargaining if it is agreed to by all the bargainers. In the event that no unanimous agreement is reached, some pre-specified disagree ment outcome will be the result. Thus, in games of this type, each player has a veto over any alternative other than the disagreement outcome. There are several reasons for studying games of this type. First, many negotiating situations, particularly those involving only two bargainers (i.e., when n = 2), are conducted under essentially these rules. Also, bargaining games of this type often occur as components of more complex processes. In addi tion, the simplicity of bargaining games makes them an excellent vehicle for studying the effect of any assumptions which are made in their analysis. The effect of many of the assumptions which are made in the analysis of more complex cooperative games can more easily be discerned in studying bargaining games. The various models of bargaining considered here will be studied axioma- cally. That is, each model will be studied by specifying a set of properties which serve to characterize it uniquely.

This book provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory.

Graduate textbook presenting abstract models of bargaining in a unified framework with detailed applications involving economic, political and social situations.

Relational structures abound in our daily environment: relational databases, data mining, scaling procedures, preference relations, etc. As the documentation of scientific results achieved within the European COST Action 274, TARSKI, this book advances the understanding of relational structures and the use of relational methods in various application fields. The 12 revised full papers were carefully reviewed and selected for presentations. The papers are devoted to mechanization of relational reasoning, relational scaling and preferences, and algebraic and logical foundations of real world relations.

This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games as well as the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. The authors devote a separate chapter to each solution, wherein they study its properties in full detail. In addition, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed.

This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes

This Edited Collection provides a rigorous and rich overview of current bargaining research in economics and related disciplines, as well as a discussion of future directions. The Editors create cross-disciplinary and cross-methodological synergies by bringing together bargaining researchers from various fields, including game theory, experimental economics, political economy, autonomous negotiations, artificial intelligence, environmental economics and behavioral operations management; as well as using various methods, including the strategic approach, axiomatic approach, empirical research, lab and field experiments, machine learning and decision support systems. Offering insights into the theoretical foundations of bargaining research, traditional applications to bargaining research and topics of growing importance due to new advances in technology and the changing political and physical landscape of the world, this book is a key tool for anyone working on or interested in bargaining.

This book provides a unified and comprehensive study of welfarism, cooperative games, public decision making, and voting and social choice theory.

Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.