[Includes 10 photos illustrations] The first 9 months of the Korean War saw U.S. Army field artillery units destroy or abandon their own guns on nearly a dozen occasions. North Korean and Chinese forces infiltrated thinly held American lines to ambush units on the move or assault battery positions from the flanks or rear with, all too often, the same disastrous results. Trained to fight a linear war in Europe against conventional Soviet forces, field artillery units were unprepared for combat in Korea, which called for all-around defense of mutually supporting battery positions, and high-angle fire. Ironically, these same lessons had been learned the hard way during recent fighting against the Japanese in a 1944 action on Saipan, not Korea, aptly demonstrates. Pacific theater artillery tactics were discarded as an aberration after War World II, but Red Legs soon found that they “frequently [have] to fight as doughboys” and “must be able to handle the situation themselves if their gun positions are attacked.” A second problem with artillery in Korea was felt most keenly by the soldiers that the artillery was supposed to support — the infantry. Commanders at all levels had come to expect that in any future war, they would conduct operations with fire that equaled or even surpassed the lavish support they had recently enjoyed in northwest Europe. It was clear almost from the beginning, however, that this was not going to happen in Korea because there was a shortage not only of artillery units but also of the basic hardware of the cannoneers craft: guns and munitions. Until the front settled down into a war of attrition in the fall of 1951 (which facilitated the surveying of reference points and positioning of “an elaborate grid of batteries, fire direction centers, [and] fire support coordination centers”), massed fires were achieved by shooting at unprecedented speed.

Trained to fight a linear war in Europe against conventional Soviet forces, field artillery units were unprepared for combat in Korea, which called for all-around defense of mutually supporting battery positions, and high-angle fire. Pacific theater artillery tactics were discarded as an aberration after War World II, but Red Legs soon found that they?frequently [have] to fight as doughboys? and?must be able to handle the situation themselves if their gun positions are attacked.? A second problem with artillery in Korea was felt most keenly by the soldiers that the artillery was supposed to support?the infantry. Commanders at all levels had come to expect that in any future war, they would conduct operations with fire that equaled or even surpassed the lavish support they had recently enjoyed in northwest Europe. It was clear almost from the beginning, however, that this was not going to happen in Korea because there was a shortage not only of artillery units but also of the basic hardware of the cannoneers? craft?guns and munitions. Until the front settled down into a war of attrition in the fall of 1951 (which facilitated the surveying of reference points and positioning of?an elaborate grid of batteries, fire direction centers, [and] fire support coordination centers?), massed fires were achieved by shooting at unprecedented speed. This tactic, in turn, exposed the fact that the huge surplus of World War II munitions was actually deficient in some calibers, and strict ammunition rationing became the norm until production caught up with demand in the last days of the fighting.

A photographic history of the Korean War, focusing on the activities of U.S. troops, as well as the Allied forces that served under the flag of the United Nations.

The Korean War is the most comprehensive and detailed bibliography compiled to date on the American involvement in "The Forgotten War." In this revised and expanded second edition, Keith D. McFarland’s clearly written annotations provide concise descriptions of more than 2,600 of the most important books, articles, and documents written in English on the conflict in Korea. Key topics include origins of the war; the political and military roles of North and South Korea, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Turkey, and other United Nations members; campaigns and battles; weapons and uniforms; and the military and diplomatic aspects of the war. Specific subjects are easy to find using the index organized by topic and author, making The Korean War a necessity for every academic or research library.

In Empire's Violent End, Thijs Brocades Zaalberg and Bart Luttikhuis, along with expert contributors, present comparative research focused specifically on excessive violence in Indonesia, Algeria, Vietnam, Malaysia, Kenya, and other areas during the wars of decolonization. In the last two decades, there have been heated public and scholarly debates in France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands on the violent end of empire. Nevertheless, the broader comparative investigations into colonial counterinsurgency tend to leave atrocities such as torture, execution, and rape in the margins. The editors describe how such comparisons mostly focus on the differences by engaging in "guilt ranking." Moreover, the dramas that have unfolded in Algeria and Kenya tend to overshadow similar violent events in Indonesia, the very first nation to declare independence directly after World War II. Empire's Violent End is the first book to place the Dutch-Indonesian case at the heart of a comparison with focused, thematic analysis on a diverse range of topics to demonstrate that despite variation in scale, combat intensity, and international dynamics, there were more similarities than differences in the ways colonial powers used extreme forms of violence. By delving into the causes and nature of the abuse, Brocades Zaalberg and Luttikhuis conclude that all cases involved some form of institutionalized impunity, which enabled the type of situation in which the forces in the service of the colonial rulers were able to use extreme violence.

Two years before the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki helped bring a quick end to hostilities in the summer of 1945, U.S. planners began work on Operation Downfall, codename for the Allied invasions of Kyushu and Honshu, in the Japanese home islands. While other books have examined Operation Downfall, D. M. Giangreco offers the most complete and exhaustively researched consideration of the plans and their implications. He explores related issues of the first operational use of the atomic bomb and the Soviet Union’s entry into the war, including the controversy surrounding estimates of potential U.S. casualties. Following years of intense research at numerous archives, Giangreco now paints a convincing and horrific picture of the veritable hell that awaited invader and defender. In the process, he demolishes the myths that Japan was trying to surrender during the summer of 1945 and that U.S. officials later wildly exaggerated casualty figures to justify using the atomic bombs to influence the Soviet Union. As Giangreco writes, “Both sides were rushing headlong toward a disastrous confrontation in the Home Islands in which poison gas and atomic weapons were to be employed as MacArthur’s intelligence chief, Charles Willoughby, succinctly put it, ‘a hard and bitter struggle with no quarter asked or given.’ Hell to Pay examines the invasion of Japan in light of the large body of Japanese and American operational and tactical planning documents the author unearthed in familiar and obscure archives. It includes postwar interrogations and reports that senior Japanese commanders and their staffs were ordered to produce for General MacArthur’s headquarters. This groundbreaking history counters the revisionist interpretations questioning the rationale for the use of the atomic bomb and shows that President Truman’s decision was based on real estimates of the enormous human cost of a conventional invasion. This revised edition of Hell to Pay expands on several areas covered in the previous book and deals with three new topics: U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the war against Imperial Japan; U.S., Soviet, and Japanese plans for the invasion and defense of the northernmost Home Island of Hokkaido; and Operation Blacklist, the three-phase insertion of American occupation forces into Japan. It also contains additional text, relevant archival material, supplemental photos, and new maps, making this the definitive edition of an important historical work.

Using the same format that made Eyewitness D-Day so unforgettable, this new volume offers an equally powerful look at the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War was one of the most controversial conflicts of the 20th century. It was also one of the most divisive. American involvement in Vietnam nearly tore the nation apart, and the war’s repercussions remain a part of the public consciousness. Written by military historian Donald Gilmore and edited by D.M. Giangreco—author of Eyewitness D-Day—Eyewitness Vietnam traces the history of America’s longest war, illuminating its causes, battles, and aftereffects, its unfolding and unraveling. Accompanied by maps and nearly 250 photographs—many seen here for the first time—each chapter highlights a specific operation and special feature of the fighting, from the Viet Cong’s guerrilla tactics to the MIA issue. And, just as in the bestselling Eyewitness D-Day, numerous interviews with first-hand participants, both American and Vietnamese, present a compelling, intimate, and deeply personal view of this tumultuous time. “I never had the thought that our mission wasn’t worth it. I questioned the rules by which we had to operate…those were dumb. Those cost lives.”—Major Leo Thorsness, Wild Weasel squadron pilot, Medal of Honor recipient