Aristotle's scientific research, logic and metaphysical theories, psychology and ethics and politics, all in their historical contexts.

This book is the first collection of essays in English devoted solely to the relationship between Aristotle’s ethics and politics. Are ethics and politics two separate spheres of action or are they unified? Those who support the unity-thesis emphasize the centrality for Aristotle of questions about the good life and the common good as the purpose of politics. Those who defend the separation-thesis stress Aristotle’s sense of realism in understanding the need for political solutions to human shortcomings. But is this all there is to it? The contributors to this volume explore and develop different arguments and interpretative frameworks that help to make sense of the relationship between Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics. The chapters loosely follow the order of the Nicomachean Ethics in examining topics such as political science, statesmanship and magnanimity, justice, practical wisdom, friendship, and the relationship between the active and the contemplative life. They have in common an appreciation of the relevance of Aristotle’s writings, which offer the modern reader distinct philosophical perspectives on the relationship between ethics and politics.

In Aristotle on Practical Truth, C.M.M. Olfert gives the first book-length treatment of Aristotle's notion of practical truth. The book covers the origins of practical truth in Plato's philosophy; practical truth's role in practical reasoning; its contributions to motivation and action; and its implications for ethical development.

The focus of Aristotle on Prescription is Aristotle’s reflections on rule-making. It is widely believed that Aristotle was only concerned with decision-making, understood as a deliberative process enabling a person to arrive at particular, contingent decisions. However, rule-making is fundamental to Aristotle’s ethical texts. Establishing rules means indicating patterns for action that are sufficiently specific to meet situational difficulties and sufficiently constant in time to provide us with a code of behaviour to be used in similar situations. When we prescribe rules, we demonstrate the ability to direct not only our own life but also other people’s lives. Alesse’s book explores Aristotle’s deep reflections on the nature and functions of prescription, and on the relationship between rules and individual decisions.

Bryn Mawr Commentaries provide clear, concise, accurate, and consistent support for students making the transition from introductory and intermediate texts to the direct experience of ancient Greek and Latin literature. They assume that the student will know the basics of grammar and vocabulary and then provide the specific grammatical and lexical notes that a student requires to begin the task of interpretation. Hackett Publishing Company is the exclusive distributor of the Bryn Mawr Commentaries in North America, the United Kingdom, and Europe.

This book offers a new account of Aristotle’s practical philosophy. Pavlos Kontos argues that Aristotle does not restrict practical reason to its action-guiding and motivational role; rather, practical reason remains practical in the full sense of the term even when its exercise does not immediately concern the guidance of our present actions. To elucidate why this wider scope of practical reason is important, Kontos brings into the foreground five protagonists that have long been overlooked: (a) spectators or judges who make non-motivational judgments about practical matters that do not interact with their present deliberations and actions; (b) legislators who exercise practical reason to establish constitutions and laws; (c) hopes as an active engagement with moral luck and its impact on our individual lives; (d) prayers as legislators’ way to deal with the moral luck hovering around the birth of constitutions and the prospect of a utopia; and (e) people who are outsiders or marginal cases of the responsibility community because they are totally deprived of practical reason. Building on a wide range of interpretations of Aristotle’s practical philosophy (from the ancient commentators to contemporary analytic and continental philosophers), Kontos offers new insights about Aristotle’s philosophical contribution to the current debates about radical evil, moral luck, hope, utopia, internalism and externalism, and the philosophy of law. Aristotle on the Scope of Practical Reason will appeal to researchers and advanced students interested in Aristotle’s ethics, ancient philosophy, and the history of practical philosophy.

This volume focuses on Aristotle’s practical philosophy. His analysis of emotional response takes pride of place. It is followed by discussion of his moral psychology: the division of the human soul into emotional and deliberative parts. Moral virtue is studied in relation to emotion, and animals are shown to lack both emotion and virtue. Different kinds of friendship are analyzed, and the effects of vehemence, i.e., temperament are given special attention. Aristotle’s justification for assigning natural slaves and women subordinate roles receives detailed consideration. The same is true of his analysis of correct and incorrect constitutions. Finally, persuasion is taken up from several angles including Aristotle’s emphasis on the presentation of character and his curious dismissal of delivery in speech.

In Levels of Argument, Dominic Scott compares the Republic and Nicomachean Ethics from a methodological perspective. In the first half he argues that the Republic distinguishes between two levels of argument in the defence of justice, the 'longer' and 'shorter' routes. The longer is the ideal and aims at maximum precision, requiring knowledge of the Forms and a definition of the Good. The shorter route is less precise, employing hypotheses, analogies and empirical observation. This is the route that Socrates actually follows in the Republic, because it is appropriate to the level of his audience and can stand on its own feet as a plausible defence of justice. In the second half of the book, Scott turns to the Nicomachean Ethics. Scott argues that, even though Aristotle rejects a universal Form of the Good, he implicitly recognises the existence of longer and shorter routes, analogous to those distinguished in the Republic. The longer route would require a comprehensive theoretical worldview, incorporating elements from Aristotle's metaphysics, physics, psychology, and biology. But Aristotle steers his audience away from such an approach as being a distraction from the essentially practical goals of political science. Unnecessary for good decision-making, it is not even an ideal. In sum, Platonic and Aristotelian methodologies both converge and diverge. Both distinguish analogously similar levels of argument, and it is the shorter route that both philosophers actually follow--Plato because he thinks it will have to suffice, Aristotle because he thinks that there is no need to go beyond it.