This book explores the trail-blazing Theory of Constitutional Rights of Robert Alexy. The authors combine critical analysis of the structural elements of Alexy’s theory with an assessment of its applied relevance, paying special attention to the UK Human Rights Act and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Alexy himself opens the book with an insightful contextualisation of his theory of fundamental rights within his general legal theory.

This book provides an analysis of key approaches to rule of law oversight in the EU and identifies deeper theoretical problems.

An eminent constitutional scholar reveals how our approach to rights is dividing America, and shows how we can build a better system of justice.

What is law? What is it for? How should judges decide novel cases when the statutes and earlier decisions provide no clear answer? Do judges make up new law in such cases, or is there some higher law in which they discover the correct answer? Must everyone always obey the law? If not, when is a citizen morally free to disobey? A renowned philosopher enters the debate surrounding these questions. Clearly and forcefully, Ronald Dworkin argues against the “ruling” theory in Anglo-American law—legal positivism and economic utilitarianism—and asserts that individuals have legal rights beyond those explicitly laid down and that they have political and moral rights against the state that are prior to the welfare of the majority. Mr. Dworkin criticizes in detail the legal positivists’ theory of legal rights, particularly H. L. A. Hart’s well-known version of it. He then develops a new theory of adjudication, and applies it to the central and politically important issue of cases in which the Supreme Court interprets and applies the Constitution. Through an analysis of John Rawls’s theory of justice, he argues that fundamental among political rights is the right of each individual to the equal respect and concern of those who govern him. He offers a theory of compliance with the law designed not simply to answer theoretical questions about civil disobedience, but to function as a guide for citizens and officials. Finally, Professor Dworkin considers the right to liberty, often thought to rival and even preempt the fundamental right to equality. He argues that distinct individual liberties do exist, but that they derive, not from some abstract right to liberty as such, but from the right to equal concern and respect itself. He thus denies that liberty and equality are conflicting ideals. Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law and the moral conception of individual rights that underlies it have already made him one of the most influential philosophers working in this area. This is the first publication of these ideas in book form.

Arguing about Law introduces philosophy of law in an accessible and engaging way. The reader covers a wide range of topics, from general jurisprudence, law, the state and the individual, to topics in normative legal theory, as well as the theoretical foundations of public and private law. In addition to including many classics, Arguing About Law also includes both non-traditional selections and discussion of timely topical issues like the legal dimension of the war on terror. The editors provide lucid introductions to each section in which they give an overview of the debate and outline the arguments of the papers, helping the student get to grips with both the classic and core arguments and emerging debates in: the nature of law legality and morality the rule of law the duty to obey the law legal enforcement of sexual morality the nature of rights rights in an age of terror constitutional theory tort theory. Arguing About Law is an inventive and stimulating reader for students new to philosophy of law, legal theory and jurisprudence.

The Essential Bill of Rights: Original Arguments and Fundamental Documents provides the convenience of an affordable and accessible compilation of the original, essential documents and arguments that eventually led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights in the United States.

The notion of “human rights” is widely used in political and moral discussions. The core idea, that all human beings have some inalienable basic rights, is appealing and has an eminently practical function: It allows moral criticism of various wrongs and calls for action in order to prevent them. On the other hand it is unclear what exactly a human right is. Human rights lack a convincing conceptual foundation that would be able to compel the wrong-doer to accept human rights claims as well-founded. Hence the practical function faces theoretical doubts. The present collection takes up the tension between the wide political use of human rights claims and the intellectual skepticism about them. In particular two major issues are identified that call for conceptual clarification in order to better understand human rights claims both in theory and in practice: the question of how to justify human rights and the tension between universal normative claims and particular moralities.

The relationship between the state and the national government is among the most contested issues in the United States. And questions about where power should reside, how decisions should be made, and how responsibility should be allocated have been central to the American experiment in federalism. In Polyphonic Federalism, Robert A. Schapiro defends the advantages of multiple perspectives in government, arguing that the resulting ''polyphony'' creates a system that is more efficient, democratic, and protective of liberties. This groundbreaking volume contends that contemporary views of federalism are plagued by outmoded dualist notions that seek to separate state and federal authority. Instead, Schapiro proposes a polyphonic model that emphasizes the valuable interaction of state and federal law, one that more accurately describes the intersecting realities of local and national power. Through an analysis of several legal and policy debates, Polyphonic Federalism demonstrates how a multifaceted government can best realize the potential of federalism to protect fundamental rights.

Socio-economic rights have been widely regarded as aspirational goals, rhetorically useful, but having few practical implications for government policy and the distribution of resources within a polity. It is not therefore surprising that socio-economic rights have been systematically neglected in the world today, with millions still lacking access to basic shelter, food or health-care. This book seeks to provide a sustained argument for placing renewed emphasis upon socio-economic rights in the fight against desperate poverty. It utilizes a combination of political philosophy, constitutional law, and public policy in its focus and analyzes why violations of socio-economic rights are treated with less urgency than violations of civil and political rights.