Our minds are severely limited in how much information they can extensively process, in spite of being massively parallel at the visual end. When people attempt to track moving objects, only a limited number can be tracked, which varies with display parameters. Associated experiments indicate that spatial selection and updating has higher capacity than selection and updating of features such as color and shape, and is mediated by processes specific to each cerebral hemisphere, such that each hemifield has its own spatial tracking limit. These spatial selection processes act as a bottleneck that gate subsequent processing. To improve our understanding of this bottleneck, future work should strive to avoid contamination of tracking tasks by high-level cognition. While we are far from fully understanding how attention keeps up with multiple moving objects, what we already know illuminates the architecture of visual processing and offers promising directions for new discoveries.

This book presents studies of self-motion by an international group of basic and applied researchers including biologists, psychologists, comparative physiologists, kinesiologists, aerospace and control engineers, physicians, and physicists. Academia is well represented and accounts for most of the applied research offered. Basic theoretical research is further represented by private research companies and also by government laboratories on both sides of the Atlantic. Researchers and students of biology, psychology, physiology, kinesiology, engineering, and physics who have an interest in self-motion -- whether it be underwater, in space, or on solid ground -- will find this volume of interest. This book presents studies of self-motion by an international group of basic and applied researchers including biologists, psychologists, comparative physiologists, kinesiologists, aerospace and control engineers, physicians, and physicists. Academia is well represented and accounts for most of the applied research offered. Basic theoretical research is further represented by private research companies and also by government laboratories on both sides of the Atlantic. Researchers and students of biology, psychology, physiology, kinesiology, engineering, and physics who have an interest in self-motion -- whether it be underwater, in space, or on solid ground -- will find this volume of interest.

The three-volume work Perceiving in Depth is a sequel to Binocular Vision and Stereopsis and to Seeing in Depth, both by Ian P. Howard and Brian J. Rogers. This work is much broader in scope than the previous books and includes mechanisms of depth perception by all senses, including aural, electrosensory organs, and the somatosensory system. Volume 1 reviews sensory coding, psychophysical and analytic procedures, and basic visual mechanisms. Volume 2 reviews stereoscopic vision. Volume 3 reviews all mechanisms of depth perception other than stereoscopic vision. The three volumes are extensively illustrated and referenced and provide the most detailed review of all aspects of perceiving the three-dimensional world. Volume 1 starts with a review of the history of visual science from the ancient Greeks to the early 20th century with special attention devoted to the discovery of the principles of perspective and stereoscopic vision. The first chapter also contains an account of early visual display systems, such as panoramas and peepshows, and the development of stereoscopes and stereophotography. A chapter on the psychophysical and analytic procedures used in investigations of depth perception is followed by a chapter on sensory coding and the geometry of visual space. An account of the structure and physiology of the primate visual system proceeds from the eye through the LGN to the visual cortex and higher visual centers. This is followed by a review of the evolution of visual systems and of the development of the mammalian visual system in the embryonic and post-natal periods, with an emphasis on experience-dependent neural plasticity. An account of the development of perceptual functions, especially depth perception, is followed by a review of the effects of early visual deprivation during the critical period of neural plasticity on amblyopia and other defects in depth perception. Volume 1 ends with accounts of the accommodation mechanism of the human eye and vergence eye movements.

Of the myriad tasks that the brain has to perform, perhaps none is as crucial to the performance of other tasks as attention. A central thesis of this book on the cognitive neuroscience of attention is that attention is not a single entity, but a finite set of brain processes that interact mutually and with other brain processes in the performance of perceptual, cognitive, and motor skills.After an introductory part I, the book consists of three parts. Part II, Methods, describes the major neuroscience methods, including techniques used only with animals (anatomical tract tracing, single-unit electrophysiology, neurochemical manipulations), noninvasive human brain-imaging techniques (ERPs, positron emission tomography, and functional magnetic resonance imaging), and studies with brain-damaged individuals. This part also includes a chapter on the computational modeling of attention. Part III, Varieties of Attention, looks at three major components of attention from the cognitive neuroscience perspective: selection, vigilance, and control. It also discusses links to memory and language. Finally, part IV, Development and Pathologies, discusses the application of findings from the previous sections to the analysis of normal and abnormal development and to pathologies of attention such as schizophrenia and attention deficit disorders. Contributors Edward Awh, Gordon C. Baylis, Jochen Braun, Dennis Cantwell, Vincent P. Clark, Maurizio Corbetta, Susan M. Courtney, Francis Crinella, Matthew C. Davidson, Gregory J. DiGirolamo, Jon Driver, Jane Emerson, Pauline Filipek, Ira Fischler, Massimo Girelli, Pamela M. Greenwood, James V. Haxby, Mark H. Johnson, John Jonides, Julian S. Joseph, Robert T. Knight, Christof Koch, Steven J. Luck, Richard T. Marrocco, Brad C. Motter, Ken Nakayama, Orhan Nalcioglu, Paul G. Nestor, Ernst Niebur, Brian F. O'Donnell, Raja Parasuraman, Michael I. Posner, Robert D. Rafal, Trevor W. Robbins, Lynn C. Robertson, Judi E. See, James Swanson, Diane Swick, Don Tucker, Leslie G. Ungerleider, Joel S. Warm, Maree J. Webster, Sharon Wigal

How do children acquire language? How does real life language acquisition differ from results found in controlled environments? And how is modern life challenging established theories? Going far beyond laboratory experiments, the International Handbook of Language Acquisition examines a wide range of topics surrounding language development to shed light on how children acquire language in the real world. The foremost experts in the field cover a variety of issues, from the underlying cognitive processes and role of language input to development of key language dimensions as well as both typical and atypical language development. Horst and Torkildsen balance a theoretical foundation with data acquired from applied settings to offer a truly comprehensive reference book with an international outlook. The International Handbook of Language Acquisition is essential reading for graduate students and researchers in language acquisition across developmental psychology, developmental neuropsychology, linguistics, early childhood education, and communication disorders.

Leading philosophers and psychologists offer a rigorous assessment of the commonsense view that perceptual experience is an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects. They examine the nature of perception, its role in the acquisition of knowledge, the role of causation in perception, and how perceptual understanding develops in humans.

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Does perception provide us with direct and unmediated access to the world around us? The so-called 'argument from illusion ' has traditionally been supposed to show otherwise: from the subject's point of view, perceptual illusions are often indistinguishable from veridical perceptions; hence, perceptual experience, as such, cannot provide us with knowledge of the world, but only with knowledge of how things appear to us. Disjunctive accounts of perceptual experience, first proposed by John McDowell and Paul Snowdon in the early 1980s and at the centre of current debates in the philosophy of perception, have been proposed to block this argument. According to the traditional view, a case of perception and a subjectively indistinguishable illusion or hallucination can exemplify what is fundamentally the same kind of mental state even though they differ in how they relate to the non-mental environment. In contrast, according to the disjunctive account, the concept of perceptual experience should be seen as essentially disjunctive, encompassing (at least) two distinct kinds of mental states, namely genuinely world-involving perceptions and mere appearances. This book presents seven recent essays on disjunctivism first published in two special issues of Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action.

The first volume of a series on Cognition. Looking at Memory, Catergorization, Causal Inference and Problem Solving. First Published in 1990. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.