At age 36, Laurence S. Kuter (1905–1979) became the youngest general officer since William T. Sherman. He served as deputy commander of allied tactical air forces in North Africa during World War II and helped devise the American bombing strategy in Europe. Although his combat contributions were less notable than other commanders in the Eighth Air Force, few officers saw as many theaters of operation as he did or were as highly sought-after. After World War II, he led the Military Air Transport Service, Air University, Far East Air Forces, and served as commander-in-chief of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). Despite these accomplishments and others, however, Kuter remains widely underappreciated. In Architect of Air Power, Brian D. Laslie offers the first biography of this important but unsung pioneer whose influence can be found in every stage of the development of an independent US Air Force. From his early years at West Point to his days at the Air Corps Tactical School to his leadership role at NORAD, Kuter made his mark with quiet efficiency. He was an early advocate of strategic bombardment rather than pursuit or fighter aviation—fundamentally changing the way air power was used—and later helped implement the Berlin airlift in 1948. In what would become a significant moment in military history, he wrote Field Manual 100-20, which is considered the Air Force's "declaration of independence" from the Army. Drawing on diaries, letters, and scrapbooks, Laslie offers a complete portrait of this influential soldier. Architect of Air Power illuminates Kuter's pivotal contributions and offers new insights into critical military policy and decision-making during the Second World War and the Cold War.

A biography of the pioneering four-star general, chronicling his influence on the United States Air Force. At age 36, Laurence S. Kuter (1905–1979) became the youngest general officer since William T. Sherman. He served as deputy commander of allied tactical air forces in North Africa during World War II and helped devise the American bombing strategy in Europe. Although his combat contributions were less notable than other commanders in the Eighth Air Force, few officers saw as many theaters of operation as he did or were as highly sought-after. After World War II, he led the Military Air Transport Service, Air University, Far East Air Forces, and served as commander-in-chief of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). Despite these accomplishments and others, however, Kuter remains widely underappreciated. In Architect of Air Power, Brian D. Laslie offers the first biography of this important but unsung pioneer whose influence can be found in every stage of the development of an independent US Air Force. From his early years at West Point to his days at the Air Corps Tactical School to his leadership role at NORAD, Kuter made his mark with quiet efficiency. He was an early advocate of strategic bombardment rather than pursuit or fighter aviation?fundamentally changing the way air power was used?and later helped implement the Berlin airlift in 1948. In what would become a significant moment in military history, he wrote Field Manual 100-20, which is considered the Air Force’s “declaration of independence” from the Army. Drawing on diaries, letters, and scrapbooks, Laslie offers a complete portrait of this influential soldier. Architect of Air Power illuminates Kuter’s pivotal contributions and offers new insights into critical military policy and decision-making during the Second World War and the Cold War. Praise for Architect of Air Power “Laslie expertly brings into focus perhaps the least known of the major Air Force personalities of World War II and the early Cold War. Kuter was the indispensable “behind-the-scenes” man in those years, and this book fills a similarly indispensable gap in our understanding of the people and ideas that propelled the nation’s air arm to independence and prominence.” —Thomas Alexander Hughes, author of Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II “Laslie’s outstanding work on Laurence Kuter is the first full and highly effective look at this exceptionally important airman. It gives the reader ample evidence of Kuter’s central role in making America the quintessential airpower nation during the course of the twentieth century. This will be the book on Kuter for many years to come.” —Robert S. Ehlers, Jr., author of The Mediterranean Air War: Airpower and Allied Victory in World War II

The architect of the successful air strategy which led to Allied victory Arthur Tedder, who was knighted and raised to the peerage for his contributions to the Allied victory in World War II, served in the British air force in World War I and played an important role in professionalizing and organizing British air forces between the two world wars. During World War II, he held a succession of increasingly vital air force posts. In addition to his achievements as Air Commander-in-Chief in the North African theater early in the war, Tedder’s most lasting contribution was as Deputy Supreme Commander under Dwight D. Eisenhower. He deserves much credit for keeping the Allied command functioning and harmonious. He was also the architect of the successful air strategy Eisenhower adopted for the Normandy invasion of 1944, which departed from both the British and American existing doctrine and models by concentrating on German rail systems rather than on either civilian or industrial targets.

Dr. John Andreas Olsen has written an insightful, compelling biography of retired U.S. Air Force colonel John A. Warden III, the brilliant but controversial air warfare theorist and architect of Operation Desert Storm s air campaign. Warden s radical ideas about air power s purposes and applications, promulgated at the expense of his own career, sparked the ongoing revolution in military affairs. Legendary in defense circles, Warden is also the author of "The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat" (republished by Brassey s, Inc. in 1989). Presenting both the positives and negatives of Warden s personality and impact in this objective portrait, Olsen offers a trenchant analysis of his revolutionary ideas and great accomplishments. "

