Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a language, a purpose, and unity of effort. Rather than establishing a set of hard and fast rules, the objective of doctrine is to foster initiative and creative thinking. To this end, FM 3-06 discusses major Army operations in an urban environment. This environment, consisting of complex terrain, a concentrated population, and an infrastructure of systems, is an operational environment in which Army forces will operate. In the future, it may be the predominant operational environment. Each urban operation is unique and will differ because of the multitude of combinations presented by the threat, the urban area itself, the major operation of which it may be part (or the focus), and the fluidity of societal and geopolitical considerations. Therefore, there will always exist an innate tension between Army doctrine, the actual context of the urban operation, and future realities. Commanders must strike the proper balance between maintaining the capability to respond to current threats and preparing for future challenges.

Army Techniques Publication ATP 3-24.3 Cultural and Situational Understanding establishes the techniques and procedures used by individuals, teams, and units of the United States Army at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. This ATP is applicable to all members of the Army profession and security assistance contractors. The techniques and procedures prescribed in this publication are used when engaging other government agencies, indigenous populations and institutions, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other military and nonmilitary entities to support conventional and special operations missions. This publication elaborates on doctrine contained in FM 3-24, Insurgency and Countering Insurgencies. The principal audience for ATP 3-24.3 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication. Understanding culture is essential in conducting irregular warfare. Irregular warfare requires a deliberate application of an understanding of culture due to the need to understand a populated operational environment, what specifically is causing instability, the nature of the threat, and the ability to work with host-nation governments and security forces. Often, training and operations rely on cultural training and education to build cultural expertise, but this may not provide the cognitive link to situational understanding. This ATP does not simply focus on culture, which often generalizes aspects of a society, does not account for diversity, and rarely represents a specific working identity (as in useful and relevant identity, which is distilled or created for a purpose) for an entire region, nation, or even an area. Alternatively, this publication builds on doctrinal publications, including ADRP 5-0 and FM 3-24, which detail terms and references regarding culture and help link these foundations to situational understanding. Situational understanding facilitates Soldiers' and leaders' abilities to make informed decisions regarding their area of operations because of their recognizing "what looks right" and "what looks wrong." This ATP covers the basics of one aspect of enhancing situational understanding through cultural understanding, and links these basics to methodologies and training tools to more rapidly gain cultural understanding through a deliberate process, rather than simply gaining awareness through learned patterns by immersion in a community or area of operations. Leaders at every level need to emphasize cultural training and understanding. Developing expertise in cultural and geopolitical knowledge, understanding, and application are requirements for all Army professionals and leaders and one of the four fields of knowledge of professional military expertise. (See ADP 1.) A deliberate, synchronized and coherent plan to develop cultural expertise is vital. If leaders set the standard, their Soldiers will follow. Leaders are expected to be culturally and situational aware. They will conduct and participate in meetings, negotiations, and other exchanges with host-nation citizens in which cultural and situational understanding are essential to influence target audiences. Obtaining keen situational awareness will also help leaders recognize and understand the prerequisites of insurgency in their area of operations, enemy patterns, how insurgents use prerequisites of insurgency to get close to the local population, and ways counterinsurgents can separate insurgents from the local population.

Field Manual (FM) 6-02, Signal Support to Operations, is the premier Signal doctrine publication, and only field manual. FM 6-02 compiles Signal Corps doctrine into three chapters with supporting appendices that address network operations in support of mission command and unified land operations and the specific tactics and procedures associated with organic and nonorganic Signal forces. The fundamental idea of Signal Corps tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of Signal forces in a supporting role to provide LandWarNet across the range of military operations. The detailed techniques regarding the ways and methods to accomplish the missions, functions or tasks of the Signal Corps indicated in this FM will be addressed in supporting Army techniques publications (ATPs). Army forces operate worldwide and require a secure and reliable communications capability that rapidly adapts to changing demands.

The Protection of Civilians (PoC) refers to efforts that protect civilians from physical violence, secure their rights to access essential services and resources, and contribute to a secure, stable, and just environment for civilians over the long-term. PoC is a moral, political, legal, and strategic priority for all military operations. Communities on the ground and around the world expect uniformed personnel to protect the population; failure to do so jeopardizes the credibility and legitimacy of the operation and can undermine other objectives. This guide is primarily intended as a resource for military commanders and staffs who must consider PoC while conducting operations. Other interested readers may include international organizations, national militaries, training centers, and civilian and police officials who are also concerned with PoC.

