In Chemical Heroes Andrew Bickford analyzes the US military's attempts to design performance enhancement technologies and create pharmacological "supersoldiers" capable of withstanding extreme trauma. Bickford traces the deep history of efforts to biologically fortify and extend the health and lethal power of soldiers from the Cold War era into the twenty-first century, from early adoptions of mandatory immunizations to bio-protective gear, to the development and spread of new performance enhancing drugs during the global War on Terrorism. In his examination of government efforts to alter soldiers' bodies through new technologies, Bickford invites us to contemplate what constitutes heroism when armor becomes built in, wired in, and even edited into the molecular being of an American soldier. Lurking in the background and dark recesses of all US military enhancement research, Bickford demonstrates, is the desire to preserve US military and imperial power.

This work seeks to provide ways in which to think about how institutional culture is formed, how it works, and how it can be changed. Essays from a variety of perspectives compare efforts to confront issues of diversity based on race, gender and sexual orientation.

This report surveys opportunities for future Army applications in biotechnology, including sensors, electronics and computers, materials, logistics, and medical therapeutics, by matching commercial trends and developments with enduring Army requirements. Several biotechnology areas are identified as important for the Army to exploit, either by direct funding of research or by indirect influence of commercial sources, to achieve significant gains in combat effectiveness before 2025.

This book provides an analysis of the development and deployment of chemical weapons from 700BC to the present day. The First World War is examined in detail since it remains the most significant experience of the chemical threat, but the Second World War, and post-war conflicts are also evaluated. Additionally, protocols attempting to control the proliferation and use of chemical weapons are assessed. Finally, the book examines the threat (real and imagined) from a chemical warfare attack today by rationally assessing to what extent terrorist groups around the world are capable of making and using such weapons.

Ever since its employment in the First World War, chemical warfare has always aroused controversy. Governments have responded by pursuing the policies of disarmament and deterrence in the hope of avoiding its recurrence. However, despite the signing of the Geneva Protocol in 1925 which banned the use of poison gas, chemical weapons have been used in subsequent conflicts and most recently in the Gulf War between Iraq and Iran. In this work the policies of disarmament and deterrence will be reassessed within a broad historical and strategic context. It will be argued that poison gas could still be used in a modern European conflict; that the Soviet forces are the best equipped to operate in a contaminated environment; and that weaknesses persist in NATO's anti-chemical defences and in her deterrent. It will be emphasised, too, that the Geneva disarmament talks, which have made some progress in recent years, still face formidable difficulties over the issues of verification and compliance. Above all, it will be claimed that the onset of nuclear parity between the superpowers has eroded the credibility of a deterrent to chemical attack based upon the threat of nuclear release. Accordingly, this book will contend that the United States should modernize her stockpile of chemical weapons to bolster the Western deterrent and to provide more leverage for the negotiations in Geneva.