Some commentators claim that Anselm’s writings contain a second independent “modal ontological argument” for God’s existence. A. D. Smith contends that although there is a second a priori argument in Anselm, it is not the modal argument. This “other argument” bears a striking resemblance to one that Duns Scotus would later employ.

"Anselm of Canterbury gave the first modal "ontological" argument for God's existence. Yet, despite its distinct originality, philosophers have mostly avoided the question of what modal concepts the argument uses, and whether Anselm's metaphysics entitles him to use them. Here, Brian Leftow sets out Anselm's modal metaphysics. He argues that Anselm has an "absolute", "broadly logical", or "metaphysical" modal concept, and that his metaphysics provides acceptable truth makers for claims in this modality. He shows that his modal argument is committed (in effect) to the Brouwer system of modal logic, and defends the claim that Brouwer is part of the logic of "absolute" or "metaphysical" modality. He also defends Anselm's premise that God would exist with absolute necessity against all extant objections, providing new arguments in support of it and ultimately defending all but one premise of Anselm's best argument for God's existence"--

This book re-examines Anselm’s famous arguments for the existence of God in his Proslogion, and in his Reply. It demonstrates how he validly deduces from plausible premises that God so truly exists that He could not be thought not to exist. Most commentators, ancient and modern, wrongly located his argument in a passage which is not about God at all. It becomes evident that, consequently, much contemporary criticism is based on misreading and misunderstanding his text. It reconstructs his reasoning through three distinct but logically connected stages. It shows that, even if Anselm’s crucial premises are sceptically interpreted, his conclusions still follow. Properly understood, this argument is not vulnerable to the standard criticisms, including Gaunilo’s ‘Lost island’ counter-example.

Publisher Description

Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109 CE), in his work Proslogion, originated the “ontological argument” for God’s existence, famously arguing that “something than which nothing greater can be conceived,” which he identifies with God, must actually exist, for otherwise something greater could indeed be conceived. Some commentators have claimed that although Anselm may not have been conscious of the fact, the Proslogion as well as his Reply to Gaunilo contains passages that constitute a second independent proof: a “modal ontological argument” that concerns the supposed logical necessity of God’s existence. Other commentators disagree, countering that the alleged second argument does not stand on its own but presupposes the conclusion of the first. Anselm’s Other Argument stakes an original claim in this debate, and takes it further. There is a second a priori argument in Anselm (specifically in the Reply), A. D. Smith contends, but it is not the modal argument past scholars have identified. This second argument surfaces in a number of forms, though always turning on certain deep, interrelated metaphysical issues. It is this form of argument that in fact underlies several of the passages which have been misconstrued as statements of the modal argument. In a book that combines historical research with rigorous philosophical analysis, Smith discusses this argument in detail, finally defending a modification of it that is implicit in Anselm. This “other argument” bears a striking resemblance to one that Duns Scotus would later employ.

Anselm’s Proslogion has sparked controversy from the time it was written (c.1077) to the present day. Attempts to provide definitive accounts of its argument have led to a wide and contradictory variety of interpretations. In this book, Ian Logan goes back to basics, to the Latin text of the Proslogion with an original parallel English translation, before tracing the twists and turns of this controversy. Helping us to understand how the same argument came to be regarded as based on reason alone by some and on faith alone by others, as a logically sound demonstration by its supporters and as fatally flawed by its opponents, Logan considers what Anselm is setting out to do in the Proslogion, how his argument works, and whether it is successful.

This volume provides a broad interpretation of Anselm’s theological method through a study of his Monologion. The Monologion has been chosen specifically because of its rich and nuanced account of the search for the one God. Through a careful analysis of this text what becomes evident is that Anselm’s theological project is much broader than a single argument or a simple account of how divine justice and honor are appeased. What one encounters is a theology informed by the notion of the human desire for God and the honest search to come to know God in an intimate way. The Monologion, therefore, will present an entry point into Anselm’s theological project. The second half of the volume will examine the reception history of Anselm’s two most famous philosophical and theological contributions (i.e., the “ontological argument” and the “satisfaction theory”). Anselm is often misunderstood because his approach to theology is reduced to the “one argument” or a carefully construed calculus of human redemption—such readings of Anselm abound and often obscure the Benedictine context within which his thought developed—and so a careful reading of Anselm’s texts and the history of reception and interpretation will offer a counter narrative to the standard perception of one of the greatest thinkers of Christian history.

Can human beings be free and responsible if there is an all-powerful God? Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) offers viable answers to questions which have plagued religious people for at least two thousand years. Katherin Rogers examines Anselm's reconciliation of human free will and divine omnipotence in the context of current philosophical debates.