On March 8th, 1965, some 3,500 US Marines, the first US combat troops to arrive in Vietnam, landed in Da Nang to defend the US air base there. On June 8th, following further reinforcements, General Westmoreland authorized his troops to begin "offensive patrolling." Lee Russell's follow-up to Men-at-Arms 104 focuses in finer detail on the uniforms and insignia of the US Army and Marines, the ARVN and the NVA. The book is packed with superbly detailed black and white photographs of the forces active in the Vietnam War, and Mike Chappell's excellent illustrations provide key reference material for the contemporary uniforms and battledress.

Philip Katcher provides an overview to the conflict that engulfed Vietnam following the division of the country into two along the 17th Parallel in 1954. The uniforms and insignia of the US forces, including the army, Special Forces, air force, navy and marine corps, are dealt with in detail, together with those of the ARVN, the Allied Forces (such as the Royal Thai Army and Korean troops), and also the Communist NLF (Viet Cong) and NVA forces. Mike Chappell's colourful artwork provides plenty of detail to accompany this authoritative text.

This book provides detailed information about how US Army units were organised and operated in America's longest war. Vietnam Special Forces veteran Gordon L Rottman examines the different types of infantry battalions and the units that supported them, their training and organisation down to platoon level. Aspects of the US Army's conventional and unconventional warfare doctrine are also addressed, along with a discussion of how replacements were trained and integrated into units. Among other areas of the US Army's involvement covered are individual and crew-served weapons, artillery, armoured fighting vehicles, transport, logistics, the complex chain of command, and combat operations.

NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRODUCT -- OVERSTOCK SALE - Significantly reduced list price This book tells the mostly forgotten story of the accelerating mental health problems that arose among the troops sent to fight in South Vietnam, especially the morale, discipline, and heroin crisis that ultimately characterized the second half of the war. This situation was unprecedented in U.S. military history and dangerous, and reflected the fact that during the war America underwent its most divisive period since the Civil War and, as a result, the war became bitterly controversial. The author is a career Army psychiatrist who led a psychiatric unit in Vietnam. In the years following his return, he was dismayed to discover that the Army had conducted no formal review of this alarming situation, including from the standpoint of military psychiatry, and had lost or destroyed all of the pertinent clinical records. In addition to permitting a study of the psychological wounds and their treatment in Vietnam, these records would have been priceless in the treatment of the legions of veterans who presented serious adjustment problems and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. As a consequence, Dr Camp has been relentless in combing the professional, civilian, and surviving military literature--including unpublished documents--to construct a compelling narrative documenting the successes and failures of Army psychiatry and the Army leadership in Vietnam in responding to these psychiatric and behavioral challenges. The result is a book that is both scholarly and intensely personal, includes vivid case material and anecdotes from colleagues who also served there, and is replete with illustrations and correspondence. It presents the story of Vietnam in a fresh manner--through the psychiatrist's eyes, and sensibilities.

Many senior army officials still claim that if they had been given enough soldiers and weapons, the United States could have won the war in Vietnam. In this probing analysis of U.S. military policy in Vietnam, career army officer and strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., argues that precisely because of this mindset the war was lost before it was fought. The army assumed that it could transplant to Indochina the operational methods that had been successful in the European battle theaters of World War II, an approach that proved ill-suited to the way the Vietnamese Communist forces fought. Theirs was a war of insurgency, and counterinsurgency, Krepinevich contends, requires light infantry formations, firepower restraint, and the resolution of political and social problems within the nation. To the very end, top military commanders refused to recognize this. Krepinevich documents the deep division not only between the American military and civilian leaders over the very nature of the war, but also within the U.S. Army itself. Through extensive research in declassified material and interviews with officers and men with battlefield experience, he shows that those engaged in the combat understood early on that they were involved in a different kind of conflict. Their reports and urgings were discounted by the generals, who pressed on with a conventional war that brought devastation but little success. A thorough analysis of the U.S. Army's role in the Vietnam War, The Army and Vietnam demonstrates with chilling persuasiveness the ways in which the army was unprepared to fight—lessons applicable to today's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The U.S. Army Before Vietnam, 1953-1965, by Donald A. Carter, covers the period between the end of the Korean War and the initial deployment of ground combat troops to Vietnam. It describes the organizational and doctrinal changes the Army implemented as it attempted to digest the lessons of one conflict and to prepare the force for another. The pamphlet also discusses the service's efforts to maintain its position in national defense within the parameters of President Eisenhower's New Look strategic policy. A key issue for the Army was the question of how to prepare a force to operate on an atomic battlefield. In order to compete with the Air Force and the Navy for a diminishing defense budget, the Army had to show that it, too, was a modern, forward-thinking organization, prepared to integrate a new family of tactical atomic weapons into its organization and doctrine. The resulting experiment with the Pentomic division forced Army leaders to reexamine some of their most basic assumptions about future conflict. With the increasing influence of Communist China throughout Southeast Asia, the Army also began to pay greater attention toward counterinsurgency and guerilla warfare. President Kennedy's interest in a doctrine of flexible response and his concern for combatting Communist inspired insurrections prompted the Army to increase training in unconventional warfare and to highlight the capabilities of its developing special forces--the Green Berets. Related products: The U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1968-1974 -Print Paperback format is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00536-1 United States Army in World War 2, Special Studies, Manhattan, the Army, and the Atomic Bomb-Print Clothbound format can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00132-2 Building the Bombs: A History of the Nuclear Weapons Complex is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/061-000-00968-0 Vietnam War resources collection can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/battles-wars/vietn... China product collection can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/international-foreign-affairs/asia/china

James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi's Dirty Little Secrets of the Vietnam War allows us to see what really happened to American forces in Southeast Asia, separating popular myth from explosive reality in a clear, concise manner. Containing more than two hundred examinations of different aspects of the war, the book questions why the American military ignored the lessons taught by previous encounters with insurgency forces; probes the use of group think and mind control by the North Vietnamese; and explores the role technology played in shaping the way the war was fought. Of course, the book also reveals the "dirty little secrets," the truth behind such aspects of the conflict as the rise of the Montagnard mercenaries--the most feared group of soldiers participating in the secret war in Laos-and the details of the hidden struggle for the Ho Chi Minh Trail. With its unique and perceptive examination of the conflict, Dirty Little Secrets of the Vietnam War by James F. Dunnigan & Albert A. Nofi offers a critical addition to the library of Vietnam War history.

Commonly mistaken for the locally raised Viet Cong, the NVA was an entirely different force, conducting large-scale operations in a conventional war. Despite limited armour, artillery and air support, the NVA were an extremely politicized and professional force with strict control measures and leadership concepts. Gordon Rottman follows the fascinating life of the highly motivated infantryman from conscription and induction through training to real combat experiences. Covering the evolution of the forces from 1958 onwards, this book takes an in-depth look at the civilian and military lives of the soldiers, whilst accompanying artwork details the uniforms, weapons and equipment used by the NVA in their clash against America and her allies.

A concise look at how military justice during the Vietnam War served the dual purpose of punishing U.S. solders' crimes and infractions while also serving the important role of promoting core American values--democracy and rule of law--to the Vietnamese.