Includes a foreword by Major General David A. Rubenstein. From the editor: "71F, or "71 Foxtrot," is the AOC (area of concentration) code assigned by the U.S. Army to the specialty of Research Psychology. Qualifying as an Army research psychologist requires, first of all, a Ph.D. from a research (not clinical) intensive graduate psychology program. Due to their advanced education, research psychologists receive a direct commission as Army officers in the Medical Service Corps at the rank of captain. In terms of numbers, the 71F AOC is a small one, with only 25 to 30 officers serving in any given year. However, the 71F impact is much bigger than this small cadre suggests. Army research psychologists apply their extensive training and expertise in the science of psychology and social behavior toward understanding, preserving, and enhancing the health, well being, morale, and performance of Soldiers and military families. As is clear throughout the pages of this book, they do this in many ways and in many areas, but always with a scientific approach. This is the 71F advantage: applying the science of psychology to understand the human dimension, and developing programs, policies, and products to benefit the person in military operations. This book grew out of the April 2008 biennial conference of U.S. Army Research Psychologists, held in Bethesda, Maryland. This meeting was to be my last as Consultant to the Surgeon General for Research Psychology, and I thought it would be a good idea to publish proceedings, which had not been done before. As Consultant, I'd often wished for such a document to help explain to people what it is that Army Research Psychologists "do for a living." In addition to our core group of 71Fs, at the Bethesda 2008 meeting we had several brand-new members, and a number of distinguished retirees, the "grey-beards" of the 71F clan. Together with longtime 71F colleagues Ross Pastel and Mark Vaitkus, I also saw an unusual opportunity to capture some of the history of the Army Research Psychology specialty while providing a representative sample of current 71F research and activities. It seemed to us especially important to do this at a time when the operational demands on the Army and the total force were reaching unprecedented levels, with no sign of easing, and with the Army in turn relying more heavily on research psychology to inform its programs for protecting the health, well being, and performance of Soldiers and their families."

Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces The mighty Soviet Army is no more. The feckless Russian Army that stumbled into Chechnya is no more. Today's Russian Army is modern, better manned, better equipped and designed for maneuver combat under nuclear-threatened conditions. This is your source for the tactics, equipment, force structure and theoretical underpinnings of a major Eurasian power. Here's what the experts are saying: "A superb baseline study for understanding how and why the modern Russian Army functions as it does. Essential for specialist and generalist alike." -Colonel (Ret) David M. Glantz, foremost Western author on the Soviet Union in World War II and Editor of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. "Congratulations to Les Grau and Chuck Bartles on filling a gap which has yawned steadily wider since the end of the USSR. Their book addresses evolving Russian views on war, including the blurring of its nature and levels, and the consequent Russian approaches to the Ground Forces' force structuring, manning, equipping, and tactics. Confidence is conferred on the validity of their arguments and conclusions by copious footnoting, mostly from an impressive array of primary sources. It is this firm grounding in Russian military writings, coupled with the authors' understanding of war and the Russian way of thinking about it, that imparts such an authoritative tone to this impressive work." -Charles Dick, former Director of the Combat Studies Research Centre, Senior Fellow at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, author of the 1991 British Army Field Manual, Volume 2, A Treatise on Soviet Operational Art and author of From Victory to Stalemate The Western Front, Summer 1944 and From Defeat to Victory, The Eastern Front, Summer 1944. "Dr. Lester Grau's and Chuck Bartles' professional research on the Russian Armed Forces is widely read throughout the world and especially in Russia. Russia's Armed Forces have changed much since the large-scale reforms of 2008, which brought the Russian Army to the level of the world's other leading armies. The speed of reform combined with limited information about their core mechanisms represented a difficult challenge to the authors. They have done a great job and created a book which could be called an encyclopedia of the modern armed forces of Russia. They used their wisdom and talents to explore vital elements of the Russian military machine: the system of recruitment and training, structure of units of different levels, methods and tactics in defense and offence and even such little-known fields as the Arctic forces and the latest Russian combat robotics." -Dr. Vadim Kozyulin, Professor of Military Science and Project Director, Project on Asian Security, Emerging Technologies and Global Security Project PIR Center, Moscow. "Probably the best book on the Russian Armed Forces published in North America during the past ten years. A must read for all analysts and professionals following Russian affairs. A reliable account of the strong and weak aspects of the Russian Army. Provides the first look on what the Russian Ministry of Defense learned from best Western practices and then applied them on Russian soil." -Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Moscow-based Centre for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) and member of the Public Council of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense. Author of Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine, Russia's New Army, and The Tanks of August.

Volume 2, Bringing Order to Chaos: Combined Arms Maneuver in Large Scale Combat Operations, opens a dialogue with the Army. Are we ready for the significantly increased casualties inherent to intensive combat between large formations, the constant paralyzing stress of continual contact with a peer enemy, and the difficult nature of command and control while attempting division and corps combined arms maneuver to destroy that enemy? The chapters in this volume answer these questions for combat operations while spanning military history from 1917 through 2003. These accounts tell the challenges of intense combat, the drain of heavy casualties, the difficulty of commanding and controlling huge formations in contact, the effective use of direct and indirect fires, the need for high quality leadership, thoughtful application of sound doctrine, and logistical sustainment up to the task. No large scale combat engagement, battle, or campaign of the last one hundred years has been successful without being better than the enemy in these critical capabilities. What can we learn from the past to help us make the transition to ready to fight tonight?