This report assesses the operational performance of explosives-detection equipment and hardened unit-loading devices (HULDs) in airports and compares their operational performance to their laboratory performance, with a focus on improving aviation security.

This book addresses new technologies being considered by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for screening airport passengers for concealed weapons and explosives. The FAA is supporting the development of promising new technologies that can reveal the presence not only of metal-based weapons as with current screening technologies, but also detect plastic explosives and other non-metallic threat materials and objects, and is concerned that these new technologies may not be appropriate for use in airports for other than technical reasons. This book presents discussion of the health, legal, and public acceptance issues that are likely to be raised regarding implementation of improvements in the current electromagnetic screening technologies, implementation of screening systems that detect traces of explosive materials on passengers, and implementation of systems that generate images of passengers beneath their clothes for analysis by human screeners.

Making aviation security more cost-effective is hampered by considerable uncertainty about the terrorist threat, security system performance, and the costs of security measures. This volume focuses on exploring ways to inform decisionmaking despite such uncertainties, providing a set of analyses that help fill some of the current gaps in the assessment of the costs, benefits, and efficiency of aviation security measures and strategies.

R. William Johnstone served on the transportation security staff of the 9/11 Commission, and wrote this book to build upon and supplement the Commission's work. In its pages, he explains the aviation security system failure on 9/11, uses that as a means for evaluating post-9/11 transportation security efforts, and proposes remedies to continued shortcomings. 9/11 and the Future of Transportation Security is based on information originally provided to the 9/11 Commission, augmented by unpublished reports and a wealth of other material that has come to light since the issuance of the Commission's own report in July 2004. Part One analyzes the aviation security system's history and institutions to explain why the system failed on 9/11. Part Two looks at what has been done in aviation and transportation security since 9/11, including the Commission's recommendations and the congressional response to them. Finally and most significantly, Part Three outlines a suggested approach for improving current U.S. transportation security. It begins with fundamental policy questions that must be answered if we are to optimize transportation security efforts, and concludes with both underlying principles for action and specific recommendations.