Air-Conditioning in Modern American Architecture, 1890–1970, documents how architects made environmental technologies into resources that helped shape their spatial and formal aesthetic. In doing so, it sheds important new light on the ways in which mechanical engineering has been assimilated into the culture of architecture as one facet of its broader modernist project. Tracing the development and architectural integration of air-conditioning from its origins in the late nineteenth century to the advent of the environmental movement in the early 1970s, Joseph M. Siry shows how the incorporation of mechanical systems into modernism’s discourse of functionality profoundly shaped the work of some of the movement’s leading architects, such as Dankmar Adler, Louis Sullivan, Frank Lloyd Wright, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Gordon Bunshaft, and Louis Kahn. For them, the modernist ideal of functionality was incompletely realized if it did not wholly assimilate heating, cooling, ventilating, and artificial lighting. Bridging the history of technology and the history of architecture, Siry discusses air-conditioning’s technical and social history and provides case studies of buildings by the master architects who brought this technology into the conceptual and formal project of modernism. A monumental work by a renowned expert in American modernist architecture, this book asks us to see canonical modernist buildings through a mechanical engineering–oriented lens. It will be especially valuable to scholars and students of architecture, modernism, the history of technology, and American history.

The United States Air Force is the most technologically advanced service in the world. Stealth, precision, global range, and space systems are only a few of the hallmarks of the USAF technology. Airborne laser weapons, super-accurate sensors, and hypersonic aircraft are already in the early stages of development. Creations such as these are not the product of stagnant minds or idle hands.It was in 1944 that General of the Army Herny H. "Hap" Arnold established the Army Air Forces (AAF) Scientific Advisory Group (SAG) under the direction of Dr. Theodore von Karman. The SAG meticulously created the first science and technology forecast ever accomplished in military history. The study predicted many of the developments in aviation technology which, today, most Americans take for granted. Some of the more outstanding of these are suipersonic flight, precision weaponry, accurate radr, and the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).In Architects of American Air Supremacy, Dik Daso tells the story of the founding of the scientific and technical base of today's USAF. But this work is much more than simply a history of technology. The SAG was a culminating point reached only after many years of building interpersonal relationships, developing industrial bonds, and tapping the wisdom of America's most influential scientists. In large measure this book reflects the symbiotic nature of the military and the society which it serves. This book is an introduction to the very nature of the USAF - a service founded in aviation science and technology and built by great commanders, innovators, and dedicated men and women in the serivce of their nation.Ronald R. FoglemanGeneral, United States Air ForceChief of Staff

Aerial warfare has dominated western war-making for over 100 years, and despite regular announcements of its demise, it shows no sign of becoming obsolete. Frank Ledwidge offers a sweeping global history of air warfare, introducing the major battles, crises, and controversies where air power has taken centre stage.

Naval aviation historian William F. Trimble provides a clear and detailed portrait of the man who took on the challenge of forming an aeronautical bureau within the U.S. Navy in 1921 and then nurtured the early development of naval aviation. Describing Admiral William A. Moffett as one of the first high-ranking naval officers to appreciate the importance of the airplane and the effect it would have on the fleet, the author contends that the admiral's strong background as a surface officer gave him a credibility and trust with his superiors that others could not match. The author attributes Moffett's desire to keep aviation as part of the fleet, along with his diplomacy, tenacity, and political and military savvy, to the success of the infant air arm during its formative years. In striking contrast to the tactics of Army Gen. Billy Mitchell, Moffett's handling of the loyalty issue and other politically sensitive topics saved the Navy's air arm, according to Trimble. The book is equally candid about the admiral's shortcomings, including his heavy-handed support for airships, a technological dead end that squandered millions and led to Moffett's death in 1933 when he went down with the airship Akron during a storm.

This collection of essays reflects the proceedings of a 1991 conference on "The United States Air Force: Aerospace Challenges and Missions in the 1990s," sponsored by the USAF and Tufts University. The 20 contributors comment on the pivotal role of airpower in the war with Iraq and address issues and choices facing the USAF, such as the factors that are reshaping strategies and missions, the future role and structure of airpower as an element of US power projection, and the aerospace industry's views on what the Air Force of the future will set as its acquisition priorities and strategies. The authors agree that aerospace forces will be an essential and formidable tool in US security policies into the next century. The contributors include academics, high-level military leaders, government officials, journalists, and top executives from aerospace and defense contractors.

Airpower is not widely understood. Even though it has come to play an increasingly important role in both peace and war, the basic concepts that define and govern airpower remain obscure to many people, even to professional military officers. This fact is largely due to fundamental differences of opinion as to whether or not the aircraft has altered the strategies of war or merely its tactics. If the former, then one can see airpower as a revolutionary leap along the continuum of war; but if the latter, then airpower is simply another weapon that joins the arsenal along with the rifle, machine gun, tank, submarine, and radio. This book implicitly assumes that airpower has brought about a revolution in war. It has altered virtually all aspects of war: how it is fought, by whom, against whom, and with what weapons. Flowing from those factors have been changes in training, organization, administration, command and control, and doctrine. War has been fundamentally transformed by the advent of the airplane.